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Thesis Abstract 
Playing the Game: The Study of Knowledge Processes Across Organisational 
Boundaries in the Videogames Industry 
 
This thesis studies knowledge processes which span organisational boundaries, 
examining how knowledge is formed and shared between two companies with divergent 
interests, facing the challenges of innovation processes. Cross-boundary work provides 
access to diverse sources of knowledge, specialties and approaches, and this enhances 
the innovative performance of firms. However, managing knowledge and spanning 
diverse boundaries has proven to be difficult. While the epistemic and social challenges 
have been identified to trigger conflicts and misunderstandings across boundaries, the 
complexity, inter-dependency and uncertainty of innovation processes have been found 
to multiply these challenges. Informed by the practice-based perspective, this thesis 
examines how the challenges of integrating knowledge in such a context are addressed 
and resolved. 
 
Building upon this theoretical perspective, the thesis aims to enhance understandings of 
knowledge processes between the large bureaucratic organisations (publishers) and 
small/medium-sized companies (developers) in the videogames industry. Underpinned 
by a social constructionist and interpretivist methodology, a qualitative study of three 
publisher-developer relationships was conducted. With thirty six semi-structured 
interviews with senior directors, managers and team leaders, the thesis examined cross-
boundary practices and the conflicts experienced in this process. In order to achieve 
this, the study focused on the role that boundary objects, trust development and power 
structures played in facilitating knowledge processes. 
 
The thesis recognises the evolving and relational character of boundary objects, 
highlighting that a combination of static and dynamic boundary objects were effective 
in facilitating knowledge integration in the publisher-developer relationship. It also 
reveals that despite high levels of distrust between the parties involved, they managed to 
create and maintain a working relationship by resorting to opportunistic practices, such 
as knowledge hiding, deception and collusion. It is emphasised that understanding the 
power dynamics in the publisher-developer relationship is a pre-requisite to explaining 
 
3 
how knowledge is managed across organisational boundaries during the course of a 
project. Drawing upon a Foucauldian perspective, the thesis identifies the positive and 
enabling aspects of power dynamics in this relationship. It argues that when the parties 
have discrepancies, competition and high levels of distrust, power games positively 
influence cross-boundary practices, the use of boundary objects and knowledge 
processes, ultimately mobilising knowledge integration. 
 
The thesis makes four significant contributions to the knowledge management and 
cross-boundary work literature. First, it identifies an evolving role for boundary objects, 
showing how they develop during the course of a project. Second, it finds a relational 
and politicised dimension for boundary objects, highlighting the role of brokers to 
manipulate and mobilise the use and effectiveness of these objects. Third, the thesis 
extends the existing literature by revealing that despite high levels of distrust, parties 
can create a working relationship. The research shows that this is achieved through 
resorting to opportunistic behaviour, such as knowledge hiding, deception and 
collusion. As a result, this thesis adds a complementary level to Carlile's Integrated 
Framework, explaining that when there are high levels of differences, dependencies and 
novelty in the cross-boundary work, knowledge hiding, deception and collusion are the 
driving force to facilitate knowledge integration and maintain a functional relationship. 
The fourth contribution of this thesis is recognising the positive and productive aspects 
of power dynamics that enable and mobilise boundary objects and knowledge 
processes, ultimately bringing positive outcomes and creating a functional relationship 
between two companies with divergent interests.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Businesses collaborate with other companies on a project or a business activity to draw 
upon various skills, expertise and resources. There might be several reasons for creating 
a partnership, but whatever the intended goal, this can offer the companies opportunities 
to further their resources, deal with the fast pace of change in today's business 
environment, compete and survive. The ability to work and communicate effectively 
across organisations, teams or groups is viewed as an important driver of innovative 
performance. However, achieving an effective collaboration, generating and sharing 
knowledge across such boundaries have proven to be problematic and complicated. The 
challenges of work across groups or organisations vary dependent upon factors such as 
the complexity of the knowledge being shared, or the level of uncertainty involved in 
the collaboration. In addition to this, differences, such as the lack of shared values, 
perspectives, knowledge and social ties have been identified as creating 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations between individuals, teams or groups 
working together. 
 
Despite their differences and challenges, the companies should be able to generate and 
share knowledge across these boundaries in order to create an effective collaboration 
and reap the maximum benefit from their partnerships. In line with this objective, many 
studies have examined the work between individuals, teams and groups to understand 
how knowledge processes and collaboration can be facilitated. As a result, they have 
identified different methods and approaches that might impact such processes, resolving 
differences and creating a mutual understanding between collaborators. These methods 
and mechanisms include (1) developing and utilising boundary objects (2) optimising 
social relationships and interactions through negotiations and power relations and (3) 
developing interpersonal trust between collaborators. 
 
Although a wide range of scholarly work has addressed the key factors facilitating 
knowledge integration and collaboration, there are still distinct areas that require further 
study. This thesis addresses these limitations and makes four significant contributions to 
the literature. The thesis contributes to boundary object literature by identifying 
different roles for them and explaining how these objects evolve during the course of a 
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project or collaboration. The thesis also reveals that power and politics are an 
unavoidable part of work across boundaries, and it contributes to the existing 
knowledge by describing how power relations mobilise knowledge processes. While the 
literature highlights that the development of trust is crucial in facilitating knowledge, 
this thesis reveals that despite high levels of distrust the collaborators could create a 
functional relationship. However this was achieved by utilising opportunistic behaviour, 
such as knowledge hiding, deception and collusion. 
 
1.1. Research Problem 
This research is focused centrally on the publisher-developer relationship in the 
videogames industry. Such collaboration is an intrinsic element in the development of 
videogames. My knowledge of this relationship in the first instance comes from my 
marriage to a senior actor within this sector, who brings heated discussions about the 
challenges of creating and developing videogames to my daily and social life. Through 
my research I wanted to make sense of this problem. 
 
Developing videogames typically requires bringing together diverse bodies of 
distinctive knowledge and technology, as well as large sums of investment, 
management and business acumen. Publishers are usually large and bureaucratic 
organisations that fund, publish and distribute videogames that have been developed 
either internally or by an independent game developer. Developers are typically small 
and medium-sized companies that can offer highly creative and innovative ideas in a 
less formal and often unstructured business set-up; hence their attractiveness to the 
publishers. Due to lack of access to finance, knowledge of the international market and 
the cutting edge technology, developers are often highly dependent on these publishers. 
However, these developers are also an invaluable source of creativity and innovation for 
these publishers. Thus, the development of videogames involves complex inter-
dependencies between publishers and developers. These inter-dependencies can be the 
main reasons why developers and publishers form a business partnership and that is 
why this relationship is considered the dominant business model in this sector. 
 
While this relationship is a critical driver for industry performance and maintaining 
competitive advantage, it has been the focal point for debate and scrutiny in the past few 
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decades. The videogames industry is replete with anecdotes that recount the challenges 
of this relationship, describing it as intriguing and problematic. This relationship 
sometimes allows both parties to be actively involved in the development process, 
forming the game concepts, sharing knowledge and producing the game together. In 
other words, even if the developer is responsible for creating the game, the publisher 
also can be actively involved in the production, by offering expert knowledge in art, 
programming, audio visual engineering, design, etc. In addition to this, the publisher 
also brings to this joint venture large financial investments, technology, knowledge of 
international markets and knowledge of distribution channels. Although the two 
companies work together to create a product, within the industry they have been 
described as totally different in nature and skills, pursuing disparate objectives and 
sometimes acting as competitors. The collaboration between these two companies 
seems to benefit them both, providing them with multiple resources, including 
knowledge, skills and finance. However, managing the work between these two 
companies has proven to be problematic and cause conflict (Fahey, 2015; Heaton, 2012) 
and I embarked on this research to make sense of this empirical problem. 
 
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives 
This study aims to analyse the inter-organisational knowledge processes involving small 
and medium-sized entrepreneurial developers and large bureaucratic publishers. To do 
this I focus on the three key factors that have been identified in the existing literature 
influencing these processes: boundary objects, power relations and development of 
trust.  
 
Since knowledge integration is an integral part of the publisher-developer relationship, I 
believe studying the knowledge processes and developing an understanding of how 
knowledge is formed and shared in this setting can contribute both to theory and 
practice, explaining cross-boundary work where there are high levels of differences, 
dependencies and novelty between the partners. My research addresses the following 
general questions: 
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RQ1: How do boundary objects influence knowledge processes across the        
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ2:  How do power relations influence knowledge processes across the publisher-
developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ3: How does developing trust influence knowledge processes across the          
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
 
1.3. Thesis Overview 
The thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the cross-boundary work 
literature and knowledge management literature. This review firstly presents the 
challenges of working across boundaries and discusses how these challenges intensify 
in complex innovation processes. Then, the review examines three key factors that seem 
to influence knowledge processes in cross-boundary work: boundary objects as 
coordinating mechanisms, power relations and trust. This chapter also identifies three 
areas in the literature that are still limited and require further research. The literature 
review culminates in the three research questions outlined above that form the basis of 
the research. Chapter three provides an overview of the videogames industry, 
introducing different actors, platforms, products and consumers. In the second section 
of chapter three, I focus on the videogame development process and how the publisher-
developer collaboration is presented within the industry. 
 
In chapter four, I first discuss the theoretical perspectives underpinning my 
methodology and then I elaborate on my research design and the techniques I used to 
generate my data. I then describe my data analysis approach, with a detailed account of 
how I managed, coded and interpreted my data. This is followed by a section that 
highlights my reflexive approach in the research process. I conclude this chapter with a 
short summary of how my methodological approach and methods helped me conduct a 
credible, plausible and transferable piece of research. 
 
In chapters five, six and seven I present the empirical findings of my study, with each 
research question being addressed in a separate chapter. Chapter five presents the data 
on the role boundary objects play in facilitating the knowledge processes in the 
publisher-developer relationship. Chapter six looks at the tension between the developer 
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and publisher, explaining how power dynamics influence knowledge processes in this 
relationship. Chapter seven examines the role of trust in the relationship, making sense 
of the trust-knowledge dynamic in this setting. Chapter eight discusses the findings of 
the research in three distinct sections, each addressing one of my research questions. 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis with an overview of the whole research. This is 
followed by a review of the central theoretical and empirical contributions made, 
examining the limitations of the study and implications for practice, and finally, 
considering suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter Two: How to Manage Knowledge Across Boundaries 
 
This chapter reviews the knowledge management literature in order to address the 
research objectives presented in the introduction and develop insights into how 
knowledge is integrated across organisational boundaries. First, the chapter focuses on 
cross-boundary work, providing a definition of this concept and considering the 
challenges that different groups face in attempting to create a working relationship and 
integrate knowledge. The next section of the chapter discusses the methods and 
strategies that are utilised to manage knowledge and collaboration between diverse 
groups. The review will focus on three key factors that have been highlighted in the 
literature: boundary objects; conflict resolution through negotiations and power 
relations; and development of trust. Each of these factors will be explained and the 
discussions pertaining to each will illuminate areas that are still unaddressed and require 
further research. In the final section of chapter three, the main research questions are 
outlined which aim to help address the limitations found in the literature. 
 
2.1. Cross-Boundary Work and Its Significance  
Cross-boundary work has become a noteworthy feature of modern organisations 
(Bechky, 2006; Clegg et al., 2002; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nicolini et al., 2012). 
Thus an increasing number of theorists highlight how the ability to work and 
communicate effectively across organisational, disciplinary, functional, departmental or 
divisional boundaries is an important driver of innovative performance and a source of 
competitive advantage for firms (Bruns, 2013; Clegg et al., 2002; Tortoriello & 
Krackhart, 2010), business units (Hansen, 1999; Tsai, 2001), teams (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Bechky, 2006; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001), 
and individuals (Burt, 2004; Perry-Smith, 2006). According to Kale and Singh (2009), 
“by the turn of this century many of the world’s largest companies had over 20% of 
their assets, and over 30% of their annual research expenditures, tied up in such 
relationships” (p.45). 
 
In the study of organisations, boundaries are the temporary and dynamic distinctions 
marking the difference between individuals/teams/groups (Bowker & Star, 1999; 
Carlile, 2002; Kerosuo, 2006; Mork et al., 2012; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Scott 
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(2013) describes an organisational boundary as enclosing a community that is involved 
in “a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and 
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (p.56). Cross-boundary 
work refers to different individuals/teams/groups collaborating either within an 
organisation (Currie et al., 2008; McGivern & Dopson, 2010), or between organisations 
(Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Newell et al., 2007). 
 
Whether within or between organisations, work across boundaries always introduces 
new problems and tasks to the members involved, representing discontinuities in 
practice. These discontinuities are the interruptions in the shared routines of a 
community. In other words, working across boundaries potentially challenges 
established meanings and practices. Therefore, in order to create working relationships 
across such boundaries, individuals/teams/groups should continuously strive to resolve 
their differences and develop a common understanding. 
 
The literature suggests a wide range of inter-organisational relationships can all be 
considered as cross-boundary work. In all of these inter-organisational relationships, 
different individuals, teams or groups who possess different knowledge, or might have 
different identities, come together and collaborate. Inter-organisational relationships 
have been examined under different names, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
networks, etc., each of which has attracted a great amount of scholarly attention and 
research (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). Figure 1 provides a helpful categorisation of 
inter-organisational relationships, presenting the distinctions between each of these 
labels.  
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Figure 1: Scope of Inter-Organisational Relationships (Source: Kale & Singh, 2009; p.47) 
 
 
The focus of this research will be on the relationships shaded as grey in the figure: 
contractual arrangements to access mutually complementary assets or skills, hence 
excluding the literature on joint venture, R&D and buyer-seller relationships. It should 
be noted that this review will not examine the academic literature on these forms of 
collaboration, and will instead specifically focus on “cross-boundary work” and 
“knowledge management” literature, in order to develop a better understanding of how 
knowledge is integrated across organisational boundaries. 
 
Cross-boundary collaboration has the potential to enhance a firm’s innovative 
performance because people in these contexts are exposed to diverse sources of 
knowledge, specialties, and approaches (Allen et al., 1979; Bartol & Srivastava, 2002; 
Carlile, 2002; Powell et al., 1996; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Wang & Noe, 2010). 
This, as a result, increases their access to resources, as well as their ability to address 
complex tasks and resolve problems (Bruns, 2013; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). 
However, despite their abundant benefits, spanning boundaries and managing 
knowledge processes in these settings has proven to be difficult (Argote, 1999; Bruns, 
2013; Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dougherty & Tolboom, 2008; Levina & Vaast, 2008; 
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Tortoriello & Krackhart, 2010; Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). The challenges of 
cross-boundary work and knowledge processes in these settings will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
2.1.1. The Challenges of Cross-Boundary Knowledge Processes 
The literature offers several explanations for the challenges of cross-boundary 
knowledge integration. Table 1 provides a brief overview:  
 
Table 1. Challenges of Knowledge Integration Across Boundaries 
 
Epistemic Challenges 
 
Epistemic differences (values, perceptions, 
thought worlds) 
 
 
Fragmented knowledge across boundaries; 
Lack of common, shared knowledge 
 
 
The nature of knowledge (embeddedness; 
tacitness; stickiness) 
 
Social Challenges 
 
No/weak sense of shared identity 
 
No/weak social ties 
 
As Table 1 suggests, epistemic challenges cause significant problems in cross-boundary 
knowledge processes. Diverse expert groups seem to have different perceptions (Boland 
& Tenkasi, 1995), values (Brown & Duguid, 2001) and thought worlds (Dougherty, 
1992) or they might come from different backgrounds (Newell & Swan, 2000). These 
epistemological differences stem from people’s specific cultural and language 
characteristics (Pauleen & Yoong, 2001; Peltokorpi, 2006) that seem to hamper 
interactions and knowledge processes between people from different communities 
(Bechky, 2003; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Such epistemological differences have 
been detected between diverse occupational communities (Bechky, 2003), sub-units 
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working together in a single organisation (Hansen, 1999) and inter-organisational 
collaborations (Pauleen & Yoong, 2001), as well as multi-disciplinary teams working 
together (Newell & Swan, 2000). In all these instances, the differences in assumptions, 
values and world-views impede diverse groups developing a mutual understanding of 
each other and ultimately obstruct effective collaboration. 
 
Groups working across organisational boundaries represent different knowledge 
communities; knowledge across these expert groups has been described as 
“fragmented” and “specialized” and they have been reported to have a limited amount 
of common, shared knowledge, which can create misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations (Cramton, 2001; Cronin & Weingart, 2007). One of the main 
challenges of managing cross-boundary collaboration is combining and integrating this 
fragmented knowledge (Blacker et al., 2000; Brown & Duguid, 1999; Hislop, 2013). 
Currie et al. (2008) highlight the problems of managing and integrating knowledge 
across boundaries in an innovative programme to improve patient safety in the NHS. In 
this study, they underline that the medical practitioners and the management had 
different understandings of the concept of risk and safety. The localised and fragmented 
knowledge between these experts, as well as a predominant “us and them” culture, were 
found to be the fundamental reasons that led to the failure of the programme.   
 
The nature of knowledge itself also has been found to create obstacles to effective 
collaboration across boundaries (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Carlile 2002, 2004). Nonaka et 
al. (2006) highlight the tacit dimension of knowledge as a challenge for effective 
collaboration, explaining that knowledge is “tied to the senses, movement skills, 
physical experiences, intuition, or implicit rules of thumb”. Using a practice-based 
perspective (see further details on the next page), Carlile (2002, 2004) describes 
knowledge as being “localized” and developed around certain practices. In his study of 
cross-functional teams, he observes that communities develop commitment towards 
their knowledge and practices; as a result, they become reluctant to adapt and change to 
other communities. He describes this as "stickiness" of knowledge and its 
“embeddedness” in practice and human activity. Similarly, Hislop (2013) highlights that 
“all knowledge work, whether using it, sharing it, developing it or creating it, will 
involve an element of activity”, as a result, knowledge cannot be easily “codified and 
separated from people” or practice (Hislop, 2013, p.34-5). 
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In addition to epistemic challenges, groups working across organisational boundaries 
face social challenges in order to manage knowledge. In these contexts, people who are 
not necessarily members of the same teams, groups or communities have to work 
together, where a lack of strong social relation (Hansen 1999) between these groups, or 
the existence of a weak sense of identity among them (Hislop, 2013) may result in 
conflicts that can impede effective knowledge integration. The next section elaborates 
on both practice-based and objectivist theories of knowledge that hold distinctive views 
on the nature of knowledge in organisations, and help us enhance our understanding of 
the challenges involved in integrating knowledge across organisational boundaries. 
 
2.1.2. The Practice-Based and Objectivist Perspectives on Knowledge 
Cross-boundary work has been addressed by two main perspectives: practice-based and 
objectivist. However, scholars have used various labels in order to explain or refer to 
these epistemologies in the literature. Table 2 on the next page provides a summary of 
the terms used to describe contrasting practice-based and objectivist perspectives.  
 
The objectivist perspective characterises knowledge as an entity that can be possessed, 
developed and transferred to a different setting without a loss of meaning or a change to 
its nature (Osterlund & Carlile, 2005; Yanow, 2004). This epistemology focuses on 
explicit knowledge that can take different forms, such as documents, plans, diagrams, 
tools or other physical and tangible objects. Stemming from the positivistic perspective 
that sees the social world as something quantifiable and measurable, the objectivist 
perspective also views knowledge as an objective entity that has an independent 
existence from the people who possess it and can be studied scientifically and separately 
from the individuals. This conceptualisation of knowledge profoundly impacts how 
knowledge integration is perceived. Building on the assumptions explained above, 
knowledge sharing is represented as a sender and receiver practice, where the sender 
simply codifies and transfers explicit knowledge to a recipient (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). Therefore, knowledge management becomes a communication and information-
processing practice in which it is assumed that both tacit and explicit knowledge can be 
collected, codified and transferred through formal and structured systems and processes.  
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Author Objectivist Perspective Practice-
based 
Perspective 
Schultze & Stabell 
(2004) 
Epistemology of dualism Epistemology 
of duality 
Werr & Stjernberg 
(2003) 
Knowledge as theory Knowledge as 
practice 
Empson (2001) Knowledge as an asset Knowledge as 
a process 
Cook & Brown 
(1999) 
Epistemology of 
possession 
Epistemology 
of practice 
McAdam & 
McCreedy (2000) 
Knowledge as truth Knowledge as 
socially 
constructed 
Scarbrough (1998) ‘Content’ theory of 
knowledge 
‘Relational’ 
view of 
knowledge 
Table 2. Competing Epistemologies (Source: Hislop, 2013, p.16) 
 
In contrast to the objectivist perspective, the practice-based perspective highlights that 
knowledge is “an on-going social phenomenon, constituted and reconstituted in 
everyday practice” (Orlikowski, 2002, p.252). Authors studying knowledge from the 
practice perspective oppose the view of knowledge as an objective entity, instead they 
perceive knowledge as inseparable from practice and people (Corradi et al., 2010; 
Gherardi, 2006; Nicolini, 2011). To them, knowledge becomes synonymous with 
practice, which involves the activation and use of a variety of cognitive, physical and 
relational faculties such as perception, imagination, routine behaviour, social 
interaction, etc. This view emphasises that knowledge is dynamically constructed in the 
course of human interaction (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005). 
Similarly, Blackler (1995, p.1032) confirms: “knowledge is multi-faceted and complex, 
being both situated and abstract, implicit and explicit, distributed and individual, 
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physical and mental, developing and static, verbal and encoded” (see Hislop, 2013, 
p.34). 
 
Within the practice-based perspective, knowledge is not only socially constructed and 
embedded in human activity, but has also been described as culturally embedded, 
influenced by people’s social and cultural values and assumptions (Weir & Hutchins, 
2005). The last main feature attributed to knowledge from a practice-based perspective 
is its contestable dimension, which acknowledges that there might be different 
understandings and interpretations of knowledge (Yanow, 2004). This contradicts the 
objective aspect of knowledge that was the central plank of objectivist perspective. In 
other words, the practice-based perspective recognises that in cross-boundary work, 
conflicts and misunderstandings might arise; hence, providing some implications for the 
way knowledge processes should be managed in these contexts (Nicolini, 2007, 2011).  
 
Knowledge sharing between communities is a significant theme in practice-based 
studies where practice and knowledge are intrinsically interrelated. Those adopting a 
practice-based perspective dispute the sender-receiver model of knowledge sharing that 
is put forward by objectivist theorists. Instead, the embeddedness, stickiness and tacit 
dimension of knowledge highlighted in the practice-based perspective suggests that 
knowledge sharing requires interpersonal interactions, mutual inferring and constructing 
of meaning, which are far from simple communication and information-processing 
practices. The tacitness and embeddedness of knowledge complicates the process of 
knowledge sharing when common experiences and processes are limited (Tucker et al., 
2007; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002).  
 
In the videogame development process, the knowledge that is produced is highly tacit. 
Knowledge is iteratively developed into a vision through the extensive interaction and 
mutual inferring of various disciplines/teams/individuals. Thus, the practice-based 
perspective on knowledge is particularly relevant to the innovative context of 
videogame development. I adopt this perspective to look at knowledge processes and 
explain how knowledge is integrated in this setting that incorporates various knowledge 
domains in the product development process.  
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2.1.3. Cross-Boundary Knowledge Integration During Innovation 
Processes 
Innovation has been defined as “a temporally and episodically structured, highly 
iterative design and decision process involving the creation, diffusion, blending and 
implementation of new ideas and knowledge at different stages” (Van de Ven, 1999, 
p.23, see Scarbrough et al., 2015,). Empirical evidence confirms that organisations need 
to bring together a diverse collection of specialised knowledge to spur innovation and 
increase their competitive advantage (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Lam, 1997; 
Dougherty, 1992; Hargadon, 2002; Slappendel, 1996; Wolfe, 1994). Due to the 
increasing complexity of innovation processes, organisations rarely, if ever,  possess all 
the knowledge and expertise required for innovation. Therefore they need to draw upon 
multiple areas of expertise. Consequently, individuals/teams/groups with different 
knowledge domains have to interact and integrate together (Bruns, 2013; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Jones et al., 2001; Lam, 1997; Perkmann & Walsh, 2007; Powell, 
1998; Tortoriello & Krackhart, 2010; Swan et al., 1999, 2007). However, coordinating 
and integrating the knowledge of heterogeneous groups is often challenging for 
companies (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Bruns, 2013; Carlile, 2002, 2004; DeSanctis & 
Jackson, 1994; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Kraut & Streeter, 1995; Leonardi, 2011; 
Scarbrough, et al. 2015; Tushman, 1977).  
 
In the previous section I argued that a lack of common knowledge and practice, 
divergent perceptions, values and no/weak sense of shared identity between 
collaborators can create tensions in collaborating across boundaries. In addition, diverse 
groups have to deal with the challenges that innovation processes create, such as the 
challenges of continuously facing novel tasks and novel conditions. This section will 
concentrate on the challenges that organisations might experience in managing their 
innovation processes across boundaries. As shown in Table 3, the literature outlines 
three main features of complexity, inter-dependency and uncertainty for a highly 
innovative and creative setting that will be explained below (Bruns, 2013; Carlile & 
Rebentisch, 2003; Majchrzak et al., 2012; Mork et al., 2012; Newell et al., 2008; 
Tschang, 2007; Zackariasson, et al., 2006). However, it should be noted that the focus 
here is on the knowledge processes and the challenges innovating organisations face to 
integrate knowledge across diverse expert groups. 
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Table 3. Challenges of Cross-Boundary Knowledge Integration During       
Innovation Processes 
1. Complexity 
2. Interdependency 
2. Uncertainty/Unpredictability 
 
1. Complexity  
Innovation processes are defined as complex because individuals/teams/groups have to 
constantly deal with new task demands and diverse knowledge domains, and at the 
same time attempt to create mutual understanding despite these differences and 
challenges (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Dougherty & Tolboom, 2008; Majchrzak et al., 
2012; Skilton & Dooley, 2010; Tschang & Szczypula, 2006). The complexity of 
innovation processes increases depending on the level and scope of the innovation 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001; Dougherty, 2001; Edmondson & Nembhard, 2009; Hackman, 
2002; Majchrzak et al., 2012; Newell et al., 2008; Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005; 
Spitz-Oener, 2006). Consequently the increasing level of innovation creates tensions 
and challenges between collaborators (Alvesson, 1993; Becker & Murphy, 1992; Bruns, 
2013; Newell et al., 2008; Spitz-Oener, 2006). The complexity of innovation processes 
is in line with the earlier discussion in this chapter that outlined the differences between 
diverse expert groups creating difficulties for collaboration (Dougherty, 1992; Leonardi, 
2011; Van de Ven, 1986). Carlile (2002, 2004) particularly highlights the differences 
between actors as impeding knowledge integration and collaboration. Due to the 
similarities between the definition of complexity in innovation processes and Carlile's 
description of differences and the problems they create, these two terms can be used 
interchangeably. Carlile’s Integrated Framework (see Figure 2) and his arguments will 
be delineated in detail, further in this chapter on pages 45–47. 
 
2. Interdependency 
Cross-boundary work during innovation processes is challenging due to inter-related 
tasks and inter-dependencies between collaborators. Adopting a practice-based 
perspective, Hansen (1999) refers to the interdependence as impeding collaboration and 
explains that this inter-dependency becomes increasingly challenging when the partners 
 
25 
are exchanging or forming tacit knowledge. This is due to the embeddedness and 
stickiness of knowledge. Carlile (2002, 2004) confirms this discussion by showing that 
the dependency between collaborators is a barrier to innovation. He further underlines 
that the higher the level of dependence in cross-boundary collaborations, the more 
complicated the process of knowledge integration becomes. This is because actors have 
to continuously face interrelated and new task demands in an innovation process. The 
scholars argue that inter-dependencies force the collaborators to re-evaluate their 
assumptions and this leads to challenges and resistance (Dougherty & Tolboom, 2008, 
Majchrzak et al., 2012; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). Consequently, they need to utilise 
distinct problem-solving methods to diagnose and address the difficulties, while 
exchanging their knowledge with the other actors.  
 
3. Uncertainty and Unpredictability  
Innovation processes have historically been conceptualised as linear, consisting of a 
predetermined structure that is progressing from one stage to another. However scholars 
have increasingly disputed this and instead more recently have defined innovation as 
dynamic or iterative (Van de Ven, 1999). An iterative development process is an 
ongoing process in which problems are recurrently reassessed and refined (Adler, 2005; 
Kellogg et al., 2006). In such contexts established and known boundaries can be 
challenged and destabilised because innovation forces them to deal with diverse 
specialised knowledge, new tasks and new conditions (Mork et al., 2012). The existing 
knowledge of diverse expert groups may thus be continuously challenged. This is 
because during such processes they have to constantly reconsider their knowledge in 
order to resolve the emergent problems and create mutual understanding between 
different functions continuously (Dougherty, 2001; Majchrzak et al., 2012; Skilton & 
Dooley, 2010; Tsoukas, 2009). Predicting emergent problems becomes extremely 
difficult for the organisations that have to manage such complex and iterative projects, 
thus they have to deal with high levels of uncertainties (Tschang, 2007; Zackariasson, et 
al., 2006). Carlile (2002, 2004) recognises the challenges of uncertainty and 
unpredictability in cross-boundary work and refers to them as novelty. He explains that 
the actors have to face the challenges of dealing with new task demands that are not 
predicted and planned earlier in the production. Hence, this novelty introduces new and 
unexpected problems that the actors have to constantly resolve. 
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The question arising here is how organisations overcome the boundaries across diverse 
groups and simultaneously address the challenges of complexity, inter-dependency and 
uncertainty in an innovation process. The next section reviews the factors that have 
been found to be effective in managing knowledge and collaboration across boundaries. 
It presents the theories and empirical research carried out mainly in the knowledge 
management literature to understand how organisations can create a working 
relationship between diverse expert groups in face of the challenges of a novel setting.  
 
2.2. Key Factors in Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries  
Studies of cross-boundary knowledge processes show that organisations use special 
approaches and methods to combine and coordinate diverse bodies of specialist 
knowledge in order to create working relationships. This involves addressing the 
challenges and improving the mutual understanding between the people working 
together. Hislop (2013) suggests creating a high degree of common knowledge, 
overlapping values and shared sense of identity as the three main factors that facilitate 
knowledge processes within communities of practice. In order to achieve this, the 
literature explains that certain rules and methods have to be implemented. For instance, 
Faraj and Xiao (2006) propose coordination practices such as dialogue, negotiation and 
joint sense-making, along with protocols and community structures to promote 
knowledge sharing and to navigate interfaces between diversely specialised groups in a 
medical trauma centre. Negotiating and developing collaborative relationships has also 
been found to be important for innovation processes (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005; Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1994). 
 
The empirical literature presents different methods and approaches to resolve 
differences and create a mutual understanding between diverse groups. Other 
mechanisms recognised in the literature that support cross-boundary work and facilitate 
knowledge integration are as follows: developing social relationships and interactions 
(Conway, 1995; Hislop, 2009); utilising brokers/translators (Wenger, 1998); 
implementing boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and developing trust (Jonsson 
& Kalling, 2007; Newell & Swan, 2000). I will focus on three key factors that seem to 
be effective in managing knowledge and work across boundaries: boundary objects as 
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coordination mechanisms; negotiation and power relations; development of trust (Table 
4).   
 
Table 4. Key Success Factors in Managing Cross-Boundary Work 
1. Use of Coordination Mechanisms: Conventional Forms/Standards; Boundary 
Objects 
2. Extensive Dialogue & Power Relations 
3. Development of Trust 
  Table 4. Adapted from Kale & Singh (2009) 
 
2.2.1. Boundary Objects as Coordination Mechanisms 
Coordination is regarded as a central practice in managing cross-boundary knowledge 
processes, being defined as a “collective set of inter-dependent tasks” (Okhuysen & 
Bechky, 2009) or “an ensemble of different types of practices that drive the process of 
cross-domain collaboration” (Bruns, 2013). A small stream of research suggests that 
conventional forms and structures, such as protocols, schedules, and routines, help 
coordinate between different expert groups and routinise innovation (Adler, 2005; 
Adler, 1999; Alvesson & Karreman, 2004; Cardinal, 2001; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; 
Davila, 2000; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Griffin & Hauser, 1992; Nixon, 1998; Wheelwright 
& Clark, 1992). For instance, Dyer and Singh (1998) recommend standardising and 
implementing structures and routines in order to enable diverse groups to share critical 
task-related information. Bruns (2013) in her study of scientific cross-domain 
collaborations also highlights that organisations use shared practices to coordinate 
innovation activities between relevant people. 
 
However, Faraj and Xiao (2006) explain that coordination in novel settings involves 
“the integration of organisational work under conditions of task interdependence and 
uncertainty” (Faraj & Xiao, 2006, p.1156). Therefore, coordination in innovating 
organisations becomes an on-going process that not only manages the interdependence 
of diverse groups and recognises their contribution, but also addresses emergent and 
potentially unprecedented situations. In these contexts, traditional norms and standards 
have been found to be inadequate to address emergent action (Bruns, 2013; Burns & 
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Stalker, 1961; Hall, 2001; Merchant, 1998; Mintzberg, 1979; Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). Instead a number of studies underline the role of boundary objects in 
coordinating work across boundaries; the significance of boundary objects, their role 
and impact on cross-boundary knowledge processes will be elaborated in the next 
section. 
 
The Definition of Boundary Objects 
One of the most common coordination mechanisms to facilitate cross-boundary 
knowledge processes is the use of boundary objects (Brown & Duguid, 1998; Carlile 
2002, 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Kale & Singh, 2009; Levina, 2005; Sapsed & 
Salter, 2004; Star & Griesemer, 1989; Swan et al., 2007). In their widely cited 
publication in 1989, Star and Griesemer introduce the concept of "boundary objects" as 
objects that can translate divergent viewpoints between heterogeneous groups/people by 
creating a common point of reference through which disparate functions can resolve 
their differences, while maintaining their autonomy. In their study of the Museum of 
Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California, Star & Griesemer (1989) emphasise 
the importance of boundary objects in facilitating the management of a museum that 
incorporates the participation of distinctive and diverse groups, such as amateur 
collectors, professional scientists, sponsors, administrators and government officials. 
Each of these groups had different visions and specific interests, stemming from the 
social worlds they belonged to. However the manager of the museum used boundary 
objects to create a meeting point uniting people’s disparate visions, to satisfy the 
interests of each actor and, at the same time, to pursue the scientific goals of the 
museum. These boundary objects will be presented in this section in four categories that 
will be discussed very briefly below. These original types of boundary objects will 
provide a basis for a better understanding and further development of the concept:  
 
(1) Repositories refer to a "pile of objects which are indexed in a standardised fashion" 
(Star & Griesemer 1989, p.410). Repositories provide a shared point of reference for 
different disciplines to store information jointly in a systematic way, from which the 
data collected and organised can be retrieved by different groups when necessary. 
Repositories are just for the collection of data. By adding their data to a repository, each 
discipline can easily make their data accessible to the other disciplines, thus facilitating 
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the data transfer between all disciplines involved. Repositories are useful for the data 
that can be easily coded. The library of specimens in the case of the museum discussed 
above is an example of a repository. This library was an important repository of 
different specimens, which served the interests of all participants in the museum. This 
was because different experts could save data in the repository and also retrieve data 
from it without a need to negotiate their differences. 
 
(2) Ideal type is a boundary object, "such as a diagram, atlas or other description which 
in fact does not accurately describe the details of any one locality or thing. It is 
abstracted from all domains, and may be fairly vague. However, it is adaptable to a 
local site precisely because it is fairly vague" (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.410). This 
type of boundary object can be jointly used by different disciplines and because they do 
not present/explain the specific details of each group, they can be used or adapted for 
the specific needs of each discipline. A prototype or an assembly drawing that contains 
design sketches, design specifications or assembly processes in a manufacturing firm 
are examples of ideal types (Carlile, 2004; Schrage, 1999; Wheelwright & Clark, 1995). 
These boundary objects can both provide means of communications between groups by 
being flexible and adaptable for the use of one discipline, and still being 
comprehensible and adaptable for the use of the other disciplines. In the case of the 
museum discussed above by Star and Griesemer (1989), species exemplify the ideal 
type due to their applicability to both professional scientists’ and amateur collectors’ 
needs, containing theoretical and concrete data. 
 
(3) Coincident boundaries refer to “the common objects which have the same 
boundaries but different internal contents” (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.410), such as 
Gantt charts, process maps and workflow matrices. These objects create a meeting point 
between different disciplines and specialties. The same object has different internal 
contents in different disciplines, such as the map of California that created a shared 
point of reference between the professional scientists, amateur collectors, patrons, 
university administrators and government officials, while containing specific details that 
could be used by them all separately. Carlile (2002) uses the term "maps of boundaries" 
to explain this form of boundary object and believes that maps help negotiations about 
“resources, deliverables and deadlines”.  
 
 
30 
(4) Standardised forms are "objects which can be transported over a long distance and 
convey unchanging information" (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.411). This type of 
boundary object is used as a common format for problem solving across a number of 
groups/people that are distributed at different sites. These forms are crucial for 
categorising the differences between teams, thus facilitating collaboration between 
dispersed groups of people. Structured documents, such as forms and indexes, can be a 
good example of this type of boundary object. Carlile (2004) explains that different 
engineering teams, including, engine engineers, design engineers and manufacturing 
engineers in an automobile manufacturing firm used standard engineering forms in 
order to report their findings to each other. Star and Griesemer (1989) add that the 
application of standardised forms deletes the uncertainties and misunderstandings 
between different teams. 
 
Further to Star and Griesemer's (1989) introduction of the concept of boundary objects, 
scholarly work defines boundary objects as either physical/concrete or conceptual/ 
abstract. Physical/concrete objects refer to “tangible definitions” (Bechky, 2003a, 
p.326), such as material forms and instruments (Scarbrough et al., 2015), technology 
(Gal et al., 2008), texts (Oswick & Robertson, 2009), project contracts (Koskinen & 
Mäkinen, 2009) and project management methodologies (Barrett & Oborn, 2010). 
Conceptual/abstract objects signify vocabulary-based, metaphoric entities or 
processes, including non-verbal expressions, figurative language, symbolism, visionary 
objects and narratives (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Briers & Chua, 2001; Huang & Huang, 
2011; Koskinen, 2005; Nandhakumar et al., 2013; Schön, 1993; Swan et al., 2007; 
Tsoukas, 2009). These objects seem to be used in conversational interactions to 
facilitate knowledge sharing both within and between organisations (Bechky, 2003a,b; 
Briers & Chua, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Following Star 
& Griesmer's (1989) introduction of boundary objects, scholars have used various 
definitions to refer to this concept. Below there is a selection of these (see Table 5). 
 
The definitions presented in Table 5 highlight two key dimensions of boundary objects 
that are important for our discussions and help us distinguish between different types of 
boundary objects, as some boundary objects might reflect one dimension more strongly 
than the other: 
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(1) Interpretive flexibility refers to the ability of boundary objects to be adapted to fit 
different functions. Star and Griesemer (1989) highlight this dimension of boundary 
objects by stating that boundary objects are “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs 
and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a 
common identity across sites” (p.393). In other words, these objects are “loosely 
structured” and flexible, such as project roadmaps (project plans), reflecting joint targets 
and deadlines while at the same time presenting more specific details of each function. 
Drawings can also represent this interpretive flexibility because they are loosely 
structured, developed and used by different teams to develop a better understanding of 
each other’s knowledge, concerns and interests. This fluidity of boundary objects means 
that they can be subject to numerous interpretations, depending on the knowledge 
domain that is being used to make sense of it (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Swan et al., 
2007; Nicolini et al., 2012; Barrett & Oborn, 2010). The interpretive flexibility of 
boundary objects seems to provide an opportunity for negotiation and interaction 
between groups (Carlile, 2004). However, some boundary objects might have limited 
interpretive flexibility, such as static and fixed objects that are only useful for 
facilitating explicit and codifiable knowledge between the partners that are aware of 
their differences and dependencies. I elaborate on the role and definition of static and 
fixed boundary objects later in this chapter.  
 
Star & 
Griesemer 
(1989) 
Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing 
them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. 
They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly 
structured in individual site use. These objects may be abstract or 
concrete. They have different meanings in different social worlds but 
their structure is common enough to more than one world to make 
them recognisable – a means of translation. 
Karsten et al. 
(2001) 
Boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Star, 1993) are physical 
objects such as design drawings, maps, contracts, learning materials, 
etc. that are used to facilitate cooperation while allowing diversity in 
interpretation. 
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Bechky (2003) Boundary objects are flexible epistemic artefacts that “inhabit several 
intersecting social worlds and satisfy the information requirements of 
each of them...., creating the common ground that leads to shared 
understandings" (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.393).  
Sapsed & 
Salter (2004) 
Boundary objects may provide informational support but denote no 
intrinsic meaning. They are, in this sense, empty vessels to be filled 
with whatever is the preferred local beverage. Boundary objects 
facilitate the reading of alternative meanings by different groups 
(Henderson, 1991). 
Swan et al. 
(2007) 
Boundary objects "can be both concrete objects and abstract concepts 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989), but their common and defining 
characteristic is that they contain some "interpretative flexibility" 
(Bijker et al., 1987) that allows them to be used to provide a common 
frame of reference for communication across different domains of 
knowledge and practice.  
Dodgson et al. 
(2007) 
Boundary objects mediate interactions between different 
communities of practice by providing a common basis for 
conversations about solutions to problems. 
Koskinen & 
Mäkinen 
(2009) 
Boundary objects are flexible in adapting to local needs and 
constraints of several communities of practice sharing them. These 
objects are robust enough to maintain a common identity across 
different stakeholders and they can be abstract or concrete. 
Barrett & 
Oborn (2010) 
Boundary objects are mediating artefacts that have interpretive 
flexibility and can be an important means of achieving collaboration, 
promoting the sharing of knowledge between diverse groups (Sapsed 
& Salter, 2004). 
McGivern & 
Dopson 
(2010) 
Objects can be conceptualised as "things" or "processes". Technical 
objects tend to be fixed, concrete and transparent, whereas epistemic 
objects are fluid, abstract and indeterminate, with an "unfolding 
ontology". 
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Winter & 
Butler (2011) 
By identifying "lowest common denominators", critical points of 
agreement, or shared surface referents, boundary objects provide a 
sufficient platform for cooperative action – but they do so without 
requiring the individuals involved to abandon the distinctive 
perspectives, positions and practices of their "base" social world. 
Nicolini et al. 
(2012) 
Boundary objects are defined by their capacity to serve as bridges 
between intersecting social and cultural worlds. Anchored in, and 
thus meaningful across, these worlds, they create the conditions for 
collaboration while, by way of their interpretive flexibility, not 
requiring “deep sharing”. 
Franco (2013) A boundary object is a shareable and tangible artefact around which 
group members can interact about a problem situation of concern, 
and may include objects such as repositories and standardised forms 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989); sketches and drawings (Henderson, 1991); 
prototypes (Bechky, 2003b; Carlile, 2002; Pawlowski & Robey, 
2004); strategy tools (Jarzabkowski, Spee & Smets, 2013; Kaplan, 
2011).  
Table 5. Selected Definitions of Boundary Objects 
 
(2) Allowing groups to maintain their identity is the second key dimension that can 
be found in all definitions of boundary object. On the contrary to their interpretive 
flexibility, boundary objects also have a "fixed and strongly structured" nature. This 
dimension of boundary objects helps different disciplines retain their individual identity 
without needing to change their practices. Standardised forms, contracts or protocols 
contain this dimension of boundary objects, because while they can clearly reflect the 
community’s needs and requirements, at the same time they can contain those of the 
other communities. These standardised and structured boundary objects are used to 
bring together different individuals/groups and reduce ambiguities and uncertainties. As 
a result, they create mutual understanding and help resolve the differences across 
boundaries. 
 
These two key dimensions of boundary objects form the basis of the distinction between 
static and dynamic boundary objects that will be presented later in this chapter. Prior to 
further elaboration on this static versus dynamic distinction, in the following section I 
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explain different roles that boundary objects can play in facilitating knowledge 
integration. Outlining these roles also provides examples of what these boundary 
objects are in practice and how they influence cross-boundary work.  
 
Different Roles of Boundary Objects in Facilitating Knowledge 
Integration 
Scholars have identified different roles that boundary objects play in mobilising cross-
boundary work. These scholars have suggested that boundary objects can manage 
knowledge across boundaries by creating a focal point, facilitating or translating 
between diverse knowledge domains. 
 
The most common characteristic of boundary objects shared in almost all literature is 
their ability to create focal points for interaction between different people. By utilising 
boundary objects, people who belong to different worlds can develop a sense of shared 
identity. Thompson (2005) proposes that the genres of popular music, such as rock ‘n’ 
roll, punk and hip hop can be regarded as boundary objects with a powerful focal point 
bringing together people from different backgrounds; "these genres have strong styles of 
dress, music, speech, and mannerisms that form all-important symbols, allowing 
strongly committed members to both identify their own allegiances and differentiate 
themselves from others" (p.152). 
 
The role of boundary objects as a focal point has also been emphasised in the 
communities of practice literature. The concept of "communities of practice" emerged 
from the work of Lave and Wenger (1991) who describe them as informal work-based 
organisations in which "groups of inter-dependent participants provide the work context 
within which members construct both shared identities and the social context that helps 
those identities to be shared" (Brown & Duguid, 2001, p.202). Wenger (1998) 
emphasises the role of boundary objects in communities of practice as "artefacts, 
documents, terms, concepts, and other forms of reification" through which communities 
can be linked (p.107). 
 
In their study of virtual communities of practice in the USA, UK and Japan, Kimble and 
Hildreth (2005) showed how a planning document, which was initially designed for use 
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within the UK, became a boundary object used between the communities in the UK and 
the USA. This document acted as a focal point for collaborative work. The planning 
document was firstly devised to be the focus of the meetings in the UK office only. 
However, it was realised that during discussion around the document, innovative ideas 
were developed and these new ideas elicited more participation in the community. The 
planning document was also found to stimulate participation and innovation, when it 
was used for creating links within and between the offices in the UK, the USA and 
Japan. 
 
The empirical literature also emphasises that boundary objects can bridge knowledge 
boundaries, thus facilitating knowledge processes and collaboration between functions 
(Barrett & Oborn, 2010; McGivern & Dopson, 2010; Sapsed & Salter, 2004; Tiwana & 
Mclean, 2005). In Sapsed and Salter’s (2004) research, program management tools, 
such as integrated timelines, online status reporting devices and modular roadmaps were 
effective boundary objects that facilitated collaboration between the different sites of a 
computing corporation spanning the USA, Europe and Japan. A large-scale data 
integration program was devised to improve the accuracy and accessibility of product 
information across several functions including production, services, sales and IT in a 
large corporation. In a semiconductor manufacturing company, Bechky (2003b) found 
that machines were more effective boundary objects than engineering drawings. This 
was because these machines were tangible objects that exposed the differences between 
the engineers and machine operators, instigating discussions and negotiations between 
these diverse parties. Consequently, they were more useful than the drawings. Here 
Bechky (2003b) highlights that boundary objects facilitate knowledge integration by 
“invok[ing] the key differences in work contexts between [different] groups” (Bechky 
2003b, p.326). Majchrzak et al. (2012) also suggest that boundary objects help different 
teams "understand each other’s deep knowledge and differences"; hence facilitating 
their knowledge integration. 
 
In addition to being depicted as focal points and facilitators, boundary objects have also 
been considered as coordinators, helping create common knowledge across boundaries 
(Brown & Duguid, 1998; Bechky, 2003a; Carlile, 2004; Henderson, 1991; Star, 1989; 
Koskinen, 2005; Star & Griesemer, 1989; Swan et al., 2007; Wenger, 2000). Boundary 
objects work as tools that can reflect the knowledge and concerns of the collaborating 
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teams to one another and improve mutual understanding between the two. A contract 
can be a good example that represents this role of boundary objects because contracts 
can become a tool or a “coordinating mechanism” through which different partners can 
develop a common understanding of each other’s interests and viewpoints (Koskinen, 
2005, p.327). Processes, routines and procedures have also been recognised as boundary 
objects that have coordinating roles and allow parties to manage their work across 
boundaries (Wenger, 2000). 
 
Swan and colleagues (2007) emphasise the impact of individual agency on boundary 
objects, conceptualising boundary objects as social constructs that require certain 
individuals (brokers) to reinforce their effectiveness. Brokers are the skilled individuals 
who have an understanding of each function’s interests and bridge the functions through 
mutual representations and negotiations. Wenger (1998, p.109) defined brokers as being 
involved in “the processes of translation, coordination, and alignment between 
perspectives” (p.109). The role of brokers in mediating and integrating knowledge 
across boundaries has been highlighted in the literature (Bechky, 2003a; Carlile, 2004; 
Levina & Vaast, 2005; Wenger, 1998). Brokers are reported to span boundaries through 
manipulation of meanings, boundary objects and social relationships (Kramer & Wells, 
2005; Sverrisson, 2001; Swan et al., 2007). In other words, brokers use boundary 
objects in order to facilitate cross-boundary work. Brokers have also been called 
boundary spanners or translators in the literature, due to their ability to introduce 
aspects of one practice to another. There is a wide range of research examining brokers 
as boundary spanners. However, the main focus of this research is the role of boundary 
objects in facilitating knowledge integration, thus I describe brokers only as mediators 
for the effectiveness of boundary objects. 
 
Boundary objects have proven to be effective in creating a common knowledge between 
different functions and facilitating problem solving and negotiation. However, as 
Carlile's (2004) Table 1 delineates, not all boundary objects are considered effective, 
and depending on the context of the collaboration and the type of boundary being 
spanned, different forms of boundary objects are required to facilitate knowledge 
integration (I will elaborate on Carlile's Table 1 and his discussions of the challenges 
and solutions on pages 42–48). Huang and Huang (2011) argue that different types of 
boundary objects lead to different levels of performance. Similarly, Sapsed and Salter 
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(2004) found that project management tools were not effective boundary objects in a 
"high-pressure project-based business" where face-to-face interactions did not exist. 
They described boundary objects as "high-maintenance items with a limited shelf life 
[that] have no independent potency for alignment, hence their ineffectiveness" (p.1531). 
Implementing boundary objects often seems to be a procedure because they need to be 
continuously changed over time. During this procedure, boundary objects should be 
revised and adapted to fit in new situations or contexts, otherwise they soon become 
out-dated and useless. For instance, in Sapsed and Salter’s (2004) empirical study, a 
lack of face-to-face meetings, as well as a lack of "interpretive flexibility" within the 
program management tool were found to be major factors in the failure of the boundary 
objects to facilitate the collaboration across diverse groups and teams. Carlile’s 
Integrated Framework (discussed more fully later) provides a useful explanation for 
why some boundary objects at some levels are not effective for managing knowledge 
and collaborations. 
 
Static Vs. Dynamic Boundary Objects 
Boundary objects have been recognised as essential tools for facilitating knowledge 
generation and coordination between groups (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; Henderson, 
1999, Ancona et al., 2001). The literature presents a wide range of definitions that 
sometimes overlap and even clash. In what follows I summarise the existing definitions 
and describe them in two categories: (1) Fixed/static boundary objects; (2) 
Dynamic/loosely-structured boundary objects (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Star & 
Greismer, 1989). Please see Table 6 on the next page. 
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Different Types of Boundary Objects Definition Examples 
Fixed/static 
Boundary Objects 
Repositories A pile of objects indexed 
in a standardised fashion 
that provides a shared 
point of reference 
Database, libraries 
Standardised 
Forms 
Structured documents, 
used as a common format 
for problem solving across 
different functions  
Forms, contracts, 
protocols  
Dynamic/loosely-
structured 
Boundary Objects 
Ideal Type Objects jointly used by 
different disciplines that 
can be used or adapted for 
specific needs, but do not 
present the specific details 
of each group 
Diagram, 
prototypes and 
assembly 
drawings  
Coincident 
Boundaries 
The common objects used 
by different boundaries 
that also contain different 
internal contents used for 
specific needs 
Gantt charts, 
process maps and 
workflow 
matrices 
Table 6. Different Types of Boundary Objects 
 
Fixed and static boundary objects are strongly structured objects that are difficult to 
change and adapt to specialised use in diverse disciplines (Cetina, 1997; Rheinberger, 
1992). Forms, contracts and databases can be fixed and static when they are not updated 
and upgraded. According to Star and Griesemer (1989) these objects "convey 
unchanging information" (p.411). These are used for coordination between different 
boundaries and mainly explicit and codifiable knowledge can be stored and shared 
through these types of boundary objects (Koskinen & Mäkinen, 2009). Ewenstein and 
Whyte (2009) explain that these objects due to their fixed and concrete nature cannot 
reflect detailed and specialised knowledge of various disciplines or groups, therefore 
they are not suitable for sharing tacit knowledge. Barrett and Oborn (2010) highlight 
that these rigid objects "[can]not facilitate effective integration of tacit knowing in 
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diverse teams and may limit learning across groups" (Barrett & Oborn, 2010, p.1200; 
Levina & Vaast, 2006; Vaast & Levina, 2006). Therefore, even if the forms can be 
updated with explicit knowledge, they cannot reflect and integrate the tacit knowledge 
of various groups. Carlile (2004) adds that these fixed and stable objects, such as 
standardised forms or repositories, can be effective only when the level of differences 
and dependencies, and novelty in the relationship is low. He argues that when the level 
of differences, dependencies and novelty is low, the partners are aware of their 
differences and dependencies, and they share common knowledge and experiences. In 
these circumstances, knowledge is explicit and it can be easily coded and shared. So 
knowledge processes will be an information processing procedure, which can be 
achieved through strongly structured and concrete objects, such as standardised forms, 
protocols, etc. 
 
On the other hand, dynamic boundary objects are fluid or loosely structured objects 
that can be adapted for use in specialised domains, reflecting the details that are 
comprehensible and useful for the local individual site, while simultaneously creating a 
common boundary for the interactions between different functions and disciplines. 
These boundary objects reflect the interpretive flexibility capacity that was discussed in 
the previous section. Some scholars have also used the term "epistemic objects" in order 
to refer to the dynamic boundary objects. Epistemic objects are defined as fluid, flexible 
and open-ended objects that are "characterized by lack and incompleteness" (Ewenstein 
& Whyte, 2009, p.9). For instance, visual representations such as design documents and 
plans that evolve and reflect knowledge development processes are epistemic or fluid 
boundary objects (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Engestrom & Blackler, 2005; Knorr Cetina, 
1999; McGivern & Dopson, 2010; Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005; Nicolini et al., 2012; 
Rheinberger 1997; Scarbrough et al., 2015). Nicolini and his colleagues (2012) define 
boundary objects as “flexible, epistemic artefacts that because they can have different 
meanings in the various communities, professional groups, departments, etc., and yet 
their structure is common to all these groups so that they are recognizable to them and 
can serve as a means of translation” (p.614). Abstract objects, such as processes and 
meetings, are classified as dynamic and flexible boundary objects. I highlight that a 
physical object can also be defined as a dynamic boundary object as long as it is loosely 
structured and has the potential to be easily updated and adapted, such as a drawing or a 
design sketch (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009). 
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In response to diverse attempts to define boundary objects, Star (2010) refined her 
arguments, emphasising their dynamic and multi-dimensional aspects. She highlights 
that boundary objects are not simply prefabricated and arbitrary things, but rather are 
“organic infrastructures” that derive from action and are subject to reflection and 
continuous tailoring (p.602). Organic infrastructures are defined as fluid and flexible 
objects that are “sunk into other structures, social arrangements and technologies”. 
These organic infrastructures both mobilise the communities and are shaped by these 
communities. Consequently, they are relative to the knowledge of those particular 
communities (see Star, 2010, p.611). Similarly, Engestrom and Blackler (2005) confirm 
the "transitory" and relative nature of boundary objects by emphasising that boundary 
objects did not remain the same and highlighting different organisational actions that 
changed the state of these objects (p.322). 
 
Scarbrough et al. (2015) provide a good illustration of the dynamic role of boundary 
objects in their study of innovation processes in the computer games sector. They 
observed that, while the objects were static in nature, the role of some of them changed 
as a result of their interactions with other shared objects, and “the relations between 
objects, and not the objects alone” facilitated the collaboration (p.197). For instance, 
they found that the role of "concept book" or concept document evolved over time, 
gradually developing into a reference point for other objects. This was a book-like 
document that reflected the changes in art documents, design documents, narratives and 
overall game objectives, thus enabling the work between different groups. 
Consequently, Scarbrough et al.'s (2015) study highlights that the relations between 
objects, such as different design documents and schedules – not the objects themselves 
– helped the team resolve their differences and create mutual understanding. 
 
While highlighting the dynamic dimension of boundary objects and their embeddedness 
in social interactions, Barrett and Oborn (2010) found that the use of boundary objects 
could trigger interpersonal clashes and conflicts in cross-cultural software teams. In 
response to this, scholars suggest a combination of boundary objects, where the 
relations between them can facilitate coordination and collaboration (Leonardi et al., 
2012; Nicolini et al., 2012; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Scarbrough et al. 2015). In a 
similar vein, Nicolini et al. (2012) highlight the dynamic and relational role of objects in 
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their study of a multidisciplinary scientific project, suggesting that "the specific role 
objects play in supporting collaborative efforts results from relations with other objects 
and other aspects of the activity and does not derive from some assumed essential 
characteristic of the object itself" (p.626). Thus, they identify that processes of 
collaboration have an impact on an object's effectiveness, changing their role constantly 
back and forth. For instance, they discuss how the container in which scientists grew 
cells had to be redesigned in order to accommodate the requirements of different 
disciplines. Confirming the embeddedness of boundary objects in social interactions, 
another stream of research addresses the ineffectiveness of boundary objects and 
explains that objects should be constantly updated, revised and negotiated through 
interactions and processes to resolve the tensions and develop mutual understanding 
across knowledge domains (Huang & Huang, 2011; Koskinen & Makinen, 2009; 
Levina & Vaast, 2005; Mork et al., 2012; Thompson, 2005). 
 
The literature puts great emphasis on the dynamic (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Ewenstein & 
Whyte, 2009; Star, 2010) and social dimensions of boundary objects (Mork et al., 2012; 
Nicolini, 2011; Orlikowski, 2007; Osterlund & Carlile, 2003). A small number of 
studies have examined the dynamic nature of boundary objects, but they mainly focus 
on their coordinating roles and the relationship between different boundary objects 
(Nicolini et al., 2012; Scarbrough et al., 2015). While highlighting the critical role of 
social processes and interactions in shaping boundary objects, Lainer-Vos (2013) 
suggests redirecting the focus from the nature and properties of boundary objects to 
understanding how social processes can influence boundary objects. However, he does 
not explain how this might work. I argue that the impact of social interactions, 
dynamics and organisational processes on boundary objects and their effectiveness in 
knowledge integration is still undeveloped (Lainer-Vos, 2013; Zeiss & Groenewegen, 
2009). Likewise, there is a limited understanding of how these objects transition and 
evolve during the course of a project or collaboration (Nicolini et al., 2012). 
Understanding the social and dynamic aspect of boundary objects in an inter-
organisational setting will provide both theoretical and empirical implications for 
managing knowledge across inter-organisational boundaries. In order to address these 
limitations of literature, I adopt a practice-based perspective that views knowledge as 
“an on-going social phenomenon” (Orlikowski, 2002), inseparable from practice and 
people (Corradi et al., 2010; Gherardi, 2006; Nicolini, 2011). Since the practice-based 
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perspective values the role of interpersonal interactions and social practices in 
integrating knowledge, I believe it is an appropriate perspective through which I can 
examine the impact of social dynamics and processes on boundary objects and how 
these processes influence the effectiveness of boundary objects in knowledge 
integration. 
 
Carlile’s Integrated Framework on Cross-Boundary Collaboration 
This section describes Carlile’s (2002, 2004) Integrated Framework for managing 
knowledge across boundaries, highlighting the role of boundary objects in different 
settings. Carlile (2004) argues that “boundary objects have proven effective in 
providing a concrete means of representing different functional interests and facilitating 
their negotiation and transformation in product development settings” (p.559). 
However, he emphasises that different collaborative contexts require different boundary 
objects to manage knowledge processes and cross-boundary collaboration. Carlile 
(2002, 2004) believes that knowledge can be both a source of and a barrier to 
innovation, because knowledge is embedded, localised and invested in practice 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Hislop, 2009, 2013; Lave, 1988; Swan et al., 
2002).  
 
In order to explain why knowledge can sometimes be a barrier to innovation and why it 
can be difficult to manage, Carlile (2004) highlights three properties of knowledge: 
difference, dependency and novelty in his Table 1, where he discusses the challenges of 
working across boundaries and suggests some solutions. Difference refers to the 
different knowledge and specialties that reside in individuals and teams, collaborating in 
a project. Dependency is a situation when the input of each team influences both the 
work of the other teams, as well as the end product or service. Co-authors’ collaboration 
in writing an article or the relationship between a design engineer and a manufacturing 
engineer are examples of such dependencies. Novelty is the third relational property of 
knowledge and it refers to the new circumstances that arise in an innovation or new 
product development process. Carlile (2004) explains novelty as "the most challenging 
aspect of the relational nature of knowledge at a boundary", in which "for each actor 
there is novelty to share with others and novelty to assess from others. A less-obvious 
source of novelty comes when an actor is unfamiliar with the common knowledge being 
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used to represent the differences and dependencies between domain-specific 
knowledge" (p.557). Carlile's three properties of knowledge and the challenges he refers 
to (Carlile 2004 - Table 1, p. 560) also can be associated with the three challenges of 
cross-boundary work in innovation processes, complexity, interdependence; uncertainty 
and unpredictability, which was explained in section 2.1.3. and in Table 3. 
 
Carlile (2002, 2004) believes that the level of difference, dependency and novelty 
between individuals, teams and functions involved in collaboration creates different 
types of boundaries and challenges to collaboration. Thus, different sets of boundary 
objects are required to be utilised in order for these challenges to be resolved. The more 
different and disparate the collaborating functions and departments are, the more 
difficult collaboration is likely to be. Especially when two different individuals, groups 
and departments have different interests and objectives, the relationship and 
collaboration between them become politicised, thus, different boundaries appear and 
different boundary objects are required to facilitate the collaborations.  
 
Three Levels of Boundaries 
Carlile (2002; 2004) utilises the practice-based perspective of knowledge, and suggests 
that the embeddedness of knowledge in practice and human activity can result in some 
negative consequences for collaboration when there are high levels of differences, 
dependencies and novelty between partners. However, he considers these challenges as 
an unavoidable and natural outcome of collaboration between different and dependent 
functions - he elaborates on these challenges in his Table 1 (Carlile 2004, p. 560). 
Carlile develops a framework that integrates Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) three levels 
of communication (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic boundaries) with the relative 
properties of knowledge. This framework (Figure 2) shows the three levels of 
boundaries for knowledge creation across functions, and explains how knowledge 
should be managed depending on the level of differences, dependencies and novelty. 
This framework elucidates the functionality of boundary objects across diverse 
functions, underlining that different boundaries call for the use of different boundary 
objects to resolve the challenges and create a mutual understanding across different 
disciplines.  
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Figure 2. An Integrated Framework for Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries 
 
 
The three different boundary types will be explained below, with a further discussion of 
the kind of boundary objects that are suitable for each level: 
 
Syntactic boundary and shared syntax: A syntactic boundary is when the level of 
differences, dependencies and novelty is low. With a syntactic boundary the partners 
working together are considered as senders and receivers of information and the only 
challenges they face are information-processing and communication problems. Shannon 
and Weaver (1949) introduce this syntactic approach to boundaries and suggest that 
creating a shared and stable syntax that ensures information exchange and accurate 
communication resolves the challenges at this level (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p.33). 
In fact, the more information, the better the communication results. Generally, in these 
circumstances the individuals/teams/functions involved in knowledge exchange are 
aware of their differences and dependencies. At this level, the main issue is simply 
knowledge transfer and since the differences and dependencies are known in advance, 
tools such as shared repositories help the actors to transfer knowledge across a 
boundary. However, sometimes due to the requirements for new specialised knowledge, 
the level of difference, dependency and novelty increases, thus creating new challenges 
that cannot be resolved by a syntactical approach.  
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Semantic boundary: A semantic boundary exists when partners have different 
interpretations of concepts and ideas or the dependencies and the differences between 
individuals/teams/functions are unclear. Work across a semantic boundary emphasises 
that people might have different interpretations of meanings and language. In order to 
create a working relationship between them, they need to develop “shared meanings” 
(Dougherty, 1992) or some systems to resolve the differences in meanings and 
interpretations. In these circumstances, even if a common language and syntax is used 
between functions, people have different interpretations of things, so they use contracts 
that clearly present different partners’ viewpoints and interests, or they use processes 
and routines in order to create a common understanding across boundaries (Koskinen, 
2005). This also suggests a potentially critical role for brokers to resolve the 
discrepancies and create a better understanding between parties. As was discussed 
earlier in this chapter, a broker is described as a facilitator who understands the 
differences and dependencies between the two actors and works as a mediator to help 
the flow of knowledge (Allen, 1971; Swan et al., 2007; Wenger, 1998). Because the 
broker is aware of actors’ differences and dependencies, they have a crucial role to 
select the most effective boundary objects for a special context or adapt the boundary 
objects in order to create shared meanings and pursue the interests of both sides. The 
interpretive differences, therefore, make collaborations between individuals, groups and 
departments difficult. Due to these semantic differences, the individual and context-
specific aspects of knowledge must be taken into consideration in the process of 
knowledge construction. Nonaka (1994) suggests that when there are semantic 
challenges between actors, they should develop “mutual understanding”. At this level, 
individuals need to present their tacit knowledge as explicit, or learn their partners’ tacit 
knowledge. However, it is highlighted that individuals are often even unaware of their 
own tacit knowledge, making the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge more 
difficult. As Polanyi (1966) states: “We know more than we can tell" – referring to the 
fact that presenting or sharing tacit knowledge is problematic. In a semantic boundary, 
not only these challenges, but the semantic differences also need to be resolved. Carlile 
(2002; 2004) suggests knowledge translation and the use of tools, such as standardised 
forms or other shared methods to translate and learn about the differences and 
dependencies. 
 
Pragmatic boundary, models and maps: A pragmatic boundary is when there are high 
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levels of differences, dependencies and novelty between actors in cross-boundary work. 
In such settings, a pragmatic/political approach facilitates divergent interests, conflicts, 
costs, dependencies, and the difficulties of knowledge creation/sharing across different 
groups (Carlile, 2002, 2004). The pragmatic approach stems from the philosophies of 
Peirce (1898), James (1907) and Bourdieu (1977) that describe knowledge as 
consequential and "at stake", emphasising that the consequences of the interactions 
between different and dependent parties need to be taken into consideration. This 
approach explains that people feel invested in the knowledge they accumulate; hence 
knowledge is "at stake". Therefore, people might be unwilling to change their gained 
skills and knowledge because of the commitment they have developed for their practice. 
People’s resistance to change also seems to stem from the costs that people might face 
in changing their existing knowledge and practices and adapting to the new ways of 
doing things. Therefore, the challenges in a novel setting are not just having effective 
communications or developing shared meanings. In such circumstances, collaborators 
need to partake in "knowledge transformation" rather than "transfer" and "translation" in 
order to resolve conflicts and create a mutual understanding between diverse groups. 
This means that the actors involved in the cross-boundary work need to make their tacit 
knowledge explicit, be able to learn the knowledge created by the other functions and 
the most important and difficult of all, they should be willing to change and have the 
ability to transform their partners’ knowledge (Carlile 1997).  
 
Managing Knowledge in a Pragmatic Boundary 
The pragmatic boundary is particularly relevant to this study because the difficulties and 
conflicts that collaborators experience in this boundary resonate with the challenges of 
managing knowledge across organisational boundaries where there are high levels of 
risks and uncertainties. Therefore, it is useful to understand what methods and strategies 
the scholars have proposed in order to deal with these challenges and manage 
knowledge integration in this setting. For this reason, I have allocated a separate section 
to explain and elaborate on processes that can be used to enable work across pragmatic 
boundaries. 
 
Carlile (2002, 2004) recommends the process of transforming knowledge to help 
resolve the negative consequences and manage knowledge in a pragmatic boundary. 
 
47 
Brown and Duguid (2001) also suggest negotiation as a useful method for transforming 
knowledge and resolving the tensions across divergent and functions. The boundary 
objects that are effective in a pragmatic boundary are the ones that can be developed by 
all functions involved. Drawings, prototypes and visual representations of designs and 
plans are among these boundary objects, because they can be regularly updated, thus 
reflecting detailed knowledge of each function and their dependencies. Due to their 
interpretive flexibility, these examples also allow tacit knowledge to be exchanged and 
shared in these contexts. Carlile and Lucas (2003) call these effective tools “trade-off 
methodologies”, and explain that these types of boundary objects represent the 
dependencies and differences of each party, and facilitate the transformation and 
negotiation between them. In Carlile's (2004) research, design engineers and 
manufacturing engineers jointly developed assembly drawings. These drawings helped 
them understand each other’s context-specific concerns and develop prototypes that 
further facilitated their collaboration and knowledge sharing practices. 
 
Carlile (2002, 2004) introduces the pragmatic boundary as a political context. He 
highlights that in this boundary the nature of interactions is highly political because of 
the divergent interests and the high levels of differences, dependencies and novelty in 
the relationship. By underlining the political dimension of the pragmatic boundary, 
Carlile (2002, 2004) explains that the actors’ ability/power in negotiation and 
transformation of knowledge has a critical role in facilitating the collaboration and 
knowledge integration. When novelty in the relationship increases, the actors might face 
new challenges and tasks. Consequently all actors involved should develop adequate 
common knowledge to deal with new tasks and challenges. However, in this context a 
powerful actor might be able to reuse their knowledge in order to pursue their own 
interests. This means that the actor might be reluctant to change their knowledge or 
skills due to the commitment they have developed towards those skills. This can also be 
the case when learning new things or changing their skills and knowledge incur some 
costs. As a result, the powerful actor uses their resources or negotiation skills to show 
resistance to changes and stick to the knowledge and skills they have. In other words, 
they reuse their knowledge. This happens while this knowledge might not be suitable 
for the new challenges or the new tasks they have faced in their collaboration. Whether 
exercised consciously or not, power games and resorting to power resources to 
influence the relationship might constrain the collaboration and knowledge integration, 
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thus making it more difficult for the consequences to be resolved. That is why Carlile 
(2002, 2004) recommends that the actors in a pragmatic boundary should resolve their 
differences and create mutual understanding in order to integrate knowledge and 
collaborate effectively. 
 
I argue that Carlile (2002, 2004) has explained cross-boundary work and the role of 
boundary objects in the context of intra-organisational collaboration, but two areas still 
remain under-developed. First, Carlile states that “boundary objects are no 'magic bullet' 
because their characteristics are hard to sustain as problems and people change” (p.452). 
This statement highlights that there is not a set of pre-defined and fixed boundary 
objects for all situations. This emphasis on the context stresses the significance of 
studying inter-organisational boundaries. This is because this context offers potential 
lack of shared knowledge and experience between partners and high levels of conflict 
resulting from it. It is expected that this context might present some new challenges, the 
understanding of which can offer insights into how knowledge is managed when the 
partners face high levels of risk, novelty and uncertainty. 
 
The second area that is not fully illustrated by Carlile is the role of power structures in 
managing knowledge across boundaries. Carlile (2002, 2004) underlines that the role of 
power and politics should be recognised in shaping collaboration and knowledge 
processes across boundaries. But he does not clarify how these power structures 
influence knowledge processes and the effectiveness of boundary objects in inter-
organisational settings. Further study is required to illuminate these limitations in 
Carlile's study. 
 
2.2.2. Conflict Resolution Through Dialogue and Power Practices 
A theoretical perspective on cross-boundary knowledge integration highlights the role 
of extensive dialogue, negotiating mutual interests and maintaining "mutual adaptation" 
in facilitating knowledge sharing (Mork et al., 2012). As discussed in section 2.1.2., the 
practice-based perspective conceptualises knowledge as a localised and socially 
constructed entity that cannot be "codified and separated from people" (Hislop, 2009, 
p.34). It also suggests that knowledge is fragmented and embedded in practice. Further, 
by using dialogue and negotiation, parties can identify, elaborate, and then confront 
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their differences (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Cook & Brown, 2000; Dougherty, 1992; 
Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Nonaka, 1994; Tsoukas, 2009), 
as well as dependencies (Bechky, 2003b; Carlile, 2004). The practice-based perspective 
also proposes the processes of "perspective making" and "perspective taking" to 
encourage knowledge integration (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995). Hislop (2013) defines 
these processes as below: 
 
Perspective making is the process through which a community develops, 
strengthens and sustains its knowledge and values. Perspective taking is the 
process through which people develop an understanding of the knowledge, 
 values and "worldview" of others (p.45). 
 
In these dialogic processes, people externalise their knowledge and make themselves 
aware of each other’s expertise and knowledge. Bolisani and Scarso (2000) refer to 
perspective making and perspective taking processes as a language game, while 
Gherardi (2000) calls it a “discursive practice” (p.221). A series of empirical studies 
supports the key role of negotiating and extensive dialogue in externalising and 
understanding knowledge. For instance, Boland and Tenkasi (1995) refer to “mutual 
perspective taking” and “dialogical processes” as the key to managing epistemic 
differences and integrating knowledge across communities (p.358). Argyris and Schön 
(1978) argue that knowledge can be integrated more effectively between diverse expert 
groups when they extensively share their expert knowledge (p.16). Hargadon and 
Bechky (2006) also find that the sharing of implicit assumptions and perspectives can 
help different groups combine and integrate their knowledge. Tsoukas (2009) suggests 
that people working across boundaries can identify their differences when they are 
aware of each other’s knowledge and expertise, enabling them to resolve their 
problems. In his words, “each interlocutor potentially makes the other realize the 
limitations of their focal awareness and stimulates a search for an ever broader focal 
awareness” (p.944). 
 
However, a recent body of research has found that dialogue and extensive negotiation 
might not be always effective in the process of knowledge integration, especially when 
the relationship between teams is temporary, such as inter-organisational collaborations 
(Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Kellogg et al., 2006). This is because 
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knowledge dialogue seems to expose differences and conflicts, thus potentially creating 
challenges and disagreements between the parties involved (Dammann & Kieser, 2010; 
Dougherty, 1992; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; 
Schmickl & Kieser, 2008; Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). Edmondson and 
Nembhard (2009) underline that conflicts are the natural outcomes of boundary work 
across divergent groups, especially in novel settings, arguing: “The competing 
viewpoints that promote creative new ideas and sound decision making lead naturally to 
conflicts that waste precious time and erode team relationships” (p.124). 
 
Further, diverse, expert groups have been found to be able to work together without 
developing a common knowledge (Donnellon et al., 1986). As Hansen (1999) explains, 
diverse parties found that engaging in deep conversations was time-consuming and they 
preferred to maintain a weak tie with the other groups and instead focus mainly on the 
project itself, rather than resolve their differences. In their study of specialised groups in 
a medical trauma centre, Faraj and Xiao (2006) suggest that dialogic coordination 
practices, such as joint sense-making and rapid sharing of general knowledge in 
response to novel events "are highly contested because of epistemic differences" 
between diverse groups (p.123). 
 
The literature on cross-boundary collaborations mainly proposes that management’s 
primary focus should be on overcoming the difficulties associated with differences in 
perspectives and different ways of knowing and practicing. Some scholars claim that 
negotiations and extensive dialogue are used to achieve this end (Bechky, 2003b; 
Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2004; Cook & Brown, 2000; Dougherty, 1992; 
Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Nonaka, 1994; Tsoukas, 2009), 
while others find these dialogic practices ineffective in creating a collaborative work 
environment between distinct disciplines (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dammann & 
Kieser, 2010; Dougherty, 1992; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Kellogg et al., 2006; Ewenstein & 
Whyte, 2009; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Schmickl & Kieser, 2008; Van der Vegt 
& Bunderson, 2005). Conflicts seem to be unavoidable when there are high levels of 
difference, dependencies and novelty between groups, thus highlighting the political 
nature of cross-boundary work. Therefore, in order to better understand how knowledge 
is managed across boundaries, it is essential to understand how these conflicts are 
addressed.  
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Conceptualising Power and Politics 
The knowledge management literature highlights the relationship between power and 
knowledge processes, emphasising that research into knowledge processes must take 
account of different forms of power and its resources. This section firstly defines the 
concept of power and the political aspect of cross community work, and secondly 
examines the relationship between power and knowledge. 
 
According to Schultze and Stabell (2004), conflicts are an inevitable aspect of social 
dynamics, whether in society or business organisations, and their existence encourages 
political behaviour among groups who have divergent and conflicting interests. The 
political aspect of cross community work, as recognised in the literature, is described as 
a social situation in which the interests, culture, values and assumptions of two distinct 
groups can be divergent and contradictory (Christensen et al., 2000; Kimble et al., 2010; 
Carlile, 2004). Hislop (2013) defines a political process as “a dynamic social situation 
where different actors (individuals or groups) who have competing or conflicting 
interests draw upon particular power resources, which are used as political tools aimed 
at achieving each group’s objectives" (p.193). In other words, differences, 
interdependencies and unequal access to power are the central factors that all lead to 
conflict of interests and competing discourses. Pfeffer (1981) highlights that 
interdependence, scarcity, heterogeneous goals and heterogeneous beliefs lead to 
disagreements and conflicts in organisations. 
 
Power is a multi-dimensional concept that is important for managers to understand 
(Clegg, 1989; Hardy, 1994; Haugaard, 2002). In order to develop a basic understanding 
of this concept, I explain the three dimensions of power, discussed by Lukes (1974), one 
of the most widely cited authors on power. I also describe the fourth dimension that has 
been added to Lukes’ dimensions of power by Hardy (1994) and Clegg (1989) to take 
account of the work of Foucault. Table 7 on the next page provides an overview of 
dimensions of power that are presented below.  
 
Lukes’ (1974) one-dimensional perspective on power or the behavioural perspective 
is drawn from Dahl’s (1957) recognition of the parties’ conflicts of interests and his 
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focus on parties’ behaviour in influencing decision-making. Dahl (1975) explains the 
situation in which power is exercised as when "A has power over B to the extent he can 
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl as cited in Lukes, 1974, 
p.11). Lukes (1974) adds that power can be used as a resource to defeat opposition, thus 
influencing decision-making (Dhillon, 2004; Gordon & Grant, 2005). This means that 
power is viewed as an entity that can be owned by one party and used to secure their 
interests. This one-dimensional perspective of power recognises conflict as an expected 
element in social interaction and also as an essential tool that enables one 
individual/group to affect others and shape social processes.  
 
 
Table 7. Four Dimensions of Power (Adapted from Linstead et al., 2009, p.282) 
 
Lukes’ two-dimensional view of power or the political view is derived from 
Bacharach and Baratz (1963). This perspective portrays organisations as comprising 
individuals or groups who pursue their own interests or goals; thus conflict is an 
indispensable part of their social interaction (Bailey, 1970; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Similar to Lukes’ one-dimensional view of power, the political view also considers 
power as a resource. However, it emphasises that the conflicts and the practice of power 
can also be covert in organisations because it assumes that one party is capable of 
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convincing the other that the conflicts do not exist, so that one party can pursue their 
own interests, without other individuals/teams/groups realising this exertion of power. 
This perspective of power focuses on unobservable mechanisms that can hide 
challenges as if they do not exist. This refers to practices such as deception and 
illegitimate activities that powerful actors can use to protect their own interests. Gordon 
and Grant (2005) explain that power is an entity that can be used to compel the other 
party to do things that they might not do if they had known about the conflicts. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1963) highlight that "power is exercised not just upon participants 
within the decision-making process but also towards the exclusion of certain 
participants and issues altogether" (as cited in Lukes, 1974, p.16). This political view of 
power applies a broader lens. Instead of focusing on individual behaviour, it emphasises 
the institutional practices that impact on power relations in organisations. Due to its 
concentration on processes and procedures that are used to exert power in organisations, 
this two-dimensional view of power is also called power-as-process (Dhillon 2004). 
Power-as-process refers to different methods, practices and processes that the powerful 
party uses to de-legitimise the other actors’ actions and decisions, thus legitimising 
theirs (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Dhillon, 2004; Pettigrew, 1979; Clegg, 2000).  
 
The three-dimensional or radical structural view of power emphasises that power 
has the capacity to influence social processes. Gaventa (1980) asserts: “power 
influences, shapes or determines conceptions of necessities, possibilities, and strategies 
of challenge in situations of conflict" (p.15). Like the political and behaviour 
perspectives, power is viewed as a resource. However, this perspective focuses on the 
directed and intended methods that the actors use to shape social practices. Examples of 
these methods can be media and communication systems, through which A influences 
and shapes B’s beliefs in a way that makes him do certain things that support beliefs or 
actions instilled by A. In such circumstances the powerless has been psychologically 
adapted to believe their “state of being without power” (Gaventa, 1980, p.16), as a 
result of which they see it impossible to reverse the situation and act against the 
powerful systems. Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) refer to this type of power that is 
practiced in organisations to control, manipulate and influence the subordinates in order 
to secure the manager’s interests. 
 
Hardy (1994) and Clegg (1989) add the fourth dimension or the relational aspect of 
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power to Lukes’ list. This fourth dimension is embedded in Foucault’s (1977) work, 
and unlike Luke’s three dimensions of power, this perspective does not explain power 
as a property that can be possessed by either party. Instead, power is relational, 
inseparable from social relationships, and moving between parties, thus power is not an 
absolute factor possessed by only one group (Gergen, 1992; Handy, 1985; Linstead et 
al., 2009). Power is dispersed, for instance, when one party is empowered in one area 
then the other party might be empowered in other areas. Foucault (1997) explains, 
power is not “a privilege that one might possess", but it constitutes "a network of 
relations, constantly in tension, in activity” (Foucault, 1979, p.26–27). Here, the 
powerful might still have the advantage over the others, but their state of domination is 
not static, and the dynamic between the parties is expected to change. Foucault explains 
that “everybody is caught [in these power relations], those who exercise power just as 
much as those over whom power is exercised” (Foucault, 1980, p.156). 
 
Power and Its Relationship to Knowledge 
Lukes’ three dimensions of power introduced above all view power as an entity and a 
resource that is independent of people that can be utilised to influence the other parties 
and help secure the interests of the powerful (Luke, 1974; Bacharach & Baratz, 1963; 
Dahl, 1957; French & Raven, 1959; Hales, 1993; Liao, 2008). Therefore in these three 
views of power, knowledge is regarded as a resource that exists independently of 
individuals and can be utilised to pursue and secure the interests of particular groups 
because it creates dependencies among groups (Pettigrew, 1979). In the knowledge 
management literature, studies seem to have mainly used this resource-based view of 
power, suggesting that power and knowledge can be the possession of special 
individuals/groups (Gordon & Grant, 2005; Hales, 1993; Liao, 2008; Swan & 
Scarbrough, 2005). The entity approach to power or the resource-based view of power 
argues that powerful groups and individuals utilise their resources to establish certain 
practices, norms and values. These resources are used to shape claims of truth; the 
practices and processes form values and norms, through which the powerful justify their 
decisions, thus pursuing their own interests. Through these established values, practices 
and norms, they promote or suppress, legitimise or marginalise their rivals’ claims of 
knowledge. This resource-based view of power and knowledge can also be observed in 
Yanow’s (2004) work that shows the exercise of power through organisational practices 
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and de-legitimisation. She found that bakery drivers’ local knowledge was not only 
"discounted", but also "disparaged" by the executives who favoured codified 
knowledge, rather than tacit and local knowledge (p.S9). 
 
However, the Foucauldian perspective views power and knowledge as inseparable and 
working in a dynamic relationship. It emphasises that power is relational, embedded in 
social practices and exercised through shaping knowledge. Deleuze (1988) delineates 
that power is tacit and for its exercise it requires a vehicle. Knowledge works as the 
vehicle through which power is produced and exercised. Knowledge justifies and 
rationalises the exercise of power, while knowledge benefits from the force and drive 
power provides it with (Guilfoyle, 2006). This interconnectedness of knowledge and 
power is underlined in the following Foucault’s statement: “Knowledge and power are 
integrated with one another … It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 1977 as 
cited in Rabinow, 1991, p.61). Similarly, Contu and Willmott (2003) highlight the 
centrality of the concept of power in studying knowledge processes and describe power 
and knowledge as mutually constituted. Thompson (2005) also proposes that “knowing 
is a social activity, … not immune from power relations” (p.153). 
 
One of the most important implications of the Foucauldian perspective on power in 
organisational studies is the interplay of knowledge and power. Power/knowledge 
claims are not viewed as absolute truths, but are constantly contested through social 
interactions, discourses and negotiations. In other words, actors are constantly involved 
in shaping knowledge by legitimising their other ideas and de-legitimising the 
knowledge of their rivals (Sewell, 2005). In her study of dispersed network of HR 
practice, Heizmann (2011) finds that practitioners marginalised and contested the 
legitimacy of each other’s knowledge through discursive practices and negotiation. She 
argues that knowledge is discursively constructed, thus emphasising the role of the 
power-knowledge relationship in organisational knowledge sharing. 
 
Similarly, Roberts (2006) highlights that power relations are formed through arguments 
and discourses. As she explores knowledge management methods in communities of 
practice, she observes that the power structures within an organisation shape the power 
relations between different groups and affect their knowledge sharing practices. 
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Therefore, the existing literature suggests that looking at the micro-practices, discourses 
and procedures of different social contexts can help develop an understanding of how 
truth or knowledge is constructed in different contexts (Buchanan & Badham, 2008; 
Ekbia & Kling, 2003; Hardy, 1994; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994; Sewell, 2005). 
 
This might seem to be similar to the discussions of the three-dimensional perspective of 
power, in which the dominant utilises processes and meanings to influence and control 
the weak. But what distinguishes the three-dimensional perspective from the 
Foucauldian view is the fact that in the former perspective, power and knowledge are 
exclusive to the dominant. In contrast, the latter emphasises that the weak also have 
access to power and knowledge, thus refuting the depiction of power and knowledge as 
an absolute factor. 
 
Another implication of the Foucauldian perspective on power is that everybody is 
subject to power. In other words, everybody is both exercising power and being 
subjected to power (Foucault, 1977). Applied to organisational studies, this view 
highlights the role of mechanisms and organisational practices in shaping the power-
knowledge relationship, also reiterating that power and knowledge are not absolute 
entities accessible only to particular groups. Instead, power and knowledge are 
relational and dynamic, embedded in social interactions, discourses and negotiations. 
Thus, the positions of power will change in negotiations over meaning; discourse and 
language shape knowledge and power. 
 
Therefore, the Foucauldian perspective sees power as moving between actors: power is 
not solely the possession of the dominant, but the weak – or for the purposes of this 
discussion, the employees – can also exercise it. This perspective resonates with 
McKinlay’s (2000) study of a multinational pharmaceutical company, in which 
management attempts to convert employees’ tacit knowledge to explicit and codified 
knowledge, as a result maintaining control in the organisation. McKinlay (2000) finds 
that employees show resistance to the managers’ exertion of power and instead they use 
their local knowledge to their own advantage. This highlights employees’ awareness of 
their capabilities and their use of knowledge to exert power and maintain control. 
 
Unlike the resource-based view that portrays power as something negative and 
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destructive, the Foucauldian perspective recognises power as “a productive force” that 
provides all parties with the opportunity to enter power relations (Swan & Scarbrough, 
2005, p.920). The resource-based view presents power as the possession of one 
group/individual, where the weak is suppressed by the domination of the other, and that 
is why it is suggested that the practice of power should be avoided (Kanter, 1979). 
However, the relational perspective does not accept this monolithic view of power, thus 
portraying it as “a force that affects outcomes” (Hardy, 1996, S3). Hardy (1996) 
disputes the negative connotations of power, highlighting that power is crucial in 
facilitating collaborative action (Hardy, 1996, S6). Similarly, Swan and Scarbrough 
(2005) identify the productive aspect of power contributing to knowledge integration 
and innovation outcomes. Mintzberg (1983) also portrays a positive aspect for power, 
and explains that power games can be healthy if they are played in moderation in 
organisations. 
 
In this section, I argued that cross-boundary collaborations are laden with difficulties 
associated with differences in perspectives and different ways of knowing and 
practicing, and proposed that to understand how knowledge is managed in these 
settings, the role of power, politics and negotiations need to be taken into account 
(Kimble et al., 2010; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Christensen et al., 2000; 
McGivern & Dopson, 2010). I presented four different perspectives of power and their 
relationship with knowledge, explaining what methods are being used to practice power 
and exert control in relationships. Although scholarly research emphasises the 
interconnectedness of knowledge processes and power, few studies have empirically 
examined the processes of knowledge integration in political contexts, or studied the 
role of power structures in these processes (Hislop, 2013; Karreman, 2010; Oborn & 
Dawson, 2010; Dopson & Fitzgerald, 2005). How different individuals/teams/groups 
with high levels of differences, dependencies and novelty manage power-knowledge 
relations is an unaddressed issue that needs further research. The literature has not 
explained how power structures impact on knowledge integration in an inter-
organisational context where the partners seem to have unequal access to power 
resources. Consequently it is important to address these limitations and examine how 
power practices facilitate/hinder knowledge integration and collaboration across 
organisational boundaries. 
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The knowledge management literature emphasises the relational and social dimension 
of knowledge integration, and I chose a practice-based view because it accounted for 
the contested nature of knowledge. Similarly, I adopted the relational view of power for 
this research because it is in line with the practice-based view, recognising the contested 
nature of power/knowledge, thus providing a suitable conceptual lens to examine 
knowledge processes (Blackler, 1995; Fox, 2000; Hardy, 1996; Marshall & Rollinson, 
2004; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). The videogame development process requires the 
combination of various knowledge domains and disciplines in which knowledge seems 
to be interactively and collectively constructed. In this context, social interactions and 
negotiations are crucial in shaping the collaboration between different disciplines and 
partners in order to develop knowledge. Thus, the Foucauldian inspired relational 
perspective of power and knowledge will be utilised here allowing me to focus on the 
relational and social aspect of practices. By using this perspective I can develop an 
understanding of how power dynamics shape practices, how knowledge is integrated 
and how collaboration is facilitated in a highly political context of inter-organisational 
work. Since only a few studies in the knowledge management literature have utilised a 
Foucauldian perspective (Heizmann, 2011; McKinlay, 2000), this thesis will also 
contribute to the existing knowledge by highlighting the importance of the Foucauldian 
perspective on power to understand the contested nature of knowledge processes in 
boundary spanning collaborations. 
 
2.2.3. The Development of Trust 
Developing trust is regarded as another critical factor in managing knowledge processes 
and collaboration. This section reviews the knowledge management literature in order 
to understand the link between trust and knowledge sharing, and how trust influences 
collaboration across diverse groups. Many studies claim that the development of trust is 
a key determinant for successful collaboration in group working and inter-
organisational relationships (Das & Teng, 2001; Geyskens et al., 1996; Geyskens et al., 
1998; Håkansson et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2011; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Mouzas et al., 
2007; Nandhakumar, 1999; Newell & Swan, 2000; Palmatier et al., 2006; Palmatier et 
al., 2007; Poppo et al., 2008; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Squire et al., 2009; Zaheer et 
al., 1998). The existing empirical literature underpins the role of trust in creating an 
effective relationship across boundaries in several ways. Developing trust has proven to 
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facilitate problem solving (Zand, 1972; Boss, 1978), communication (Thomas et al., 
2009), commitment (Ristig, 2009; Paine, 2006; Darrough, 2008), partner satisfaction 
(Schreiner et al., 2009; Shockley-Zalabak et al., 2010), productivity (Kramer & Cook, 
2004), and profitability (Davis et al., 2000; Bibb & Kourdi, 2004). Trust has also been 
found to foster continuance of collaboration (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Malhotra & 
Lumineau, 2011) and team performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Webber, 2002), while at 
the same time reducing the perception of risk (Doz, 1996) and transaction cost (Chow, 
2008). Empirical studies conclude that trust can be a source of competitive advantage 
for organisations (Barney & Hansen, 1995; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). But, in the 
knowledge management literature the recent surge of interest in the concept of trust is 
due to its links with knowledge and innovation (Adler, 2001; Huemer et al., 1998; 
Marshall et al., 2005). 
 
Before examining the trust-knowledge relationship, I will first define the concept of 
trust and different dimensions attributed to it. Trust can be defined as “a set of mutual 
expectations or anticipations regarding each other’s behaviour and each other’s 
fulfilment of perceived obligations” (Thorelli, 1986, see Madhok, 1995, p.120). 
Therefore trust is not simply a "naïve belief" in your partner (Bromiley & Cummings, 
1993). Poppo et al. (2008) explain that trust is when the partners recognise that the 
agreements between them can be violated, but their partner chooses not to behave in 
their own interests. Sako (1992) defines trust based on how it can be developed in a 
relationship, giving the partners’ the ability to predict they will be treated in a “mutually 
acceptable manner”. Trust has also been defined as a risk-taking act or a “willingness to 
render oneself vulnerable” to the actions of another party (Rousseau et al., 1998, p.395). 
Newell and Swan (2000) add to these definitions by providing a threefold typology that 
has been extensively used and referred to in empirical research. Newell and Swan’s 
(2000) typology distinguishes between companion trust, competence trust and 
commitment trust. Companion trust refers to partners’ goodwill or personal friendships, 
where people rely on their morality in order to behave in certain ways and not to harm 
their partner. Competence trust is formed on the basis of people’s ability and 
competence to perform. In this case partners develop a sense of respect for the 
complementary skills their partners have. The last form of trust in their typology is an 
institutional trust, called commitment trust, which is shaped and fostered due to 
contractual agreements between the parties. 
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Another way to conceptualise trust is to differentiate between structural and social trust. 
Structural or institutional trust is developed and reinforced through institutional factors, 
such as contracts or other formal mechanisms that build up a security for the parties, so 
that they feel they will not be abused or mistreated in the relationship (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989; Dyer & Chu, 2003; McEvily et al., 2003). On the other hand, social trust 
refers to individual people’s confidence in each other’s goodwill and integrity (Madhok, 
1995). This research utilises this latter typology of trust because these definitions of 
trust focus on the mechanisms or methods that are used to develop trust. Where as 
Newell and Swan's (2000) definition of trust centres mainly on the nature of trust, 
whether being companion, competence or commitment. Since the thesis aims to 
examine how development of trust facilitates knowledge processes in cross-boundary 
work, the structural and social typology and its focus on explaining the methods of trust 
development is much more relevant to my research. I believe this classification helps 
me enhance my understanding of the impact of different mechanisms/tools or processes 
on facilitating cross-boundary collaborations, rather than solely explain what type of 
trust is being developed. 
 
Jiang et al. (2011) find that both structural and social trust have a significant role in 
building inter-organisational relationships. Depicting the development of trust as 
mutually constitutive and a “cyclical” process, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) also 
believe that both negotiations (formal bargaining, informal sense-making) and 
commitments (formal legal contract, psychological contract) are required to foster trust 
in the relationships between organisations (p.112). But other scholars argue that social 
trust, as “relational capital”, is the key driver of inter-firm collaborations (Kale & Singh, 
2009; Kale et al., 2000; Schreiner et al., 2009). For instance, Narayandas and Rangan 
(2004) study the trust-commitment dynamics in inter-organisational relationships and 
suggest that inter-personal trust can have a significant impact on commitments, but they 
do not support the role of institutional or structural trust in these relationships. This 
stream of research defines social trust as a knowledge-based confidence that is 
gradually shaped and developed mutually through partners’ informal processes (Zaheer 
et al., 1998). 
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The critical role of trust in facilitating knowledge processes has been highlighted by a 
vast quantity of research (Abrams et al., 2003; Adler, 2001; Andrews & Delahaye, 
2000; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Darvish & Nikbakshs, 2010; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; 
Dyer & Chu, 2003; Holste & Fields, 2010; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Lee et al., 2010; 
Levin & Cross, 2004; McEvily et al., 2003; Mooradian et al., 2006; Newell et al., 2007; 
Roberts, 2000; van Wijk et al., 2008). For instance, Niu (2010) examines 188 
companies working in four international networks and concludes that trust facilitates 
open communication and knowledge acquisition. Mooradian and his colleagues (2006) 
explain the trust-knowledge sharing relationship,  highlighting that those with a higher 
tendency to trust get more involved in knowledge sharing activities. Similarly, Ko 
(2010), in his study of consultant-expert dyads finds trust as a crucial factor in 
maintaining an effective knowledge transfer. The link between trust and knowledge 
transfer in the literature is so strong that some scholars even consider trust as knowledge 
transfer. For example, Yusof and Ismail (2010) define trust as people’s willingness to 
share knowledge in order to gain mutual benefits and protect them from being exploited 
by the other actors within the organisation. 
 
As stated above, the literature establishes the relationship between trust and knowledge 
sharing. However, it generally only links the social or relational aspect of trust to 
knowledge sharing, claiming that the trust which is developed through interpersonal 
relations has a significant impact on knowledge processes (Adler, 2001; Darvish & 
Nikbakshs, 2010; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Lee et al., 2010; 
McEvily et al., 2003; Mooradian et al., 2006; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Newell et 
al., 2007; van Wijk et al., 2008). In contrast, contractual obligations do not always seem 
to be effective in facilitating knowledge integration, especially when tacit knowledge 
needs to be shared between different expert groups (Inkpen & Pien, 2006). The stable 
and fixed nature of contracts often cannot reflect the details and intensity of knowledge 
that is expected to be shared. 
 
Rather than contracts, forms and structures, high levels of social interaction are 
sometimes needed to develop trust and enable the partners to share tacit knowledge 
(Becerra et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2000; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Similarly, Holste and 
Fields’ (2010) study of professional managers in an international organisation underline 
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that personal trust, developed through personal relationships, had a greater impact on 
the sharing of tacit knowledge, than structural and institutional trust. Another good 
example of the link between social trust and knowledge sharing is Harryson and his 
colleagues’ work (2008). This study showed that the management had to encourage 
informal social interactions in order to increase the level of trust and knowledge sharing 
between different expert groups. But this perspective was disputed by Mouzas et al. 
(2007) who claim that trust should be conceptualised differently for inter-organisational 
relationships, suggesting that interpersonal trust will be insufficient for the collaboration 
between firms. They argue that protective mechanisms and standards should be used , 
alongside social trust, in order to facilitate business relationships. 
 
Trust in Cross-Boundary Collaborations 
Having reviewed the literature on the concept of trust, it can be concluded that trust, 
especially in the context of inter-organisational collaboration, is a multi-dimensional 
concept (Currall & Inkpen, 2006; Mouzas et al., 2007). The importance of trust and its 
significant impact on knowledge sharing in cross-boundary collaboration cannot be 
denied (Adler, 2001; Argote et al., 2003; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; 
Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Newell et al., 2007; van Wijk et al., 2008). However 
when there is a limited amount of shared and common knowledge, as well as a weak or 
no sense of identity between the groups working together, the development of trust 
becomes a complex and difficult task (Hislop, 2013; Janowics-Panjaitan & 
Noorderhaven, 2009). The complexity of trust in cross-boundary work can be explained 
by its link to perceptions of risk, uncertainty and vulnerability. As Hislop (2013) 
highlights “development of trust-based working relations is by no means easy or 
straightforward, especially when the groups collaborating perceive that their interests 
may be conflicting” (p.179). 
 
Research suggests that trust mitigates the perceptions of risk and failure, thus 
encouraging knowledge processes in these contexts (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Quigley et al., 2007). In other words, it is suggested that organisations need “trust as an 
input condition in order to stimulate supportive activities in situations of uncertainty or 
risk” (Luhmann, 1988, p.103). Thus, trust is used as a form of control to relieve 
uncertainty or risk in organisations (Das & Teng, 2001; Rodriguez & Wilson, 2002). 
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However, it can be argued that individuals/teams/groups face some elements of risk 
when they trust their partner(s) and share their knowledge with them. In other words, 
knowledge providers put themselves in a vulnerable position and they might lose 
competitive advantage if valuable knowledge is shared with a competitor (McEvily et 
al., 2003). This is particularly true when the partners view knowledge as a source of 
power (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Szulanski, 1996). Another part of the risk is that the 
recipient of knowledge may absorb poor quality knowledge that might have been 
conveyed with bad intentions (Mooradian et al., 2006). Therefore, sharing knowledge 
equals risk for the knowledge provider in such circumstances. 
 
Since cross-boundary work and knowledge integration also involve elements of risk 
(Mooradian et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998), I adopt Rousseau and her colleagues’ 
depiction and define trust as a risk-taking act or a “willingness to render oneself 
vulnerable” to the actions of another party (Rousseau et al., 1998, p.395). Structural and 
social trust have been found to have different impacts on different settings and studies. 
As some highlight implementing protective mechanisms to develop trust (Dyer & Chu, 
2003; McEvily, et al., 2003; Mouzas et al., 2007), others claim that social or relational 
trust enable different groups to engage in collaborative relationships in which 
knowledge is integrated successfully (Kale & Singh, 2009; Kale et al., 2000; Schreiner 
et al., 2009). However, the question of which dimension of trust (social and/or 
structural) facilitates knowledge processes when uncertainties and risk reside in the 
environment remains unanswered. This thesis addresses this gap in the existing 
literature and examines how the development of trust influences knowledge processes in 
the complex, uncertain and risky relationship of publishers and developers in the 
videogame industry.  
 
2.3. Limitations of Existing Literature 
High levels of innovation and competition demand effective work across different 
boundaries (Bruns, 2013; Bechky, 2006; Nicolini et al., 2012; Tortoriello & Krackhart, 
2010). However, the management of collaboration and maintaining fluid knowledge 
processes across diverse groups cannot be easily achieved. This chapter has reviewed 
the literature on cross-boundary work and the challenges of managing cross-boundary 
collaborations. Three key factors were identified that facilitate knowledge processes in 
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cross-boundary work settings: boundary objects as coordinating mechanisms; extensive 
dialogue and power structures; and the development of trust. However, the review 
reveals that there is a limited understanding of three distinct areas in the existing 
literature that need further study. 
 
Firstly, the multi-dimensional and dynamic aspect of boundary objects has been 
highlighted in the literature (Nicolini, 2011; Star, 2010). These studies mainly 
concentrate on the coordinative roles of boundary objects and the relationship between 
different objects to facilitate collaborations (Nicolini, et al., 2012; Scarbrough et al., 
2015). However, there is a limited understanding of the role of social processes and 
interactions on the effectiveness of boundary objects and knowledge processes (Lainer-
Vos, 2013; Zeiss & Groenewegen, 2009). The review also identifies that the dynamic 
characteristics of boundary objects and how they evolve during the course of a project 
or collaboration are relatively unaddressed (Nicolini, et al., 2012). Carlile (2002, 2004) 
proposes that “boundary objects are no ‘magic bullet’ because their characteristics are 
hard to sustain as problems and people change” (p.452), adding that depending on the 
level of novelty, differences and dependencies between the partners, knowledge 
processes require different mechanisms and methods to be managed. However, Carlile 
(2002, 2004) explains cross-boundary work and the role of boundary objects in the 
context of intra-organisational collaboration. Thus, our understanding of knowledge 
processes across inter-organisational boundaries, where there are expected to be more 
divergent interests and conflicts between partners, remains undeveloped. 
 
Secondly, the review shows that the crucial role of power, politics and negotiations in 
cross-boundary collaboration has been recognised in the literature (Kimble et al., 2010; 
Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Christensen et al., 2000; McGivern & Dopson, 
2010). I presented different dimensions of power and discussed different methods that 
are being used to practice power in organisations, hence influencing knowledge 
processes and relationships. The interconnectedness of knowledge and power was 
emphasised, and the relationship between different dimensions of power and knowledge 
was highlighted. However, we know little about the impact of power on knowledge 
processes or about how knowledge is integrated in political contexts (Hislop, 2013; 
Karreman, 2010; Oborn & Dawson, 2010; Dopson & Fitzgerald, 2005). The 
Foucauldian/relational perspective on power is important because it accounts for the 
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contested nature of knowledge, recognising the role of social practices and interactions 
in shaping power/knowledge dynamics (Blackler, 1995; Fox, 2000; Hardy, 1996; 
Marshall & Rollinson, 2004; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). However, the utilisation of 
this Foucauldian/relational perspective on power is particularly neglected in the 
literature. 
 
Thirdly, the literature underlines that the development of trust is an essential factor in 
facilitating knowledge and cross-boundary work (Adler, 2001; Argote et al., 2003; Dyer 
& Chu, 2003; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Newell et al., 
2007; van Wijk et al., 2008). The review concentrated on structural and social trust – 
the former leads to the implementation of protective mechanisms to develop trust (Dyer 
& Chu, 2003; McEvily, et al., 2003; Mouzas et al., 2007), while the latter suggests that 
social interactions can facilitate knowledge processes and collaboration (Kale & Singh, 
2009; Kale et al., 2000; Schreiner et al., 2009). However, the literature also highlights 
that the development of trust in highly risky and uncertain work environments is a 
complicated process that is hard to achieve (Currall & Inkpen, 2006; Hislop, 2013; 
Janowics-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). I argue, first, that developing trust, cross-
boundary work and knowledge integration across boundaries all involve elements of 
risk (Mooradian et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Second, I suggest that the processes 
through which trust can be developed to enable knowledge integration and facilitate 
cross-boundary work in a highly risky and unpredictable environment have received 
very little research attention. 
 
2.4. Existing Research in the Videogames Sector 
Through this review I argued that integrating knowledge in cross-boundary 
collaborations is particularly challenging due to the complexity, unpredictability and 
uncertainty of innovation processes. Carlile (2002, 2004) proposes that the relational 
properties of knowledge, such as difference, dependency and novelty, are barriers to 
innovation, explaining that the higher the level of novelty in the collaboration across 
boundaries, the more complicated the process of knowledge integration becomes, thus 
requiring distinct methods to diagnose and address the existing difficulties. This 
empirical study examines knowledge processes in the context of the videogame industry 
because the challenges of complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty seem to be 
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highly prevalent and distinctive in the videogame development process (Nandhakumar 
et al., 2013; Stacey & Nandhakumar, 2009; Tschang, 2007; Zackariasson et al., 2006 a, 
b). 
 
The focus of existing research in the videogames sector has been mainly on 
understanding creativity (Cohendent & Simon, 2007; Panourgias et al., 2014; Tschang, 
2007; Zackariasson et al., 2006 a, b), highlighting the distinctive features of videogame 
development as a dynamic and unpredictable process that involves interdependent, 
emergent and under-specified tasks and goals (Kellogg et al., 2006; Nandhakumar et al., 
2013; Panourgias et al., 2014; Scarbrough et al., 2015). There has also been some 
research on the methods and tools used in videogame development, such as project 
management tools (Kanode & Haddad, 2009; O’Hagan & O’Connor, 2015; Petrillo & 
Pimenta, 2010; Politowski, et al., 2016). However, few studies focus on knowledge 
processes in these contexts. Some of the scholarly work in the videogame industry 
identifies the role of objects in coordinating work across groups, concentrating on the 
"interpretive flexibility" of objects in facilitating practices and collaborations (Bruns, 
2013; Kellogg et al., 2006; Nandhakumar et al., 2013). Scarbrough and his colleagues 
(2015) apply a relational view of the role of objects and examine the relationship 
between objects. In their study, they suggest that the relations between objects are 
effective in coordinating between groups. Conversely, their study focuses on intra-
organisational dynamics within videogame development studios. Therefore, the existing 
literature shows that there is a limited understanding of knowledge processes in the 
highly complex, unpredictable and uncertain setting of videogame development. 
Nandhakumar et al. (2013) suggest that the existing research in the videogame industry 
is also less concerned with the conflicts and organisational politics between diverse 
groups. As a result, I believe that studying inter-organisational dynamics in videogame 
development will address these undeveloped areas in the literature and will explain the 
impact of organisational and social processes, including the role of power dynamics and 
social/structural trust, on boundary objects and knowledge integration in these creative 
and innovative contexts. 
 
In the rapidly changing videogames industry, collaboration and communication are 
considered critical factors because to produce a successful game, companies need to 
facilitate cross-discipline activities between designers, artists, engineers and 
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programmers, as well as implementing knowledge of the international market with 
cutting-edge technology. The juxtaposition of all these skills, expertise, knowledge and 
technology, however, needs a large amount of investment, management and acumen. 
The predominant business model within the industry is based on the partnership of 
publishers and developers. This publisher-developer relationship is a critical driver for 
industry performance and has been the focal point for debate and scrutiny in the past 
few decades. However, it still remains intriguing and problematic. Since knowledge 
integration is an integral part of the publisher-developer collaboration, it is believed that 
studying the knowledge processes in the novel setting of this relationship will shed 
more light on how knowledge is integrated in cross-boundary collaboration. The next 
chapter will provide an outlook on the videogame industry and the documented 
conflicts of the publisher-developer relationship. 
 
2.5. Summary of Research Objectives 
Cross-boundary knowledge integration has attracted much attention in recent research 
due to the importance and challenges of having an effective working relationship in 
such contexts. The literature suggests different methods and strategies to enable 
organisations to facilitate knowledge integration across their knowledge domains. At the 
same time, the literature emphasises that this can be a problematic and complicated 
process when there are high levels of differences, dependencies and novelty between 
different disciplines working together (Majchrzak et al., 2012).  
 
In this review, three key factors were identified to be effective in facilitating knowledge 
processes across boundaries. In the course of the literature review I identified three 
areas in the existing theoretical and empirical literature that need further research. To 
address these limitations, this research aims to examine knowledge processes within the 
cross-boundary practices of the large publishers and small/medium-sized developers in 
the creative and innovative setting of videogames development. The study will look at 
cross-boundary practices, the conflicts experienced within these boundaries, while at the 
same time looking for practices or methods that encourage knowledge integration 
within the developer-publisher collaboration. In order to achieve this, the research will 
address the following questions: 
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RQ1: How do boundary objects influence knowledge processes across the          
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ2:  How do power relations influence knowledge processes across the publisher-
developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ3: How does developing trust influence knowledge processes across the          
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
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Chapter Three: An Overview of the Videogames Industry 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the videogames industry, introducing its six 
distinctive actors. The chapter focuses on two of these actors, developers and 
publishers, outlining their features and main responsibilities in developing videogames. 
I provide the statistics for the developers in the UK because the companies I have 
studied were all based in the UK. However, for the publishers section, I present a more 
general and global overview of the publishers and their function. This is because the 
publishers involved in my research were multinational firms. Later in this chapter, I 
highlight the importance of the publisher-developer relationship in the industry, 
explaining how this collaboration is formed and governed. The chapter underlines that 
the industry rhetoric depicts the publisher-developer relationship as conflicting and 
irreconcilable. Finally, I add that this negative portrayal inspired me to examine the 
publisher-developer relationship in order to understand how knowledge can be 
integrated in such a complicated setting. 
 
Over the past three decades, the videogame industry has grown from a niche technology 
sector to a mainstream consumer entertainment, providing interactive content to a vast 
range of consumer segments. The global videogames market is worth over $100 billion 
annually, with a 6.2 per cent increase in worldwide revenue in 2016 (Newzoo, 2017). It 
is predicted that the entire games market will reach $188.6 billion by 2019 with a 
projected growth of 6.6 per cent (Newzoo, 2017). In comparison, the global film 
industry recorded worldwide revenues of $38 billion by the end of 2015 and is expected 
to grow to $50 billion by 2020, which is surprisingly much lower than the total 
videogame revenue (Ukie, 2017). 
 
In terms of regional segmentation, China has overtaken the USA as the world’s biggest 
market – $24.4 billion versus $23.6 billion. Given the greater number of residents in the 
region and the capacity of gaming to reach full market penetration, it is expected that 
China's global lead will only expand over time (Newzoo, 2017). However, the two 
market leaders, China and the USA, have significantly different sources of revenue, 
with the USA remaining established in its traditional market of games consoles and 
virtual reality (VR) at a $9.9bn share. On the other hand, China heavily focuses on the 
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PC market (consumers using personal computers to play games) at a $15.2bn share 
(Ukie, 2017). In terms of revenue generation, the UK videogames industry is the sixth 
largest game market after China, the USA, Japan, South Korea and Germany (Ukie, 
2017). 
 
The videogames industry in the UK is recognised as contributing significantly to the 
creative economy (TIGA, 2016). In 2014, the videogames sector accounted for £1,115 
million of the UK’s GDP and generated £471 million for HM Treasury in tax revenues 
(TIGA, 2017). The UK houses twenty three of the most successful and profitable game 
studios in the world, having produced titles such as Football Manager, Tomb Raider 
and Grand Theft Auto – the fifth iteration of which as of 2016 has sold more than 70 
million copies worldwide (TIGA, 2016). Game development is regarded as a knowledge 
industry, employing highly-skilled and trained individuals. The number of skilled 
employees who work directly in games development reached 10,869 in 2014 (TIGA, 
2017). A recent report highlighted that "there are 2,141 active games companies in the 
UK, operating at all sizes and scales, with world-class talent" and 95% of these 
companies are micro or small businesses" (Ukie, 2017). 
 
The videogame industry is made up of six distinctive and connected layers, including 
publishers, developers (talent), production tools, hardware, distribution and retail, and 
customers (Bethke, 2003). 
 
• Publishers are medium to large organisations that develop games either 
internally or fund external studios to develop them and seek returns through 
licensing, selling and distributing these games in the market.  
• Videogame developers are composed of talents, such as artists, designers and 
programmers who work either independently, or in collaboration with a 
publisher under project-based temporary contracts, or they might be owned by 
the publisher. 
• Production tools refer to game engines, middleware or production management 
tools that are used to create games. There are companies within the industry that 
create and sell this software to both publishers and developers.  
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• Hardware refers to the underlying platform required to run the game, which may 
be a games console or PC, online-based, or accessed through mobile devices 
such as the iPhone. 
• Distribution or retail refer to the companies that are involved in marketing and 
channelling of games to the end user, via stores or online distribution portals. 
• Customers are the end-users or players of the games.  
 
Since this thesis focuses on the publisher-developer relationship, in the next two 
sections I elaborate on developers and publishers. 
 
3.1. Profile of the Videogame Developers in the UK 
There are over 220 developers (development studios) in the UK, the majority of which 
are small and medium-sized enterprises (Ukie 2014). This number includes (1) in-house 
developers, (2) third-party developers, and (3) independent developers. 
 
An in-house developer is a studio or group developing games for – and owned by – a 
publisher or a console manufacturing company. These developers might use the name of 
the publisher or they might have their own trademarked name, such as Guerilla Games, 
owned by Sony, or Dice, owned by Electronic Arts (EA). An in-house developer can 
also be an independent developer that has been acquired by the publisher, such as 
developer Double Helix, acquired by Amazon in 2014. Whatever name the developer 
uses, practically it is owned by the publisher and they are considered as the "publisher's 
team". Developers acquired by the publisher tend to continue to operate much as they 
did before acquisition, with the primary differences being in exclusivity and the 
financial details. However, sometimes even these developers have conflicts of interests 
and clashes with the publishers, such as Infinity Ward whose directors had legal clashes 
with Activision after the publisher acquired them. The episode ended in the original 
directors of Infinity Ward being fired – this was one of the biggest scandals of the 
videogames industry in 2010 (McWhertor, 2010). The average mean turnover of in-
house developers is £15,500,000 and they employ an average of 245 employees – this is 
only 9 per cent of the whole population of videogame developers (Wilson, 2015). 
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A third-party developer is an independent videogame developer, employing a highly 
skilled and creative workforce, including artists, programmers and designers. These 
developers collaborate with a videogame publisher to develop a game. In most cases, 
they do not own the IP (Intellectual Property) of the game. Instead, they are paid by a 
publisher to create a game and usually receive some form of royalties after they break 
even. The idea and concept of the game either comes from the developer, or it is shaped 
and developed through their collaboration with a publisher. This type of collaboration 
with a publisher is also called “work for hire” in the industry. I explain what a publisher 
is and how the publisher-developer relationship is formed and governed in sections 3.2 
and 3.3. respectively. It is reported that 91 per cent of third-party developers are small 
and medium, employing an average of 55 highly skilled workers, including artists, 
designers and programmers. The average mean turnover of a third-party developer 
studio that develops games is £3,130,600. Although these developers mainly raise funds 
for developing games through signing a contract with a publisher, they might also self-
finance their operations, draw on royalties and use bank overdrafts. The data show that 
collaboration with a publisher (33 per cent) and self-financing (30 per cent) constitute 
the most important sources of finance for most developers (Wilson, 2015). 
 
An independent developer is an individual or a small software developer that is not 
owned by or beholden to a publisher. These developers self-publish their games and 
develop their games without a publisher's financial support (Gril, 2008). To market their 
games, these developers rely on the Internet and word of mouth. Without the huge 
marketing budgets of publishers, their products almost never get as much recognition or 
popular acclaim as those of larger publishers such as Sony, Microsoft or EA. However, 
these developers are free to explore experimental themes and styles of gameplay that 
publishers would generally not risk their money on. They might apply a different 
business model, such as designing a free-to-play social game, such as Farmville on 
Facebook (Irwin, 2008), and draw upon a wide range of sources of finance including 
venture capitalists/business angels (7 per cent), bank loans (1 per cent) or 
government/EU grants (3 per cent) (Wilson, 2015).  
 
A recent study of videogame development studios found that the majority of 
development studios are independent, as opposed to being in-house, publisher-owned 
developer (Ukie, 2017). In 2012, there were approximately three times more 
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independent development studios than publisher owned, in-house studios (Gibson & 
Gibson 2012). However, these small/medium-sized enterprises typically depend on a 
single customer or a small number of customers, making their business highly risky. If a 
developer loses its key customer or customers the effect could be irreparable. 
Significantly, independent developers that also publish games have the most diverse 
customer base – since these developers can successfully publish and distribute their own 
games, they can diversify their route to market and reduce their dependence on 
publishers. But there are still a large number of developers that are reliant on 
collaboration with publishers. Wilson (2015) showed that 56 per cent of games 
produced by developers were "work for hire" projects and 63 per cent of games 
produced by independent games developers were funded by a publisher or other licence 
holders, such as toy companies, TV license holders, etc. (TIGA, 2015). 
 
3.2. Profile of the Videogame Publishers 
A videogame publisher is a company that takes to market games that they have either 
developed internally (in-house) or have them developed by an external company (third-
party developer). Sony, Microsoft, Activision Blizzard, Nintendo and Ubisoft are 
among the major publishers in the world, with multiple regional operations and 
subsidiaries, employing a large number of staff. For instance, Ubisoft is based in 
France, but employs 10,000 worldwide. Activision Blizzard has its headquarters in the 
USA with 9,000 employees working for the company worldwide. There are smaller 
specialist publishers within the industry, such as Capcom and Konami that, according to 
their corporate data, hire 2,600 and 4,580 people respectively (Metacritic, 2014). 
Codemasters is the best-known British-founded publisher, employing 400 staff 
(Maxwell, 2017). However, the large publishers are the major players influencing and 
shaping the industry. O'dea (2006) asserts that publishers act as key agents controlling 
substantial resources and linking platform holders, distributors and retailers. Publishers 
derive their revenues from multiple sources: (1) the sales of videogames developed 
internally; (2) the sales of videogames developed externally through contracting third-
party developers; (3) licensing fees for their Intellectual Property and franchises 
(Rabowsky, 2010). The highest revenue generated by these publishers is that of Tencent 
that has generated $10.2 billion in 2016 (Newzoo, 2017). 
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Similar to book publishers, videogame publishers are responsible for the manufacturing 
and marketing of the game. In addition to these, the videogame publishers sometimes 
distribute the games, or help distribute them by contracting distribution companies or 
larger videogame publishers. Other functions usually performed by the publisher may 
include deciding on and paying for any licensed technology that the game may utilise; 
paying for localisation; paying for the manufacturing of boxed products; paying for the 
server hosting of online functionality; providing for external QA (Quality Assurance); 
handling the relationship with hardware manufacturers; and the promotion of the 
product. Publishers are interested in being creatively involved in the development 
process – they often provide both their internal and external development team with 
creative services such as concept, art and sound design, as well as programming 
contributions. 
 
Publishers finance videogame development and this is associated with high levels of 
risk for them. According to Zee (2013), development costs have massively increased in 
the past decade. O'dea (2006) explains that this change is because of the advanced 
technology of the console hardware and the high levels of competition. The technology 
powering recent console hardware in the market, such as Sony's ‘Playstation 4’, 
Microsoft's ‘Xbox One’ and Nintendo’s ‘Nintendo Switch’, has advanced capabilities. 
Therefore, the market/consumer expectation is that videogames developed to be played 
on these consoles should be more complicated – such as more characters with more 
artistic details, complicated functions and in some cases hundreds of hours of playtime, 
etc. Developing videogames with high quality and complicated specifications needs 
bigger teams. That is the main reason development budgets for this generation of 
console games sometimes reach tens of millions. For instance, Activision spent $50 
million on the production of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 – this amount did not 
include the marketing costs, which reached $150 million (Gibson, 2014). Another 
example is Disney Infinity, for which Disney Interactive Studios spent $100 million on 
its production, excluding the marketing costs (Gibson, 2014). Furthermore, the industry 
has recently been defined as "hits driven", meaning that the quality of the game might 
not necessarily lead to the success of the game and sometimes customers purchase the 
games that are marketed better (Matthews, 2012). This unpredictability results in high 
levels of competition between the publishers (Messina, 2013). 
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3.3. Publisher-Developer Relationship 
The videogame development sector is a high technology industry, using highly skilled 
workers and cutting-edge technology, and investing massively in research and 
development (TIGA, 2016). While the data show that videogame developers spend on 
average 22 per cent of their organisation’s turnover on research and development, it is 
reported that these developers have had difficulty securing the IP rights for their 
videogames and on average they own only 51 per cent of the IP of their games (Wilson, 
2015). Therefore, in spite of high levels of technical, creative skills and their continued 
production of world-class games, videogame developers face important structural 
weaknesses and above all limited access to finance and skill shortages (Mateos-Garcia, 
et al., 2014). These problems constrain the developers' capacity to generate their new 
ideas and own their IP. The revenue flows generated with the independent business 
model are insufficient to develop original ideas. As a result, developers have to rely on 
publishers' funding to survive and compete with the international rivals. The UK’s most 
successful independent studios derive two thirds of their gross revenues from contracts 
with publishers (Wilson, 2015). On the other hand, the publishers are cost-conscious, 
having great incentives to contract projects to cheaper studios in Eastern Europe and 
Asia. This competition is viewed as a threat to the UK developers and has made the 
sustainability of the development studios more perilous, as highlighted by the recent 
campaigning to gain greater tax breaks for British companies in order to stimulate local 
investment (Blake, 2014).  
 
Despite new trends in the industry and opportunities for independence, development 
studios are still interested in collaborating with the publishers or being acquired by them 
in order to have access to finance, international markets and for the purpose of 
knowledge sharing (Cashman, 2014). PopCap is a previously independent developer 
that owns some of the most famous casual gaming IPs in the world and is behind very 
successful brands like Peggle, Bejeweled and Plants vs. Zombies. However, PopCap has 
been acquired by EA as part of a deal worth a reported $1 billion. Paul Breslin, 
PopCap’s managing director, was confident that the studio is going to benefit from its 
association with EA. He asserted, “EA gives us the ability to accelerate our plans to get 
our games into more people’s hands. There are 8,000 people at EA, and EAi, which 
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we’re a division of, has a very good distribution capability. We can now tap into that 
distribution network and get more of our games out there” (Freeman, 2011, p.38). 
 
The business between a third-party developer and publisher is formed and governed by 
a contract that specifies the game specifications, plans and milestones for the delivery of 
the game (while this thesis focuses on the relationship between third-party developer 
and publisher, I only use the term developer to refer to the third-party developers. This 
is done to simplify the language). Both publisher and developer contribute actively to 
the game design and production, but it is the publisher that is responsible for fully or 
partially funding the development. In return for this investment, the developer transfers 
full or partial ownership of their assets and their Intellectual Property. An industry 
source reports: 
 
In most instances, it is the publisher that funds the development of a game it intends to 
publish. This normally takes the form of a royalty advance and is paid on a milestone 
basis. Once a game is released, the developer receives no royalty payments until the title 
[game] has recouped the publisher's advance (Game Investor, The Publishing Process, 
2006). 
 
The publisher-developer contract can value between a hundred thousand to tens of 
millions of pounds, depending on the type and the scope of the game, as well as the 
platform for which the game is produced. For instance, Schreier (2015) reports that EA 
paid $19,700,000 to 38 Studios for their deal to make a game in 2015.  The publisher 
pays this amount to the developer at different stages, as periodic advances on royalties. 
These advances are paid when the developer reaches certain stages of development 
called milestones. After the developer delivers an updated version of the game for each 
milestone, the publisher verifies that the project is progressing, meeting the publisher's 
criteria. Upon the publisher's approval of each milestone, the publisher pays the 
developer an advance on royalties (Walfisz et al., 2006). When the publisher finances 
development, it manages development risk and monitors the project with a team of 
producers and project managers. This team keep track of the progress of the project, 
critique ongoing development and assist the development team in production as 
necessary. The publisher team might be involved in designing the game or developing 
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the concepts and art. The publisher's involvement in the development process varies 
from project to project. 
 
From the developer’s perspective, signing a development agreement with a publisher 
provides a high level of security that they will have the required finance to complete the 
project (Bakhshi et al., 2010). The developer uses this money to fund its production and 
general operations within the studio. However, there has been abundant criticism of this 
publisher-developer relationship in the industry. The relationship has been defined as 
unequal and one-sided, where the publisher is the only beneficiary and the developer is 
described as being exploited. O'dea (2006) explains that it is "the publisher [who] 
retains the largest share of the revenue generated by videogame sales at retail and 
enjoys significant profit margins" (p.41).  
 
The industry is replete with stories that the publisher-developer relationship has 
contributed to the demise of the development studio (Kotaku, 2013), examples of which 
include the associations of Team 17 with Lilith Ltd (Booker, 2016) and Rockstar with 
Team Bondi (McMillen, 2016). Some criticise the structural weakness of the developers 
and their lack of financial stability (Wilson, 2015). Wilson (2015) explains that third-
party game development is a volatile business because these developers can be entirely 
dependent on funding from one publisher, and a single cancelled game can lead the 
developer to go out of business. The continual struggle to get payment for milestones 
and to line up the next game contract is a persistent distraction to the management of 
every game developer. A common and desirable exit strategy for an extremely 
successful videogame developer is to sell the company to a publisher, and thus become 
an in-house developer. 
 
The dominant rhetoric within the industry accuses the publisher of exploiting the 
developer in this relationship, thus damaging the publisher-developer relationship. 
Doucet (2017) depicts the publisher-developer conflicts as below: 
 
 [Their] conflicts are obvious – the stereotypically greedy businessmen 
 [publishers] who leverage their power to put themselves and their rich partners 
 first, at the expense of ... the developers that toil under bad working conditions 
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 to produce them [the games]. This is a sadly familiar example in our industry 
 (Doucet, 2017). 
 
The publishers and developers are described to be different in skills and expertise. 
Confirming these differences, Heaton (2012) explains that "developers are from Mars, 
publishers from Venus". The developers are described as "the real heroes of games 
development", while the publishers are portrayed as "lack[ing] the expertise to develop 
games" (Hill, 2012). In addition to these differences, it is highlighted that the publisher 
is the party with more leverage, thus controlling the relationship to secure their own 
interests. Hill (2012) claims: 
 
Publishers expect developers to shoulder a huge burden and because they hold 
 the purse strings they can be as demanding and difficult as they like. Most 
developers will be able to tell you some story about a ludicrous demand they 
received from a publisher and the bottom line is profit for publishers whereas 
for many developers all they care about is creating a great game (Hill, 2012). 
 
While the publisher-developer relationship is said to be conflicting and problematic, 
some believe that the relationship is irreconcilable and they, therefore, suggest 
empowering developers within the industry, so that they can work independently from 
the publishers (Fahey, 2015). Johnson (2015) asserts:  
 
 I don't think [the publisher-developer relationship] is fixable. Big business 
 mixing with small business never really works well as the entire mindset is 
 mismatched. Neither party is doing anything deliberately, well not usually, so 
 there's no real blame. Thankfully there are so many other publisher-free routes 
 to market, available for the small guy [developer] that they at least have 
 breathing space nowadays. 
 
People have responded differently to this portrayal of publisher-developer relationship 
as incongruous and toxic (Fahey, 2015) and some disagree that this collaboration should 
be eradicated from the industry (Heaton, 2012). Instead, it is suggested that "the 
connection between developers and publishers is the great, largely unwritten, story of 
videogame history". Thus this business model should be reviewed and modified, and 
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other approaches might be used to develop a better understanding of the publisher-
developer relationship and create a more successful collaboration between the two 
(Heaton, 2012). 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
The videogame industry has a major impact on the economy through the sales of 
consoles and games throughout the world; however, it is facing constraining problems. 
Development costs were previously minimal; therefore, videogames were highly 
profitable. Games developed by a single programmer, or by a small team of 
programmers and artists, could sell hundreds of thousands of copies each. Many of 
these games only took a few months to create, so developers could release several 
games each year. Thus, publishers could often be generous with benefits, such as 
royalties on the games sold. Many early game publishers started within this economic 
climate, such as Electronic Arts, Capcom and Activision.  
 
Due to technology advances, the increasing consumer demands for complex and diverse 
products and the competition in the industry, the videogame development process has 
become complicated and risky. Large sums of investment and big development teams 
are required to address the ever-increasing graphical and market complexities. With the 
budgets reaching tens of millions of dollars, the developers rely on the publishers to 
fund and develop their games. At the same time, publishers seek innovative and 
competitive ideas, spreading the risk of development by investing in multiple 
development studios. Some developers turn to alternative production and distribution 
methods, such as online distribution, to reduce costs. However, the publisher-developer 
business model is still relevant in such a fast-growing, knowledge-intensive industry, 
with both parties needing their partner's knowledge and resources to thrive and compete. 
The challenge for the developers and publishers going forwards is to develop a better 
understanding of their relationship and learn how knowledge could be integrated more 
effectively. To address this problem, this thesis examines the role of boundary objects, 
power games and trust in the publisher-developer relationship. 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology and Methods 
 
Having laid out the literature on knowledge sharing across boundaries and a review of 
the context of my research (videogames industry), I proceed in this chapter by providing 
a critically reflexive account of my research process and justifying the approach and the 
methods I've chosen. I also explain how my research methods developed and changed 
due to difficulties I experienced in negotiating access. 
 
Firstly, I introduce the epistemological and theoretical perspective underpinning my 
methodology. Defining methodology as the philosophy and methods that support the 
research process (Seale, 1998), I explain my use of social constructionism and 
interpretivism as my underlying methodological position (Section 4.1.). Next, I outline 
respectively the research design (Section 4.2.) and the techniques I utilised to generate 
my data and explain why they have been chosen (Section 4.3.). Then, I present my data 
analysis approach and provide a detailed account of how I executed this analysis 
(Section 4.4.). The next section provides my reflections on how as a researcher I have 
influenced the process of my research (Section 4.5.). I conclude this chapter with a short 
summary of how my methodological approach to this study contributes to a credible, 
plausible and transferable piece of research (Section 4.6.). 
 
4.1. Research Philosophy 
This section outlines the theoretical approaches underlying this thesis. The researcher's 
philosophical paradigm should be clear because ontological and epistemological 
assumptions influence the research process, including the research questions, the 
methods utilised to generate data and the data analysis approach (Cassell and Symon, 
2004). I explain here that I take a social constructionist and interpretivist position and I 
describe why this theoretical perspective is appropriate for this research. 
 
This thesis rejects the notion of a single and objective truth (Partington, 2002). Instead, 
it recognises social constructionism as its ontological position. Social constructionism 
attempts to explain the nature of reality and it supports a relativist and anti-realist stance 
(Hammersley, 1992). This theory focuses on the constructed and created nature of 
social reality – meaning that truth and reality do not exist externally to be discovered, 
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but they are socially constructed through the subjects' interaction with the world (Gray, 
2014; Watson, 2008). Therefore, meanings are not fixed, but dependent on the context 
and constantly formed and reified through subjects' experiences and interpretations over 
time (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Charmaz (2000, 2006) 
explains that the terms constructivism and social constructionism tend to be used 
interchangeably, and sometimes they can both be referred to as constructivism as a 
generic term. While constructivism focuses on the constructed aspect of reality through 
the individual’s mind, social constructionism highlights how social interactions shape 
and form reality. Therefore, understanding these social interactions is paramount in 
order to make sense of social reality in forming knowledge about it (Young & Colin, 
2004).  
 
Interpretivism is drawn from the writings of scholars, such as Max Weber (1864–1930) 
who argued that understanding social reality requires understanding the point of view of 
the people residing within it. This notion is rooted in the ontological doctrine of 
indeterminism arguing that there might be multiple accounts of reality that can be 
equally valid. So the researcher's role in developing an understanding of a social 
phenomenon is to study people's perceptions and experiences of this reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Cohen & El-Sawad, 2007; Bryman, 2008). This does not mean that 
there is no prospect of consensus over meaning. Instead, interpretivism emphasises that 
meaning matters, but it acknowledges that subjects' social interactions influence and 
inform meanings and knowledge (Cohen & Ravishankar, 2012). Therefore, a researcher 
uses an inductive reasoning and considers multiple accounts of reality by an interpretive 
understanding of human experience in its context. 
 
I have taken a social constructionist and interpretivist perspective in this thesis because 
these ontological and epistemological assumptions translate into a view of knowledge as 
a process, rather than an object (Spender, 1996), and they are in line with the position 
my research takes in terms of conceptualising knowledge. The interpretivist perspective 
supports an epistemology of practice (Schultze & Stabell, 2004), viewing knowledge as 
an on-going social phenomenon (Zander & Kogut, 1995), inseparable from people 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993) and action (Cook & Brown,  1999). As documented in chapter 
two of this thesis, the literature on knowledge management and cross-boundary work 
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also recognises the importance of using a practice-based perspective in the study of 
knowledge processes because it was highlighted that: 
 
• Knowledge is multi-faceted and complex (Blackler, 1995). 
• Knowledge is socially and dynamically constructed in the course of human 
interaction. So practice and knowledge are intrinsically interrelated (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995; Nicolini, 2011; Orlikowski, 2002; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005). 
• Knowledge is contestable, so there might be different understandings and 
interpretations of knowledge (Yanow, 2004). 
 
Having considered the nature of knowledge as documented in the literature, my study 
focuses on social practices and processes in order to understand how knowledge is 
integrated across boundaries (Nicolini et al., 2008; Nicolini, 2011). This requires a 
methodology with similar ontological and epistemological assumptions towards the 
social world, thus reinforcing the suitability of the interpretivist approach to look at and 
examine this phenomenon. 
 
I can justify the usefulness of an interpretivist research methodology for this study by 
also highlighting how a practice-based perspective can be valuable for examining the 
nature of videogame development. Chapter three provided a description of the 
videogame industry and development processes, emphasising the uncertainties of the 
industry, as well as the high levels of complexity and unpredictability involved in the 
making of videogames. Due to the creative nature of development, the knowledge 
produced in videogame development is the outcome of an iterative and collective 
process, and this process requires the extensive interaction and mutual inferring of 
various disciplines, teams and individuals (Chandler, 2009; Nandhakumar et al., 2013; 
Scarbrough et al., 2015; Zackariasson et al., 2006). Given the tacit and social nature of 
knowledge formed in videogame development, I decided to adopt a practice-based 
perspective to enable me to examine knowledge processes in the context of publisher-
developer cross-boundary work. For the same reason, I take a social constructionist and 
interpretivist position because I believe this theoretical perspective will enable me to 
focus on the processes and micro-practices in the publisher-developer collaboration. 
Since several disciplines are involved in the videogame development process, I believe 
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studying the perspectives of these different disciplines helps to develop a better 
understanding of how boundary objects, trust and power dynamics facilitate/hinder 
knowledge processes in their cross-boundary collaboration.  
 
4.2. Research Design 
This section outlines my qualitative research design. I explain that my social 
constructionist and interpretivist positions, together with the nature of the research 
questions support a qualitative methodology. Bryman (2008) distinguishes between the 
research design and research method, describing the former as "a framework for the 
[generation] and analysis of data" and the latter as "simply a technique for [generating] 
data, ... such as a questionnaire, a structured interview guide, or participant observation" 
(p.31). So I only discuss my research design and what research techniques I chose for 
my study, leaving the details of the techniques I used to generate data to the next 
section. In this section, I also describe how my research techniques evolved throughout 
the research, whilst I reflexively responded to the barriers I faced in negotiating access 
to my research subjects.   
 
The aim of this research is to examine knowledge processes across boundaries with a 
focus on the role of boundary objects, trust and power dynamics in shaping and 
influencing the knowledge processes. I formed the three following research questions, 
all contributing to developing an understanding of how knowledge is formed, shared 
and integrated across diverse disciplines or organisations: 
 
RQ1: How do boundary objects influence knowledge processes across the            
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ2:  How do power relations influence knowledge processes across the publisher-
developer organisational boundaries? 
RQ3: How does developing trust influence knowledge processes across the          
publisher-developer organisational boundaries? 
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, my study focuses on the role of social practices and 
interactions to find out how these influence boundary objects, trust and power 
dynamics, thus shaping knowledge processes. Therefore, in order to capture their 
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practices and interactions, it was essential for me to get close to the research subjects 
and their perspectives. This also enabled me to interpret and understand how my 
research subjects would form and share knowledge (Shaw, 1999).  
 
Since the central goal of my research was "to understand people's actions and 
experiences of the world", I initially chose an ethnographic research method to collect 
my data, but I had to change my methods when I faced difficulties accessing the 
research participants. My assumption was that ethnography would create "intimate 
familiarity" with the social phenomenon, thus this would help me "in capturing the 
voices of people who inhabit it" (Alvesson, 1996; Brewer, 2011). As advocated by 
Atkinson and Hammersley (2007), ethnography should be used when the researcher 
wishes to explore the nature of a specific social phenomenon. Whilst resonating with 
my interpretivist position, the literature on knowledge management also suggested the 
use of methods that involved observations (Carlile, 2002; Nicolini, 2009; Nicolini et al., 
2012; Spradley, 1979). However, after nine months of negotiation with companies, I 
was unable to gain access to development studios to conduct observations (this will be 
discussed in more detail in section 4.3.1). Given these difficulties, I decided that 
conducting interviews was a more plausible and practical method for my research. 
 
Having considered all the factors involved, semi-structured interviews were used as my 
primary method for data generation. In semi-structured interviews, "the interviewer has 
a list of issues and questions to be covered, but may not deal with all of them in each 
interview" (Gray, 2014, p.385). According to Gilbert and Stoneman (2016), in semi-
structured interviews "the interviewer asks major questions the same way each time, but 
is free to alter their sequence and probe for more information in their own words" 
(p.282). So these interviews are more flexible than structured interviews and generally 
an interview guide, including both closed-ended and open-ended questions, is used to 
assist the interviewer in probing views and opinions when it is appropriate (King, 2004). 
By contrast, in unstructured interviews "the questions are not, generally, pre-planned. 
The researcher must have a notion of the objectives of the research, [and] the input of 
the interviewer is mainly confined to checking on any doubtful points and rephrasing 
answers to check for accuracy of understanding" (Gray, 2014, p.386). In the semi-
structured interviews that I carried out in this research, I used the list of my interview 
questions along with an interview guide. This helped me to stay focused on my main 
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questions and simultaneously allowed me to show some flexibility and probe the 
respondents when I found them feel comfortable to share their opinions with me (I will 
provide more details on my interviews and questions in section 4.3.3.). 
 
As supported by Alvesson (2003), interviews constitute a human encounter, through 
which opinions, perspectives and experiences can be gathered, hence their 
appropriateness for my study. However, I recognise that along with its advantages, this 
method holds its own disadvantages too (Cassell & Symon, 2011) and I explain how I 
addressed these disadvantages below. 
 
Establishing trust and commitment between the interviewer and the respondents is 
considered to be a critical factor in conducting interviews successfully (Alvesson, 
2003). In terms of my research, however, establishing trust with the respondents was 
not an easy task and it took me time to build a trusting relationship with the people I 
talked to. The videogame industry is very small and highly competitive, where 
everybody seems to know each other. People were wary of revealing much about their 
projects and themselves, fearing this information might damage their reputation or their 
top secret technology/project would be leaked – as a result harming their company 
financially. The industry is also male-dominated and being a woman made the 
development of trust and establishing credibility more challenging. In addition, the 
respondents felt awkward when they were asked about the challenges of the publisher-
developer relationship, and this was due to the sensitivity of this relationship within the 
industry. I addressed and tackled the participants' lack of trust in me by immersing 
myself in the industry, learning jargon, technical words, key industry people, products 
and events (Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Tracy, 2010). I also prepared an interview guide 
for each interview that contained some background information about the participant, 
their company and the projects they had worked on (I provide more detail on my 
interview guide in section 4.3.3). This pre-interview document equipped me with useful 
knowledge that I could deploy at different points in our conversation to remind the 
participant of my enthusiasm for what they had said or achieved, thus helping me bridge 
the gap that existed between us.  
 
Another relevant limitation of interviews is the over-reliance on transcripts as 
representing truth (Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012) and not considering the influence the 
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researcher's and respondents' perceptions and interpretations can have on the research 
process (Kuhn, 1970). I argue that the philosophical position of this study and the 
exploratory nature of the research questions offsets this limitation of interviews. 
Informed by the interpretivist perspective, the interview transcript is not viewed as 
representing the "real" experience of the interviewee, but it is only an interaction or 
interpretation of an "indefinite number of possible interpretations" (King, 2011, p.13). 
The researcher's subjectivity and interactions with the interviewee "is part of the 
research process, not a distraction from it" and the interviewee is considered as a 
"participant in the research, actively shaping the course of the interview" (King, 2011, 
p.11). Both the researcher and the participant together contribute to the production of 
knowledge and theories (Cunliffe, 2003). The researcher and the participants' 
interpersonal interactions can actually benefit the interview process, through which the 
researcher can build trust and rapport with the participants. In other words, these 
interactions enable the researcher to access useful and sensitive information 
(Korczynski, 2000; Robson, 1993). 
 
It is vital for the researcher to be aware that reflexivity in research can help 
counterbalance the limitations of qualitative interviews. According to Finlay (2002), 
reflexivity refers to researchers' engagement in "explicit, self-aware analysis of their 
own role" throughout the research process (p.531). Interview transcripts can sometimes 
be considered as representing an "absolute truth", so other factors influencing the 
transcripts can be overlooked (Alvesson & Ashcroft, 2012, p.245). Therefore, the 
researcher needs to take into account the impact of her own perspectives and sense-
making process, which might have influenced the course of the interview (Cassell, 
2005; Myers & Newman, 2007). Reflexivity allows the researcher to understand the 
interview transcripts as not an absolute representation of truth, but rather a complex 
setting that has been influenced by many factors (Goffman, 1959; Myers & Newman, 
2007). Johnson and Duberley (2003) highlight the complexities of interview transcripts, 
by explaining that "in undertaking reflexivity, we do not arrive at 'the answer', rather 
researchers gain more (but not complete) understanding of the complex and ongoing 
interrelationship which exists between themselves and their research" (p.191). I discuss 
the role of reflexivity in my research and how it affected my research process in section 
4.5. 
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4.3. Data Generation 
In this section, I explain the techniques I used to generate data. Informed by my 
epistemological position, I avoid using the term “data collection” because I believe 
knowledge is produced and constructed as a result of the researcher and the participants' 
interaction throughout the research process (Bevan, 2009). In the previous section I 
discussed that I chose semi-structured interviews as my research method. Here, I start 
by presenting the issues I faced in negotiating access to the research participants and 
describe how these difficulties affected the process and criteria by which the 
participants were selected. Next, I introduce the three networks I developed within the 
industry through a chain-referral method. This will be followed by an elaboration of the 
techniques I used to generate and record my data. I will end this section by discussing 
the ethical considerations of my research.   
 
4.3.1. Access to Participants and Their Selection Process 
Negotiating access to the research subjects in the videogame industry was not a 
straightforward process and the selection of participants was significantly influenced by 
these difficulties. As I referred to it in section 4.2, I initially aimed for the research to 
use observations as the main method for data generation. As highlighted by Patton 
(1987), producing rich information is the primary objective of qualitative research, not 
representativeness of the data. For this reason, I selected two cases that I thought would 
lend themselves to the research problem in this study (Shaw, 1999) – the study of the 
collaboration between large publishers and small/medium-sized developers producing 
videogames. Both cases were medium-sized companies, collaborating with a large 
publisher on a big budget project. I was hoping that through these development studios, 
I could gain access to their publishing organisation. I also assumed that comparing two 
cases with similar business set-ups would allow me to develop a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon under investigation.  
 
Unfortunately, I was refused the permission to carry out observations in the studios. I 
had initiated the negotiations with these two companies through personal contacts and 
referrals. As suggested by Bryman (2001), I drafted a research proposal that clearly 
explained the aims of my research and the methods I intended to use in my research to 
generate data. I sent this proposal to the studio heads to clarify my research aims and 
 
88 
objectives. The directors of both companies showed interest and enthusiasm towards the 
research and tentatively granted me access. However, further in the process, when it 
was actually time to do the observations, both studio heads changed their minds and 
showed reluctance in cooperating with me. Having completed my research in the 
industry now, I can better understand and reconcile the reasons for facing these 
difficulties. The relationship between the developer and publisher was highly political 
and sensitive. The technology they used in the studios and the game concepts were also 
top secret. The companies seemed to be worried that this information might be 
disclosed to the public or within the industry, thus putting their reputations and 
businesses at risk. 
 
In response to the difficulties I faced in gaining access to the studios and having realised 
the sensitivity of the subject, I amended the research method and used semi-structured 
interviews to conduct the research. To encourage people to take part in the research, I 
first contacted some studio directors who seemed to be more outspoken on social media 
and had already carried out numerous interviews with the media. At the same time I 
contacted the heads/managing directors of numerous studios (Eland-Goossensen et al., 
1997) in order to increase the response rate. Using social networking, such as LinkedIn 
and Twitter, I contacted these directors, to which a good number responded and agreed 
to an interview. It was notable that senior directors and informants within the industry 
showed more willingness to talk to me, but middle managers and junior members of 
staff did not respond to my attempts at making contact. The middle managers and junior 
staff only agreed to interviews when they were introduced by their studio heads.  
 
Biernacki and Waldorf (1981) support snowball sampling in cases where the study 
focuses on a sensitive issue and when there are difficulties in gaining access or 
recruiting participants. I used the snowball method to expand my sample – I started off 
by conducting interviews with the senior directors, and used their referrals to form three 
networks of developers and publishers who had collaborated together. As I mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, I chose a number of informants in the industry and I used 
them as informants in my research – these informants talked generally about the 
publisher-developer relationship, but they were not necessarily part of the three 
networks of publishers and developers that I formed in this research.  This data 
generation process developed organically, as I followed the lead of a few directors who 
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were willing to introduce me to more colleagues and friends in the industry. Some 
senior directors introduced two or three people within their company or the industry. As 
a result of this organic process, I conducted thirty six semi-structured interviews in three 
distinct networks. Each network presented a publisher-developer collaboration on a big 
budget game, where both companies were actively involved in the co-production of the 
game, hence providing similar contexts for studying knowledge process. I provide more 
details about my interviews and the three networks I developed in the next section.  
 
4.3.2. The Three Publisher-Developer Relationships 
Here I will provide a brief summary of each of the three networks that I developed in 
the process of my interviews, but in order to protect my research subjects, I refrain from 
presenting more details about their projects and companies. This is due to the sensitivity 
of the subject under study. The industry is so small that more details might be too 
revealing, leading to the subjects involved in my research being recognised. Table 8 
outlines the number of interviews conducted, as well as displaying the number and 
types of roles I interviewed within each network. 
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Table 8. Demographic and Business Details of Participants 
 
Developer A and Publisher X 
Company A was a videogame developer, based in the UK. It was a medium-sized 
company, well known for a couple of critically acclaimed games internationally and 
within the industry. The games they produced were all "big budget games" (AAA or 
Triple-A games) that required large investment from the publishers. This company had 
the experience of working with several publishers for their different titles. I started off 
interviewing the founders and the senior directors, including the ones who were still 
running the company and the ones who had left for a variety of reasons. Through the 
directors' reference, I interviewed a few directors and team leaders who were placed 
lower in the organisational hierarchy. The interviews focused on the publisher-
developer relationship and knowledge processes, but the participants seemed to be 
reluctant to discuss their current publisher and project, instead they were willing to 
share their stories on their previous projects. As a result of this, I focused the interview 
around their last project and followed the same pattern for the later participants from 
this network. Following this lead, I also managed to identify four key people from the 
publishing organisation this developer had worked with on that past project. These 
participants were involved closely in this project. However, I had to contact these 
people directly without any reference to the developers I had talked to. I had realised 
that due to the sensitivity of the publisher-developer relationship and the history 
between these people, it was prudent not to use the developers as my reference. As a 
last note, developer A and publisher X released a game that was averagely scored by the 
critics and it should be noted that these two companies never collaborated together 
again after this project. I conducted fifteen interviews within this network. 
 
Developer B and Publisher Y 
Company B was another medium-sized developer, based in the UK. This company had 
produced very successful big budget games with an internationally renowned publisher. 
My network within this company was initiated through a cold-call approach and 
gradually developed through the snowballing method. My interviews focused on two 
previous projects they completed with a publisher. In this case, I also started off by 
interviewing the founder and proceeded with two executive directors and one team 
leader. As was the case with Company A, the participants were unwilling to discuss 
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their current projects, so I gradually found my way to talk to a good number of people 
from the development studio and managed to secure interviews with four participants 
from the publishing organisation, including the vice president and three key members 
who were closely involved in the two projects with this developer. The collaboration 
between company B and publisher Y resulted in two very successful games, but they 
ceased collaboration after these two projects. I conducted eight interviews within this 
network. 
 
Developer C and Publisher Z 
Company C was a small independent developer who had been recently founded and was 
almost new to the industry. The company produced an "AAA game" with a smaller 
budget compared to the other two networks. The smaller the scope of the game, the 
smaller the budget for the game. Therefore, this would imply that the relationship 
between the developer and publisher was comparatively less sensitive, when the 
financial investment was not as large as bigger projects. Since this company was small, 
the number of participants from this network turned out to be smaller compared to the 
previous two networks. I conducted the interviews with the founder, two directors and 
one team leader, from company C. These participants discussed a previous project and 
one current project with me. In terms of their previous project, their relationship with 
their publisher did end with a number of controversies. I attempted to contact their 
publisher, but I did not receive any response from them. I also did not contact the 
producers and managers involved in their current project within publisher Z, because I 
did not wish to risk their relationship. However, I interviewed senior executives from 
publisher Z – they were not directly involved in the project, but I thought they followed 
the same values and policies, therefore could provide me with an insight into how this 
publisher dealt with their external developers. I conducted nine interviews within this 
network.  
 
4.3.3. Interviews, Questions and the Participants 
I carried out thirty six semi-structured interviews with the industry informants, senior 
directors, and team leaders, such as lead designers, lead artists, lead programmers, etc. I 
interviewed eight of my participants twice at two different dates and sittings, so I 
collected more than two hours of data with each of these eight participants. The 
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frequency of these interviews was due to the participants' key role and knowledge in the 
publisher-developer relationship and their willingness to share more information with 
me. Having noted this, I responded to their enthusiasm and grasped the opportunity to 
learn from them more. The rest of my interviews took approximately sixty to ninety 
minutes. They were all audio-recorded, except two cases in which the participants 
preferred that I took notes. All audio recordings were later transcribed verbatim.  
 
The literature suggests using an interview guide in qualitative interviews to help the 
researcher with the process and, as a result, elicit better results (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). This interview guide does not provide a formal and rigid structure to the 
questions, but it lists the main topics that the researcher should address during the 
interview (Cassell & Symon, 2004). Cassell and Symon (2004) identify the sources of 
an interview guide as following: “the research literature, the interviewer’s own personal 
knowledge and experience of the area, and informal preliminary work such as 
discussions with people who have personal experience of the research area” (Cassell 
and Symon, 2004, p.15). Likewise, I prepared a separate document, drawn from the 
participant's public website, industry publications or social media. This information 
reflected the participant's biography, achievements and perspectives relevant to the 
issues being investigated in my research. In those cases where participants had already 
conducted numerous interviews with the media, I included their opinions and point of 
views not only in the interview guide but I also used their quotes in my data analysis. 
This interview guide helped me to start the interview with confidence. Using this 
information in the interviews helped me build a better rapport with the participants. 
Given the sensitivity of the topic (the publisher-developer relationship), as well as the 
difficulties in gaining access, building up trust with the participant was paramount to 
me. Therefore, I started each interview by introducing myself and the research, followed 
by some questions that carefully referred to the participant's achievements. Immediately 
after each interview, I also took some further notes to present my general impressions, 
feelings and comments, as well as my observations of the participant's body language, 
company's premises and interview atmosphere (Byrne, 2006, p.37). This document 
enabled me to compare and contrast the interview with the previous ones, create links 
and unravel the stories, especially for the interviews embedded in each network. 
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Informed by the existing literature on knowledge management and cross-boundary 
work, my research focused on three main factors that seemed to influence knowledge 
processes in cross-boundary settings, including boundary objects, trust and power 
structures. However my flexible questions and also my interviewing techniques allowed 
me to gain in-depth and detailed knowledge about the concepts under investigation. I 
designed an interview guide with a clear set of questions to address these three areas 
(Guest et al., 2006). However, I showed a great amount of flexibility in order to make 
the participants feel comfortable and in control of the interview. I made sure that I 
would subtly steer the conversation towards where I wanted it to go when it was 
required. I also used probing questions to encourage the participants to provide me with 
more details and expand their responses (Bryman, 2008; Cassell & Symon, 2004). This 
was very difficult during the earlier interviews. But gradually as my research progressed 
and I gained more knowledge about the industry, my ability in using probes to elicit 
more information from participants improved. By transcribing and listening back to the 
interviews, I learned more of the names, products, technical terms and above all became 
aware of sub-stories. Therefore, this gradually built up my confidence and interview 
skills, thus I could elicit better results with the probes.  
 
4.3.4. Ethical Considerations 
In this section, I explain how I observed and followed the ethical standards of research. 
Before embarking on the fieldwork, I had my research design approved by the Ethics 
Committee at Loughborough University that had procedures in place to ensure the 
research followed the standard ethics. My research focused on the publisher-developer 
collaboration in the videogame industry, and in my interviews I attempted to delve into 
the dynamics of this relationship and reveal the participants' hidden thoughts and 
reflections on the issue under study. As has been emphasised throughout the research so 
far, the publisher-developer relationship was highly sensitive, in terms of the technology 
they used, the political nature of the collaboration and the risky and bulky investments 
at stake. All these factors together compelled me to strictly comply with the ethical 
standards and give the participants constant reassurance that their information would 
remain confidential and anonymised (Remenyi et al., 1998). Revealing some sensitive 
information that participants shared with me, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
could sabotage their reputation within the industry, thus jeopardising their future 
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projects or collaborations. Therefore, I made sure that my actions or research would not 
put the participants' employment and businesses at any risk (Silverman, 2010). 
 
As suggested by Gray (2014), informed consent is a critical ethical consideration in 
research. The participants' informed consent was ensured through an industry research 
proposal that I enclosed in my correspondence with them prior to the interviews. This 
document detailed the research aims and objectives and ensured the participants of the 
ethical considerations of my research, including confidentiality and anonymity of data 
(see Appendix A). The participants were also informed of their right to withdraw from 
the study at any stage of the research with no reason required. In addition to this, some 
companies also asked me to sign a non-disclosure agreement form (NDA), which I 
agreed to. At the start of each interview, participants were again reminded verbally of 
the purpose of the study. However, I refused to use a consent form in order not to 
influence the interview dynamic. The participants were expected to share their thoughts 
and perspectives on a sensitive topic, so I designed the interview to be an informal chat, 
rather than a formal affair, and I thought the formality of signing the consent form 
might make the participants feel uncomfortable (Ryen, 2011). Ryen (2011) comments 
that building up trust and rapport between the interviewer and the subjects of study are 
instrumental in interviews. So instead, I made sure that I asked for their consent to be 
recorded – all agreed except two. In these two cases, I took notes and revised my notes 
immediately after the interviews. I used pseudonyms for each participant and their 
company, while taking notes and transcribing the voice recordings. When I used their 
quotes and wrote up the thesis, I also made further attempts to disguise the participants' 
identity by using anonymised references to their projects and companies (Bryman, 
2001, p.483).   
 
4.4. Data Coding and Analysis 
In this section, I explain how I used thematic analysis to identify and analyse themes 
and patterns within the generated data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Informed by my social 
constructionist and interpretivist perspective, I employed an inductive approach that 
allowed me the flexibility to focus on the processes by which the participants were 
constructing meanings (Gioia, et al., 2013). This, as a result, enabled me to identify new 
 
95 
themes and concepts, thus developing a deeper knowledge of the untold stories and  
hidden transcripts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
My data coding and analysis involved an iterative process that evolved throughout the 
course of my fieldwork (Bowen, 2008; Langley, 1999). After finishing each interview, I 
transcribed and imported it (including notes and transcriptions) into NVivo 10. My 
initial coding list consisted of general descriptive themes drawn from the existing 
literature, using a pen and paper method (Silverman, 2010). However, this list evolved 
as I conducted more interviews and gradually represented emergent themes when I 
started detecting inconsistencies and contradictions in participants’ viewpoints (see 
more detail on this contradictory data later in this section). I have provided my initial 
coding list as Appendix C in this thesis, where I have highlighted the emergent codes as 
well as the codes that were drawn from literature. For instance, I intended to understand 
the role of power practices in shaping the publisher-developer knowledge integration 
and relationship. This was highlighted in the literature (see section 2.2.2) and formed 
my second research question. Therefore, I made sure that I included questions during 
my interviews to understand this relationship. It should be noted that due to the 
sensitivity of the publisher-developer collaboration, I had to ask questions that were not 
too direct, making the participant feel uncomfortable (see Appendix B).  
 
One of the sensitive topics of conversation was "man month rate", which was found to 
be highly contentious between the publisher and developer. Rather than asking 
questions directly about the problems resulting from "man month rate", I would enquire 
about how easy/difficult it was to stick to time and the budget specified for the project. I 
would also ask how would the publisher support the developer in case the project was 
not going to be finished on time and budget. Or in case of interviews with the publisher, 
I would also ask what the publisher's contingency plan was for when the project was 
found to be needing more resources. These questions would firstly trigger discussions 
about challenges and dependencies. However, when the participants were probed and 
encouraged to illustrate the matter and bring some examples and details, they would 
reveal much about frustrations with their partner, their perceived loss due to changes in 
the projects and the games they had to play to secure themselves. As indicated in 
Appendix C, the initial codes pertinent to the second research question included themes 
such as challenges, differences, power inequalities and developer dependencies. 
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However, new themes emerged as I carried out more interviews and generated more 
data - codes such as, power dynamic, power games and publisher dependencies (see 
Appendix C for more details). The earlier interviews revealed the sensitivity of 
determining "man month rate", so I tried to probe this topic by asking indirect questions 
and also asking for more details / examples. As explained in the example above, this 
resulted in new themes to emerge, such as power dynamics, power games and publisher 
dependencies. I added these emergent themes to my coding template - this is shown in 
Appendix C. 
After all the data was transferred into NVivo 10, I grouped and collated similar and 
relevant themes, which allowed me to eliminate irrelevant themes and develop 
documents for further interpretation (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Patton, 1987). I followed 
the techniques Ryan and Bernard (2003) suggested for data analysis: "(1) discovering 
themes and subthemes, (2) [narrowing down] themes to a manageable few (3) building 
hierarchies of themes or code books, and (4) linking themes into theoretical models" 
(p.85). As a result of this process, I developed a final "data structure" consisting of three 
levels as presented in Table 9 – this table formed the basis of my data analysis and 
findings chapters (Gioia, et al., 2013):  
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Table 9. The Three Level Data Structure (Adapted from Gioia et al., 2013) 
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Table 9. Continued. 
 
 
99 
The first-level data portray a superficial level, representing participants' initial responses to 
my questions. This level of data consists of cliché responses that resonate more with what 
the existing literature suggests in facilitating cross-boundary work and knowledge sharing. 
This first-level data highlight the importance of trust, communication, honesty and 
knowledge sharing in facilitating cross-boundary work. While the participants emphasised 
the role of static boundary objects, such as contracts and design documents, they also 
attempted to portray an asymmetrical and irreconcilable relationship between the 
publishers and developers by stressing their differences and dependencies. This implied 
power inequalities between the two parties. 
 
The second level represents the data I generated through probing, which is more detailed 
and contradictory. At the beginning of each interview, all participants provided me with 
cliché responses, but later during their interview session they would reveal some more 
information that sometimes contradicted their earlier statements. Probing was indeed a 
useful method in order to delve more into practices and processes they used in their 
relationships and elicit some new themes (Shaw, 1999). These contradictory statements 
were found to be consistent in the majority of the interviews. For instance when Simon was 
asked to explain how they managed their work with the developer, he highlighted the 
crucial role of knowledge sharing, saying "one of the factors that makes a game successful 
is when the development is done as a joint project with a publisher ... knowledge transfer is 
hugely central to this whole process between the publisher and developer" (Simon – 
publisher executive). However, after being probed about particular projects and 
collaborations, he revealed that the ideal scenario is when you have "supervision, 
collaboration and support from the publisher, and honesty and transparency from the 
[development] studio". However, in reality "some of the studios are not honest" and they 
hide information, creating tensions between the two parties. 
 
At the second level data, the participants revealed the existence of high levels of distrust 
and opportunistic practices, such as knowledge hiding, deception and collusion in the 
publisher-developer relationship. This level also shows power dynamics and power games 
between the partners, where both partners had access to positions of power. These findings 
contained emergent themes and concepts that were not initially identified in the literature, 
such as the concepts of distrust and knowledge hiding and their role in cross-boundary 
work. 
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In the third level of my data structure I have aggregated the two contradictory themes, 
linking them to relevant concepts, as well as generating new theoretical insights. This last 
level has three sections each addressing one of my research questions. Contradiction in 
data complements and enriches the findings, providing further scope for refining theory 
(Mays & Pope, 2000; Richardson, 1991). Similarly, the juxtaposition of contradictory 
evidence – that I found within my interviews and across the three networks – assisted me 
in reframing my understanding of the knowledge processes in the context of my study, thus 
generating new theories (Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
4.5. Reflexivity 
My fieldwork was an outcome of a reflexive and iterative process, in which I developed as 
a researcher. My gradual learning shaped and evolved the research process, including the 
questions, the research design, my position as a researcher and the findings of the research. 
In this section, I reflect upon my role as a researcher and explain how my assumptions 
influenced the research – before the fieldwork started, during the interview process and 
while I carried out my data analysis. This "self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as 
[a] researcher" is defined as reflexivity (England, 1994, p.82) and it is in line with my 
social constructionist position, proposing that reality is socially constructed through the 
actors' interactions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This notion of reflexivity is viewed as "a 
resource which helps researchers recognise their own creative input" in the generation of 
data, thus enabling them to construct new interpretations (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, 
p.188). As argued by Haraway (1988) and Cunliffe (2011), not only the experiences and 
perspectives of the researcher, but also those of the research subjects influence the process 
of research and analysis. Therefore, the researcher should reflect upon their role in 
constructing meaning and "truth claims" (Cunliffe, 2003, p.985), and also recognise the 
inevitable power dynamics between the researcher and the research subjects (Cohen & 
Ravishankar, 2012).  
 
During the research process, having ongoing contact with an "insider" within the industry 
had a crucial role in providing me with deeper and broader insight into the participants' 
perspectives and shaping the research (Adler & Adler, 1987). The insider was my husband 
who has sixteen years of work experience in the videogames industry both as a developer 
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and publisher. At the outset of my fieldwork, I was a complete stranger to the videogame 
development process, but I gradually developed my knowledge of the settings and 
approached the interviews with more familiarity and confidence (Brannick & Coghlan, 
2007). Through the insider's help, I familiarised myself with names, technical lexicon and 
jargon. The insider also facilitated access to some participants, helped me in the sampling 
process to identify some key informants and also provided continuous discussions on the 
issues being investigated. Through his personal contacts, I had the opportunity to attend 
videogame events and socialise with the videogame developers/producers in a less formal 
and more relaxed set-up. This built up my confidence to engage in conversations with my 
interview subjects in a less intimidating environment, thus preparing me for my interviews.  
 
The insider also had a significant role in evaluating my findings and assessing the 
credibility of my claims. This was especially beneficial to my research, because he had 
worked both as a developer and a publisher and could provide insight from both 
perspectives. While I cannot deny the insider's role in educating me within the industry, I 
was aware of the impact he might have had on my perspectives and I continuously 
questioned whether my assumptions and my research were influenced by his/our 
preconceptions and biases (Calás & Smircich, 1991, p.664). In order to address this 
limitation, the findings were discussed and validated by four participants in the study – two 
developers and two publishers. With these participants I conducted extensive interviews of 
over two hours in different sittings and at different times to discuss my findings. Two of 
the above also reviewed the data analysis chapter. 
 
According to Maykut et al. (1994), "the qualitative researcher’s perspective is perhaps a 
paradoxical one: it is to be acutely tuned-in to the experiences and meaning systems of 
others ... and at the same time to be aware of how one’s own biases and preconceptions 
may be influencing what one is trying to understand" (p.123). At the beginning of the 
research, the focus was on knowledge management in intra-organisational cross-boundary 
work. This had evolved, as a result of the literature on knowledge management and, 
indeed, the discussions I had with my insider. But later in the research, this focus gradually 
shifted to inter-organisational dynamics, due to the themes that emerged from the 
interviews. Interestingly, the roles my insider had undertaken in the videogame industry 
were in capacities that were more involved in the intra-organisational dynamics and less 
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aware of inter-organisational politics. This change of direction in my research from intra-
organisational to inter-organisational processes obviously limited the impact that the 
insider's pre-conceptions and biases had on the research findings.  
 
During the course of my interviews, I reflexively studied the data generated, my role as an 
interviewer and the dynamic between myself and the participants. As a result of this, I 
improved and modified my interview techniques, interview questions and research focus. 
The videogame industry was a male-dominated community, where I found it very difficult, 
especially at the earlier stages of the interviews to create a relaxed and friendly atmosphere 
for my interviewees. I felt the participants had more power in leading the conversation, in 
which they kept providing me with cliché responses. I was aware that my background as a 
non-British academic woman influenced the dynamic between me and the participants 
(Cohen & Ravishankar, 2012). This dynamic, however, changed, when I found myself 
more in control in discussions at later stages of the interviews. For instance, I realised that 
using academic language might be alienating for the participants. Instead I consciously 
used jargon and name-dropping in order to put the participants at ease and at the same time 
gain some credibility in the interviews. In order to create a more balanced power dynamic 
between us, I gave the participants the flexibility to move between topics or discuss issues 
that they were willing to, and, instead, carefully steered the conversations towards the 
topics that were on my agenda. Utilising semi-structured interviews to generate data 
allowed me to have this freedom to be explorative and elicit better outcomes from the 
interviews (England, 1994; Haraway, 1988). 
 
The last consideration in the aim to be reflexive during my interviews was my probing 
technique and its potential impact on my research. As I became more familiar with the 
industry and as a result of the emergent themes, I shifted the focus of my research to 
knowledge processes across inter-organisational boundaries. The topic centred around the 
publisher-developer relationship that seemed to be highly sensitive. So in order to 
encourage the participants to disclose some information about this issue, I had to ask 
probing questions and become really engaged in the conversation. This method resulted in 
accessing richer and deeper data. However, I was aware that this might have influenced the 
participants' accounts or have put more emphasis on certain topics. I addressed this 
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problem when I analysed the data – I asked the insider and four of my participants to 
review and validate my findings and results. 
 
I remained reflexive during my data analysis process and considered how different actors 
in my research and their perceptions and biases affected the way I interpreted my data. In 
order to develop a deeper understanding of my respondents' accounts, in addition to the 
participants’ perspectives, I attempted to record their manners, body language and other 
cues in their environment in a post-interview document (Jackson, 2012). I did this to create 
a context for what the participants had said. However, I was aware that these details would 
not necessarily provide me with an unadulterated account of their thoughts and 
experiences, and these were only one observation of the participants’ account. Therefore, I 
consciously looked for more details, patterns and inconsistencies across different 
perspectives, thus I did not take the participants' perspectives for granted. This required 
constant reflection on my position as a researcher, my research focus and techniques. As 
stated earlier in this chapter, my data coding and analysis started when I was carrying out 
my fieldwork, while I re-read/re-listened to my interviews, notes and transcripts. As a 
result of this continuous re-assessment, new themes emerged, I enhanced and improved my 
interview techniques, and my research took new directions. 
 
I believe personal reflexivity has been a valuable tool that has enriched my "research 
process, method and outcomes" (Finlay, 2002, p.225). This reflexive practice has given me 
the awareness of how my position, perspectives and relationship with the research subjects 
can influence the course and direction of research, thus enabling me to identify and 
respond to the limitations of my research and as a result generate rich data from a complex 
and rather inaccessible setting.  
 
4.6. Credibility, Plausibility and Transferability of the Research 
I outline the attempts I have made to ensure rigour in my research in this section. While 
traditionally the quality of research is assessed by its validity, reliability and 
generalisability, the literature questions the appropriateness of these evaluation 
measurements for qualitative research and claims that these seem to be suitable for studies 
that are conducted from a positivistic worldview (Cassell & Symon, 2004; Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002). Silverman (2010) argues that with qualitative research that follows a social 
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constructionist perspective an objective truth cannot be found. He suggests that qualitative 
research, instead, should aim to produce a credible and plausible account of the 
phenomenon under study. Consequently, I present credibility, plausibility and 
transferability as the alternative evaluation criteria to assess the rigor of my study (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). 
 
Credibility of the research is achieved by demonstrating that the research design and 
methods have resulted in findings that are accurate and believable (Gray, 2014). In other 
words, the interpretations and theoretical conclusions should present a credible description 
of the phenomenon under investigation. Hall and Callery (2001) explain that credibility in 
research can be strengthened through plausibility, which can be defined as the researcher's 
ability in "convinc[ing] the reader of the soundness and sense of their research"  (p.187). 
Hammersley (2005) describes research as plausible in the sense that respondents agree 
with findings and what we know, whereas he explains credible research as unlikely to 
generate significant error. Hammersely (2005) highlights that the plausibility and 
credibility of research are two important criteria to achieve rigour in qualitative research. 
In order for the research to be credible the researcher should be aware of the impact she 
has on the research process and she should frequently check the accuracy of the data 
(Curran & Blackburn, 2001). Scholars have also recommended transparency of techniques 
and methods used to generate and analyse data in order to secure credible research 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Gephart, 2004; Silverman, 2010). This requires providing in-
depth and concrete detail so that readers can draw their own conclusions about the 
accuracy of the research findings (Tracy, 2010). 
 
In order to ensure a credible and plausible piece of research, I adopted the following 
techniques: 
 
1. As in all qualitative research, where the quality and richness of data should be 
aimed for not the quantity (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), my main aim was also 
to produce rich and detailed data. For this reason I chose to conduct semi-
structured interviews to gain access to the participants' thoughts and 
experiences. The flexibility of these interviews also helped me to allow the 
participants to digress when it was appropriate and as a result elicit relevant 
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and interesting details about the phenomenon under investigation. This also 
allowed me to delve deeper into the subject through probing questions, 
especially when I recognised inconsistencies in participants’ opinions. 
2. In order to develop a deep understanding of knowledge processes in the 
publisher-developer relationship, the perspectives of various participants were 
sought. The participants held different roles in the companies under study, 
ranging from studio heads and producers to different team leaders, such as 
programmers, artists and designers from both development studios and the 
publishers. I aimed for multiple and varied voices in my research, based on 
Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2002) suggestion that the researcher should ensure “a 
sufficient number of perspectives have been included,  [so that] the study 
clearly gains access to the experiences of those in the research setting” (p.53). 
3. To ensure transparency, I have provided a detailed description of my research 
process, including the access and sampling method, interview techniques, and 
finally coding and analysis process (see sections 4.3. and 4.4.). I also audio 
recorded my interviews and transcribed them all verbatim as explained in the 
data generation section (McMillan & Schumacher, 1997). I also made an effort 
to be honest and transparent when presenting and analysing my data, making 
sure that I distinguished between my interpretations and the data to provide a 
clear picture for the reader (Skrtic, 1986).  
4. Reflexivity gave me the opportunity to reflect on my assumptions and how 
these assumptions influenced my interpretations (for more details on reflexivity 
see section 4.5.). 
5. The use of multiple sources or multiple data generation tools is considered as 
one of the most important means for achieving credibility in research (Denzin, 
1989). In addition to paying heed to multiple voices during the data generation 
process, I asked four participants and the insider to review and validate my 
interpretations and conclusions during the processes of analysing the data and 
producing the research report (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). 
 
The third evaluation criteria I have sought for in my research is transferability. 
Transferability refers to the extent to which the research findings can be transferred to 
wider groups and circumstances (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This definition can be associated 
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with generalisability – “the relevance of the concepts and constructs derived from [a] study 
to other settings” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.53). However, generalisability in 
qualitative research is problematic. This is because a qualitative piece of research 
incorporates interpretations and personal experiences that make it almost impossible for 
other researchers to replicate it (Babbie, 1995). Instead, Dey (1993) recommends 
transferability as an alternative measurement for qualitative research, in which the 
researcher provides a detailed description of their method and justifies that their findings 
can be transferred to other contexts (Silverman, 2008). While generalisability is 
"conclusive", transferability in qualitative research is only "suggestive" (Gray, 2014, 
p.183). 
 
In the case of my research, the chain-referral sampling method allowed me to develop 
three networks that I closely studied for similarities and discrepancies (Miles et al., 2013). 
These three networks all represented publisher-developer collaboration on an AAA game 
(see section 4.3.2.) and it is likely that in similar cases where there is a publisher-developer 
relationship formed to develop a big budget game, the same practices and processes can be 
identified. However, I refrain from generalising my findings. One of the significant 
contributions of my research is developing Carlile's Integrated Framework and explaining 
how knowledge is integrated in the political context of inter-organisational cross-boundary 
work. I assume that this model can be applied to similar contexts where there are high 
levels of differences, dependencies and novelty between partners. However, I am aware of 
the limitations of research and remain cautious in generalising my findings. Instead, I 
recommend that further research be required to confirm whether this model can be applied 
to other contexts. I will explain this in my conclusion chapter, where I discuss the 
limitations of my study and recommendations for further research. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to outline and justify my underlying methodological position, 
the research design and methods I used to carry out this study. This required me to explain 
briefly about the aims and objectives of my research, and discuss how my social 
constructionist and interpretivist theoretical position would fit the questions I was asking in 
the study. I described the methods and techniques I used to identify the research subjects, 
negotiate access and carry out the interviews. I provided a clear explanation of how the 
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generated data was preserved, coded and analysed. I also elaborated on how adopting 
reflexivity enabled me to recognise that the research process was subject to personal 
interpretations and the influence of different actors. But as a result of this reflexive process, 
I contend that I was able to address these limitations and generate rich and deep data in a 
credible, transferable and plausible piece of research. 
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Chapter Five: The Role of Boundary Objects in 
Facilitating/Hindering the Publisher-Developer Cross-
Boundary Work 
 
The complexity and unpredictability of videogame development, the inter-dependencies 
between different collaborators and the time and resource constraints of production make 
cross-boundary work a complicated and contentious process. However, publishers and 
developers utilise a wide range of objects, methods and infrastructures in order to manage 
their multi-disciplinary collaboration. This chapter presents the interview data on how 
boundary objects are used in the publisher-developer relationship and how these objects 
contribute to knowledge processes and the videogame development process. 
 
The nature of the game development process necessitates the application of certain devices 
and methods in order to assist coordination and collaboration within and across boundaries. 
According to the participants, game development should be an iterative practice, through 
which an under-defined concept will turn into a marketable product. Thus, trying to launch 
production with pre-defined plans and structures is deemed unnecessary and ineffective. 
However, this is at odds with what most publishers expect from their multi-million-budget 
investment. They often require plans, prototypes and contracts that reflect a clear picture of 
the product and the process of making it, in order to reduce the investment risks. An 
experienced developer emphasises the unpredictable and iterative nature of game 
production: 
 
It's quite difficult sometimes to know what the game is, earlier on. People like the 
game to evolve and get better. I don’t think I ever started a game where I had a 
really clear idea of what it would be in the end and even if I did, it wouldnever been 
mapped and I think that's just because they’re very complicated things (Ethan – 
developer director). 
 
 Another developer executive defines the production process as below: 
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Game development is not like you have this pre-defined idea and this is where 
 we’re gonna go. It’s kind of like, oh, let’s do this in the first two weeks and then get 
there. Then after we get there, we’ll decide where to go next. It works like that, 
rather than defining at the start. To define the game from 10 months in advance 
won’t be of good use for a creative product, but it certainly makes lawyers and 
publishers happy (Todd – developer executive). 
 
A publisher producer also confirms the iterative nature of videogame development: 
 
You’ve got something in your head, you try it out, so often when you try for the first 
time it doesn’t work, so you try again, based on what you’ve learned from the first 
time and the changes you’ve made based on that experience. Then you’d try it 
again and you’d try it again. The more times you reiterate, the more right it gets, 
the better results you get (Paul – publisher producer).   
 
 Due to the iterative and unpredictable nature of game development, certain types of 
boundary objects are found to be useful at different stages of the production. The study has 
detected a wide range of objects that facilitate the game development process. However I 
only focus on static and dynamic objects that have been found to be effective in the 
publisher-developer relationship, facilitating knowledge integration and work across their 
organisational boundaries. The two following sections will present static and dynamic 
objects consecutively. 
 
5.1. Static Boundary Objects 
This section gives an account of static boundary objects that are effective at the start of 
projects for creating the impression of trust and reducing high levels of risk. However 
these boundary objects lose their effectiveness later in the project and even lead to 
disagreements between the publisher and developer. This is because the iterative, creative 
and unpredictable nature of game development necessitates changes to the plans and 
documents. However, these boundary objects are not regularly updated due to the costs and 
resources that might be required to implement changes. In other words, even if these 
objects are not static in nature, they are static in the context of videogame development. 
That is why I have defined these boundary objects, as static boundary objects. Here, I 
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present Game Design Documents, Project Planning Documents and Contracts as the three 
static boundary objects that I found to be prevalent in use in the three networks I studied: 
 
5.1.1. Design Documents 
 Design documents can refer to a set of documents, such as the game design document 
(GDD), the technical design document (TDD) and the art design document (ADD). GDDs 
contain the detailed design of the game, including the characters, mechanics, tasks, plot, 
etc., as well as the scope of the game. TDDs show the technical specifications of all the 
elements in GDDs, while ADDs are more art focused and show the environment, the 
characters, etc. more in detail from the art perspective. The development studio refers to 
them interchangeably as design documents, and might implement an ensemble of all these 
three documents, or sometimes only one. This is how a publisher producer describes a 
design document: 
 
Design document is an exhaustive high level, medium level, and all encompassing 
200-page design bible that runs to every little thing, so that everyone knows what 
part they play, what role they're delivering and what they actually have to do (John 
– publisher producer). 
 
There is no set format for a design document; it can be a text document or an electronic 
presentation or even in the form of an online wiki. The document is compiled at the outset 
of a project by the developers to reflect the game vision in as much detail as they can. This 
document is used both internally at the development studio, and also externally for the 
investors and publishers. Within the development studio, design documents help different 
disciplines to have a better understanding of the game, creating a point of reference for 
discussions between the disciplines. Design documents are considered to be crucial for the 
pre-production stage when the publisher-developer relationship is formed, because they 
provide a relatively clear picture of the game vision and specification, thus making better 
grounds for publisher investment. Ethan a developer director highlights the important role 
of design documents at the outset of the project to create a unified vision between the 
publisher and developer: 
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Game design documents is the statement of the vision. These documents go around 
the management team initially to ensure that we have a shared vision and there's 
no disagreement there, and then we will filter that down to the  team through 
dialogue and conversation (Ethan – developer director) 
 
Design documents are particularly important for the publisher because they form a basis 
for their assessment of the project, its plausibility and potential risks. They help the 
publisher assess how the game vision is going to be gradually developed and whether the 
appropriate resources have been allocated to it. A publisher producer highlights the crucial 
role of "design documents" in building up trust between the publisher and developer: 
 
Publishers love seeing these types of things. It makes the publisher feel better 
because it proves that developers have thought of everything all the way through or 
all the way that they could (John – publisher producer). 
 
Matt, a publisher producer reinforces that design documents provide some security and 
clarity for the publisher. He states that the publisher "wants more security and assurance 
that they are not wasting their money and the design documents help them make their 
assessments on the project and decide whether they want to spend that x amount of money" 
(Matt – publisher producer). 
 
Although respondents emphasised that design documents are crucial in creating mutual 
understanding between the developer and publisher, they highlighted that these documents 
should evolve in order to be useful and practical in the development. Since game 
development is an iterative process, these documents will be irrelevant in a short period of 
time due to changes that are progressively imposed on the game/game vision. In other 
words, as the creative vision is gradually shaped into a playable version of the game, the 
initial design documents need to be updated, revised and reviewed throughout the game 
development. Here, a developer underlines the iterative nature of the game development 
and how it impacts game design documents: 
 
A design document is a snapshot of the moment. So here is the current design but 
next week when we figure out something didn’t work or could work or could be 
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done better or whatever, it invalidates huge sections of it, right, and that’s just not 
useful for anybody (Ethan – developer studio head). 
 
The interview data reveal that these documents, despite their usefulness at the earlier stages 
of the production, can become redundant later on. Due to the temporal and financial 
restrictions, these documents are often not upgraded and are rarely exploited. According to 
the head of a development studio: 
 
This is a creative endeavour right and, things change as you work through the 
project. Why should I spend all this money and waste my staff time to make a 
document that I have to change again in a month’s time? We don’t do that 
anymore. That doesn’t work (Adrian – developer director). 
 
Updating lengthy documents needs time, money and resources, and the developer finds it 
time-consuming, costly and distracting to constantly revise and write the documents. The 
technicians are also reported to be unwilling to use these documents, instead they are more 
willing to utilise more visual objects (these options will be discussed later in this chapter). 
A developer designer claims that continuous meetings substituted an updated design 
document in their studio:  
 
Design document was just an initial thing that needed to be done to please the 
publisher, but the game changed quite drastically and the document never really 
got updated. We didn’t really have a central design document that was an evolving 
document and we were pretty much okay, because we were working over the Skype 
mostly (Fin – developer lead designer). 
 
Considering it more of an unnecessary chore, some developers might even go into 
production not having one. Calling it "a relic from previous generations", a senior 
publisher producer who owns his own development studio says: 
 
Design document is the one I don’t believe in. Well it’s a little bit of a joke. People 
spend a lot of time and resources installing a massive design document, like a 
hundred of other design documents that no one reads. Even if you put it on a wiki 
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or a network, it sits there; people will never go to that location to read it, it can be 
great as a repository of information but it kind of often gets left there. So we 
stopped doing that (Chris – senior publisher producer).  
 
A publisher senior executive also believes that long written documents are not effective in 
the context of videogame development. However, he suggests that having visual material 
that can be updated and revised is of more benefit to working across boundaries. 
 
When am I going to read 150 pages of game design? And after they update it, I've 
got another 150 pages. I haven't got time to read any of this. I think forms of 
documentation are needed for in studio, but I don't see that necessarily as a 
massive design document. Largely visual material is much better than written 
materials. Let's say I've got some marketing guy coming in. It's like, do I want to 
show him a game or do I want to ask him to read [a] ten page document? 
(Laurence – publisher vice president). 
 
Here, Laurence explains that design documents can be useful at earlier stages of 
production, but if you consider the production as a whole, their impact reduces as 
production goes on. He suggests that implementing an updated playable version of the 
game might be a better replacement for a bulky written game design document. Section 
5.2.3. elaborates on the role of the playable/build/prototype in facilitating cross-
disciplinary work. However, the next section introduces another static object that is 
sometimes used in videogame development. 
 
5.1.2. Project Planning Documentation 
A dominant approach to the organisation of projects in videogame development is called 
the Waterfall Model (Weisert, 2003). This establishes a set of clear-cut phases for the 
project, where moving to the next phase is contingent upon the completion of the 
preceding phase. This method calls for adopting objects, such as project planning 
documentations at the outset of the project, which present requirements of the 
development, timelines, staff, and budget, with specified milestone deliverables. This is 
how Rob – a creative director and an ex publisher producer – describes project plan 
documents: 
 
 
114 
 
A project planning document is like a big spider’s web that covers the whole 
production, with all the tasks, dependencies, dates and issues to be resolved. A 
solid project planning can be integral to the whole production which reaches out 
and touches all different departments and organises them (Rob – creative director 
and ex publisher producer).  
 
The Waterfall Model with a sequential and robust architecture for product development 
remains a highly popular approach for videogame development, because it creates a 
perception of stability and predictability, based on which investors/publishers can hold 
developers accountable for, primarily, the sequential delivery of milestones for an agreed 
budget and timeline.  
 
However, most of the developers in my study show disapproval for the method due to its 
incongruity with the game development process and its requirements. Stanley, a developer 
art director and studio founder talks about the absurdity of using rigid and meticulously 
written project plan documents in the following statement. He says: 
 
The difficulty comes when the publisher needs something down on a paper to be 
able to believe that the developer have an understanding of  what and how they are 
going to deliver. They need to break the whole game design down to the nth degree, 
[but] scheduling this in the project plan and milestone deliverables is a huge 
mistake; we need some flexibility in production (Stanley – developer art director 
and studio founder). 
 
The participants emphasise that the Waterfall Model can create some security and trust for 
both parties. Paul, a publisher producer explains that utilising this project planning method 
is "one of those mind-numbingly important things to be done and it’s very detail orientated 
like a cold hard battle of scheduling". This publisher executive highlights that when 
"you’ve got a waterfall method and plan agreed at the start then you don't have to face up 
to [the developer's] their disagreements. It's tough, but they have to get on with it and do 
the project [as planned]" (Paul). Jing, another publisher producer, confirms that detailed 
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project planning documents can give the publisher some security over the quality. He 
states:  
 
The trinity of project management is budget, timing and quality, you know. The one 
thing that will put budget, timing and quality off balance is planning. Without 
planning we can't ensure the game will come out on time, budget and with the 
quality we asked for (Jing – publisher producer). 
 
Some developers in the study also emphasised that using detailed Waterfall Model 
planning documents could create stability and security for the development studio. David 
who is a studio head states that these documents will help them "agree exactly with the 
publisher on the scope of the game before they start the project" and this can secure them 
because the publisher might "change their mind and want more things in the game than 
what was agreed upon". 
 
Conversely the participants contend that the method and its sequential project planning 
documents at the later stages of development have proven to be not only inefficient for the 
game development process, but sometimes also hindering the work across disciplines. The 
interview data show that the iterative and unpredictable nature of game development 
disrupts the highly detailed Waterfall Model plans. Unexpected problems and the need for 
changes and amendments throughout the production can make detailed planning 
documents redundant. 
 
Due to the dependencies between the disciplines within the development studio, addressing 
the emergent problems or making changes sometimes requires increasing or reallocating 
staff, which in turn calls for more temporal and financial resources. This will lead to 
further disruption in planning, hence disagreements and clashes between developers and 
publishers. Here, Andrew – a production director and an ex project manager – illustrates 
how this project plan document can be a hindrance to cross-boundary work that has high 
levels of dependencies. He recalls: 
 
In our project, the project plan was a big source of contention between us and the 
publisher, because there had been a game plan initially specced out with a month 
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by month milestones definitions. This plan wasn’t practical at all, because after 
being six months in production, the game had changed and it was constantly 
evolving, therefore the whole plan had to change. So basically what we had to do 
was, we had to work with publisher team constantly to try and make our game fit in 
with the old definitions, which they were willing to a degree at the beginning. But 
when push came to shove and the relationship broke down, the willingness to be 
flexible became less and less to the point when there was zero flexibility. Obviously 
the game had changed and was changing continuously and this became a big 
source of contention between the parties (Andrew – production director). 
  
Implementing the Waterfall Method with highly routinised and predictable plans seems to 
also interrupt the creativity of developers. As a result, the use of rigid and structured 
project planning documents is considered as impractical and non-functional even within 
the development studio. The project managers who are responsible for planning the game 
and managing the team claim that their practice is sometimes received as disruptive by 
some developers within the studio and they are often considered as "outsiders" (Allan – 
publisher executive). A publisher senior executive underlines the tension between 
creativity and rational planning, highlighting the resistance teams show towards planning 
and structures:  
 
It is really interesting how they still subvert project management. I think the 
credibility of the project management in the videogame space is absolutely 
diabolical. The only reason project managers are disliked [by developers] is 
because [the developers] don’t understand what [project managers] are doing. 
This is the executive producer’s responsibility to make the team value [project 
managers] and clear the ambiguity about the role of project manager. The industry 
is young and inexperienced. People have big egos and they don’t like to be told 
what to do (Allan – publisher executive). 
 
The participants of the study, including both publishers and developers, admitted that the 
detailed Waterfall Model planning documents are found to be impractical and also create 
clashes between both parties. The developers showed more disagreement towards these 
planning documents because they suggested that adopting a structured and highly 
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controlled method in development would restrict creative freedom, thus alienating the 
creative staff. The creative freedom is what the publisher seeks in the developer. However, 
the publisher insists on applying the planning documents despite their awareness of the 
impracticality of this document at the later stages of production. The publisher seems to 
ignore the developer's resistance to this structured and sequential planning because through 
these planning methods the publisher attempts to reduce the risks of investment and 
development. The participants (both developers and publishers) confirmed that these 
documents create perceptions of stability and trust at the outset of the project, hence they 
are viewed as crucial in forming the publisher-developer relationship. 
 
5.1.3. Contracts 
A contract is a standard object that translates and facilitates understanding and work 
between two different but dependent organisations. The publisher-developer collaboration 
starts with a written contract that is intended to increase mutual understanding and build 
trust between the two. This contract is composed at the outset of the collaboration and 
incorporates game specifications and features within the game design documents, as well 
as an elaborate project plan. Publishers demand a detailed and structured contract because 
they can hold the developer accountable for the timely and quality delivery of the product; 
hence their usefulness at the start of the project. A publisher executive highlights that 
"contracts are essential – we make an assessment and devise a contract to secure a quality 
delivery" (Simon – publisher executive). Matt – an experienced publisher producer – talks 
about the role the contract plays in creating perceptions of trust and stability for the 
publishers: 
 
We try to come to this belief that the developer can really deliver a product and 
using the contract we get the developer to commit to the contractual milestonesand 
game specifications (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
The developer also explains that the contract makes them trust each other. He says "we 
stick to the spirit of the contract ˙ we know what that is and we don’t dispute it. There are 
absolute lines in the contract and they are given. We trust them [the publisher], we work 
with them and we respect them and their contract" (Francis – developer director).  
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However, the interview data reveal that this traditional and detailed contract at the later 
stages of project seems to be not only impractical, but is actually a hindrance to the cross-
boundary videogame development. Adrian, a highly experienced developer/studio head 
complains that:  
 
The contracts are often not fit for purpose really. You will never end up having a 
game that you designed in the contract. This will never happen; it's impossible with 
software. But we all sign the same contracts every year, exactly the same 
framework. I challenge you to find a single development contract that actually 
represents the game (Adrian – studio head). 
 
The interview data also show that contracts are generally not referred to or used during the 
development process, unless serious problems arise. Ken explains why they tend not to 
discuss contracts with publishers:  
 
We never go to the contract, because first of all, that's not what we want to be 
doing. We want to make games not be sitting in court. Second, our companies are 
much smaller than publishers, there's no way we can win. So we try not to get to 
that position (Ken – developer executive producer).  
 
Developers are not the only ones who talk about the ineffectiveness of contracts in this 
relationship. Here Jing – a publisher producer who currently owns his development studio 
– states that contracts are only taken seriously when the relationship is formed, but later 
they are avoided. He states: 
 
The contracts are there to be and they might only be used when things go wrong 
between partners. It's always written in the contract that it's going to work along 
those timelines, but it never does. It's blank trust and it's one that's biased in the 
beginning and it's not later. It's a grey area that is difficult to navigate and people 
often don’t go there (Jing – publisher producer). 
 
Publisher executives also admit that a contract is not an efficient device to manage the 
publisher-developer relationship. Here, a publisher senior executive delineates:  
 
 
119 
 
You can put stuff in a contract, but you can't manage people with contracts. You 
can't manage vision; you can't manage your game with a contract. Contracts, 
largely, set out terms and conditions, but using contracts and waving bits of paper 
to get what you want is not normal course of business (Laurence – publisher 
executive). 
 
Some developers in the study perceive the detailed contract as a medium for the publisher 
to exert control and monitor the developer. Ben – an experienced developer who has 
worked on very successful game titles – explains that the publisher pushes for a detailed 
contract in order to make sure the developer delivers the game with the quality and 
timeline they want. However, he believes the publisher’s expectation for detailed planning 
in the contract is "unrealistic" and "overly ambitious":  
 
On the publisher side I think there has always been a suspicion about the 
relationship and they want the contract to be something which they could use to 
drive the whole thing through, so they want to see ambitious scheduling (Ben – 
developer executive).  
 
The developer views the contract as "unrealistic and overly ambitious" because they 
believe that there is incompatibility between the game development process and the nature 
of the contract. Due to the iterative and creative nature of game development, the 
developer emphasises that they definitely have to change the features/specifications that 
were agreed upon in the contract later on in the production. As a result, contracts are not 
suitable for a creative development process, and they only lead to disagreement and 
dissension between parties. A developer executive complains:  
 
Publishers’ lawyers want a contract with clear milestone definitions, they want 
everything defined, designed and mapped out from the first day all the way up to 
the end. This is not a great way to make a creative product; you can’t granulate or 
procreate a creative product (Todd – developer executive).  
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Here, a developer creative director also reinforces how the contract will create more 
clashes between the parties in the publisher-developer relationship: 
 
There's a definite conflict between the need to define a game as delivering a certain 
amount of content and features in a contract, and the process of actually 
developing the game with those specifications. The problem is that when you start 
making a game, you might have planned a certain set of features and content for it, 
but as you develop that game, you may need to cut some of them, either because 
they don't quite work in gameplay terms, or  simply because sometimes, in order to 
stay on time and on budget you need to cut things. Obviously, from a publisher's 
point of view, this is not what they originally agreed to pay for – even if the end 
result might be a better game, hence all sorts of problems arise (Dylan – developer 
creative director). 
 
The contract seems to provide a resource for the publisher in their disputes with the 
developer. If the developer diverts from the contractual milestones, the publisher can 
legally withdraw from paying and they can also cancel the project. A publisher executive 
confirms that they "devise a contract to secure a quality delivery and penalise late delivery” 
(Simon – publisher executive). That is the reason why the developer sometimes avoids 
committing to a detailed contract so that they have more flexibility to implement the 
changes that might be needed in the game. The point here is that given the complexity of 
dependencies between the partners, detailed contracts can be detrimental. The head of a 
development studio emphasises that the developer prefers to share less information with 
the publisher about the development, especially at the beginning of the relationship in 
order to stop more misunderstandings in the future. He explains: 
 
There are some grey areas in the contract that can’t be measured properly, these 
are some milestone criteria that are mainly subjective themes, and they are not 
black and white. The contract says this feature should be completed 70% but it’s 
not measurable. Our contract with the publisher has lots of details such as staff 
plan, which determines how many people should be in each group. We never 
exactly liked those details because these could work against us. This is very 
complicated due to crossover within the team. There is always some information 
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that you don’t want to share, as a developer, I’d better be careful because that 
information might be used against me (Nigel – developer studio head).  
 
The publishers in the study also confirm that contracts create clashes between the parties. 
A publisher executive says “the contract spells trouble, I have to wave contracts when I 
have a massive problem” (Laurence – publisher executive). In other words, he expresses 
his disapproval of exploiting the contract as a threat to resolve the disagreements in the 
relationship, while confirming that the developer can be very difficult in sharing some 
information and committing to the contract. Another publisher executive states:  
  
They [the developer] sometimes wouldn’t give you design documents, wouldn’t give 
you schedules or dates. They just wouldn’t commit to the contract or contractual 
milestones. Getting details from them is like you have to get blood out of stone 
(Allan – publisher executive). 
 
The interview data reveal that design documents, project planning documents and contracts 
are widely used in the publisher-developer relationship because they create perceptions of 
trust and stability between the partners, thus enabling them to form a relationship 
regardless of their differences and dependencies. Although design documents, project 
planning documents and contracts are not static in nature, they are static in use because 
they are not regularly updated and upgraded due to the costs and resources that are 
required to do this. Therefore, the study suggest that these static boundary objects are not a 
useful medium/object at later stages of videogame development. The participants 
emphasised that these can also create more clashes and disagreements between the parties. 
The next section presents the dynamic objects that were found to be useful for the iterative 
and unpredictable process of the videogame development. 
 
5.2. Dynamic/Epistemic Objects 
The creative and iterative nature of videogame development makes it very difficult to 
define the product and its development at the start of the project. The static boundary 
objects need to be updated and revised regularly in order to be useful for the duration of 
the project. However, this is not done due to the costs and expenses that are required to 
upgrade these documents. The developers are under immense time and resource pressure to 
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deliver the game on time and budget, so they prefer the methods that are more cost and 
time effective. Therefore, they utilise dynamic objects or processes that can be easily 
upgraded, updated and revised throughout the development process. The dynamic and 
epistemic objects are used alongside the static objects, to facilitate knowledge integration 
and collaboration during game development. The following sections examine three 
dynamic objects/processes that are widely used in the industry and are considered as 
effective for the videogame development process, as well as the publisher-developer 
relationship. Agile project planning, meetings and prototypes are the three dynamic objects 
that will be discussed in the following parts.  
 
5.2.1. Iterative Planning, a Dynamic Process 
As noted earlier, due to high levels of novelty, videogame development is an unpredictable 
process and the participants highlighted that instead of the static Waterfall Model of 
project planning, an approach based on cycles and iterations could be more effective. 
Iterative development is a response to the deficiencies of the horizontal and inflexible 
methodologies, like the Waterfall Model, which were implemented in the industry. There 
might be other iterative software development methodologies, such as Extreme 
Programming, Adaptive Software Development, Pragmatic Programming, etc. that put 
forward an approach to software development that is very different from the rationalist, 
plan, document and process intensive strategies implicit in the Waterfall Model. But the 
interview data only refer to the Agile methodology as an effective replacement for the 
traditional Waterfall Model in videogame development. 
 
An Agile project deploys a series of iterations/cycles for the development (Schwaber, 
2004). According to Schwaber (2004), iterations/cycles are short intervals that take 
generally two to three weeks. Each iteration/cycle includes all the phases of development, 
such as concept, design, coding, integration, and testing of the game within that time 
frame. At the end of each cycle/iteration, an updated and playable version of the game will 
be submitted to the customer. The customer can be the publisher producer, developer 
producer, etc. who reviews the game and produces a product backlog that defines and 
prioritises the game features and plans for the next stage. The iterative development 
process might contain numerous cycles/iterations in its timeline. 
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An experienced development studio owner confirms how the Agile methodology gives 
them more flexibility in development: 
 
We’ve changed our old ways of doing things. Now we try to be very agile in 
development and do things with short-term goals. You know, it’s a day-to-day 
thing; sometimes things are being decided almost every morning. The flexibility of 
Agile and redefining goals is very useful (Ethan – developer studio head). 
 
A publisher programmer also confirms the effectiveness of the Agile methodology in game 
development:  
 
It's hard to use any sort of project management software, except Agile because 
game development is more of a day to day thing, with short-term goals (Gareth – 
publisher lead programmer). 
 
With the Agile methodology, the implementation of static tools, documents and inflexible 
contractual plans are ineffective. In an Agile project, they do not avoid planning, but they 
adopt dynamic planning practices that allow for change as the project is developed. David, 
a renowned developer, emphasises the critical role of the Agile methodology in facilitating 
development: "Through Agile programming and Scrums, we can recognise the changes to 
the project and identify the resources needed for those changes – this is crucial for the 
project" (David – developer studio head). 
 
Chris – a publisher producer – stresses the importance of the Agile methodology for 
development. However, he highlights that while they are flexible to changes, they attempt 
to prevent implementing big changes to the project: 
 
We use Agile and Scrum, which is the most sophisticated development approach. 
We track performance daily, we ask for printouts daily and we monitor the whole 
project on a daily basis. We are flexible to changes but we don't tolerate really 
massive changes in schedule (Chris – publisher producer). 
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Rather than focus on milestones and documents predefined in the contract as in most 
Waterfall Models, the Agile project concentrates on dynamic processes and objects.  
Communication between parties and multiple disciplines is facilitated through frequent 
meetings that are held regularly between the internal teams, and on organisational and 
inter-organisational levels. Yousef – a developer director – confirms: 
 
When we have an Agile and iterative project, we have more frequent meetings both 
internally and with the publisher to make sure we are all on board in terms of the 
vision or the direction of the game (Yousef – developer director). 
 
While both publishers and developers emphasise that iterative planning such as the Agile 
methodology is highly useful for the videogame development process, they express their 
concern over managing projects with these plans. Dylan describes iterative planning as 
"extremely difficult" (developer programmer), while Timothy – a publisher executive – 
calls them "risky": 
 
In the last ten years, we all became professionally changed and trained. We 
learned about Agile, we learned about Scrum. But it's risky to use them. The 
development budget and risks involved are so high that employees, especially 
developers running these projects have to be pretty sophisticated (Timothy – 
publisher executive). 
 
Due to the large sums of investment, the publisher associates Agile planning with high 
levels of risk and this is the main reason why they demand that the developer starts the 
project with a clear and detailed project plan. However, later in the project the publisher 
will show more flexibility towards using iterative planning. The interview data above 
showed that this project planning methodology is congruous with the iterative and 
unpredictable nature of videogame development.   
 
5.2.2. Meetings 
Face-to-face meetings seem to be an integral part of the development process that facilitate 
communication and knowledge integration within and between different disciplines. The 
meetings also happen virtually, through Skype calls and other sorts of video conferencing 
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methods. However, the interview data suggest that communicating via these methods is not 
as effective as face-to-face meetings. A developer highlights the difficulty of 
communication through other media: “unlike face-to-face meetings, email and Skype can 
be unforgiving [creating misunderstandings]” (Francis – developer). Adam, another 
developer director, highlights the importance of face-to-face meetings: 
 
I don’t like emails because so much gets lost, whereas personally I think face-to-
face meetings are always the best. I always make an effort to talk to everyone on 
my team at least once a day, even if just to have a coffee. When you start having 
bigger teams, meeting everyone on the team would get difficult. But you make sure 
that the teams meet on a daily basis and you meet with your leads everyday, cause 
you don’t have time for that face-to-face interaction with everybody on the team on 
daily basis (Adam – developer director). 
 
The participants claim that implementing the Agile methodology calls for more meetings 
during development, thus leading to better communication between and within the teams. 
Here Ken – an experienced developer producer – explains: 
 
 
So the frequency of meetings depends on how we are managing the development, so 
if we are more on an Agile iterative kind of team then it would be more frequent, 
and of course it results in better communications. If it is more Waterfall based then 
the meetings are less frequent (Ken – developer producer). 
 
The internal meetings within the development studio range from daily to monthly and 
formal to informal, depending on the size of the development studio. The head of a large 
and renowned development studio outlines: 
 
We’ve got different types of different meetings: weekly meetings; bi-weekly 
meetings; some meetings every five to six weeks. These meetings are based-on 
different aims in order to keep track of all stages of product development and for 
information flow, to make sure we have a shared vision, and that's anything from 
the way the game monetises all the way through to its story and what's going to 
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make it fun and everything. We also do have some everyday meetings as well 
between the internal producer and leads (David – studio head). 
 
Face-to-face meetings also have a critical role in facilitating communication and 
knowledge integration in the publisher and developer relationship. An on-going publisher 
presence within the development studio is common in the development process. Paul 
explains that in the projects, he is responsible for a development team:  
  
I always ask for a desk and I stay there with my team regularly, this is partly to see 
what's going on, keep track of everything, have regular meetings and support the 
developer. But above all making sure if they say they have twenty people on the 
project, they do really have those people onboard (Paul – publisher producer). 
 
However, the publisher’s level of integration into the development studio and the access 
they will be allowed will very much depend on the level of trust between the two parties. 
Another publisher producer talks about his approach to the developer: 
  
I would insist on weekly or at least bi-weekly meeting, just like a short update. On a 
high level, we used stand up meetings, plus ad-hoc meetings. But ideally, I would 
want my producer on-site; it would be ideal to try and get a desk in the studio, 
somewhere, anywhere (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
Ad-hoc meetings are used as a method to monitor and assess the development progress. 
The publisher’s on-site visits can take place "as little as once every few months or as 
frequently as once/twice a week depending on the stage of development, the proximity of 
the publisher to the studio, as well as the level of trust between two parties" (Andrew – 
developer producer). But it is likely that during these visits, random/ad-hoc meetings occur 
in and around the office between the publisher representatives and various members of the 
development team. Unlike ad-hoc meetings, the stand-up meetings are planned. Chris, a 
publisher executive producer, defines stand-up meetings:  
 
In stand-up meetings, we would get the whole team up in a room once a week, 
normally where everyone is working. We gather them around and get everyone to 
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stand up to give a little bit of information, within fifteen to twenty minutes, like here 
where we are at, this is what is happening (Chris – publisher executive producer). 
 
When the publisher is present at the development studio, whether daily, weekly or 
monthly, the publisher team holds informal ad-hoc or other low-level meetings with the 
development team. These meetings are held to monitor and support the development team. 
The formal publisher-developer meetings are called steering meetings, in which company 
directors, senior development staff, as well as key stakeholders such as marketing, PR and 
QA are involved. The interview data show that the steering meetings are held between the 
publisher and developer on a regular basis to present overall progress of development, 
outline future plans, and potentially negotiate and approve various facets of the prototype. 
These meetings are essential in facilitating the publisher-developer knowledge integration 
and collaboration. Rob, a publisher producer, highlights: 
 
It’s really important to get face-to-face time with the developer. Through 
discussions and  regular meetings we surface the issues and reach agreements (Rob 
– publisher producer). 
 
The interview data reveal that in case of problems and clashes, contracts are not referred to 
(as shown in section 5.1.3), instead the publisher and developer resort to steering meetings 
to resolve their issues and create "a unified vision and direction for the game" (Ethan – 
developer director). Mike who is the creative director of a development studio also 
confirms that "what’s lost in communication can be covered in meetings – when you have 
face-to-face interaction" (Mike – developer creative director). As the project progresses, 
meetings replace the use of contract in order to address the changes to the project, 
misunderstandings and disagreements. These face-to-face publisher-developer meetings 
provide a good opportunity for the partners to resolve their differences and create mutual 
understanding. 
 
5.2.3. The Prototype 
Another dynamic boundary object that seems to work effectively in videogame 
development is the prototype. The prototype is a playable version of the game that is 
developed at the pre-production phase. The prototype will be updated and refined 
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iteratively as the game progresses, and it is interchangeably referred to as the "build", 
"vertical slice" or "playable". Although the term "build" is used prevalently within the 
industry, in this thesis, I choose the term prototype to refer to this updated version of the 
game during the project. This is because the term prototype seems to be intelligible to a 
wider audience.  
 
The developer and publisher use the prototype as a point of reference and discussions both 
within the studio and across the companies. This is regarded as the most effective way to 
communicate and create better understanding between different disciplines. Brian – a 
developer executive and founder of a very successful studio – delineates how in their 
studio they have replaced the "time and resource consuming" game design documents with 
the prototype to create a better understanding of the vision and the game between different 
disciplines. He states: 
 
For our projects we actually create a prototype really quickly and focus on 
updating them iteratively as we go on. Some people certainly in the past quite often 
would write a lot of things down in a bulky bible, but we've decided to skip the 
documentation, but talk about what we want to produce and then just create a build 
(prototype) really quickly. That goes pretty well because it gives us a talking point 
between teams, and it actually gives us something to play, and then see if there is 
either potential for fun or actually if there's fun in there at all (Brian – developer 
executive). 
 
The prototype shows the gameplay and features of the game, and it also displays the 
dependencies of different disciplines. In addition, the prototype allows all the stakeholders, 
including programmers, artists, designers and the publisher, to see and test how their ideas 
can all work together. A developer producer and creative director called Dylan highlights 
how not having a playable version of the game until late in the development created 
misalignments between different teams; hence, a detriment to their project: 
 
On that project we were constantly trying to catch up with where the art and design 
had gone to, with the technical side of it. So I would say doing the build (prototype) 
and having something playable is a great thing to have, something that people 
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would look at and say yeah it works; it’s fun. But this was something we didn’t do 
on Star Soldier. Looking back on it, maybe we should have done a build (prototype) 
using our existing engines. But now I’ve learnt that when we do a project, the first 
thing we do is get something playable going and make sure it’s fun cause if it’s not 
fun there’s no point in making it (Dylan – developer producer and creative 
director). 
 
Apart from building a common point of understanding between publishers and developers, 
the prototype also helps the developer plan the development process more realistically. The 
prototype provides an overview of the development and the resources required to finish it, 
such as staff, technology and time. Therefore these requirements can be easily detected by 
the developer and communicated to the publisher. Marcus, a developer lead artist, 
elaborates: 
 
Key to keeping a project on time and budget is to know before you start (a) exactly 
what it is you're making and (b) that it's actually something fun. The only reliable 
way I know of, to do this, is to prototype things at the start, iterate them as you go 
along, and then when you're happy with the results, enter full development. I've 
seen projects come together without prototypes and it's pretty galling to only reach 
the stage where a game is properly playable late in development and to realise that 
it's not actually much fun. Obviously that then requires extra work to turn it 
around, which will often add to the time/budget (Marcus – developer lead artist). 
 
Keeping the project on time and budget is one of the main objectives of any publisher 
investing in a project. This is also important for a development studio, because sometimes 
the costs of running a studio for one extra month can be so high that the developer may 
find it difficult to finance. There can be a breakdown in the publisher-developer 
relationship if the project runs late and requires extra budget. This might result in the 
termination of the project and sometimes the demise of the development studio. Therefore, 
using a prototype which is gradually upgraded and updated can prevent these problems and 
create a better understanding of the development process for both the publisher and 
developer.  
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The prototype is sometimes created at pre-production stage, as a proof of concept, 
gameplay and assets for the publisher or other investors, to raise funds. The prototype is 
also used throughout the development process to show the investors/publishers or other 
stakeholders how much the project has progressed. The updated and playable version of 
the game seems to be the best document to be presented to the publisher for each 
milestone, through which the publisher can assess and track the game’s progress. Paul, 
who is a publisher producer, emphasises the importance of the prototype (build/playable) 
in winning the trust of the publishers to invest:  
 
The playable (prototype) is like seeing five minutes gameplay that represents of 
what the final game will be like. So by seeing a vertical slice, you can de-risk that 
massive chunk of money that you must spend because then you know what the game 
is going to be like. The analogy might be like making a show home, for a property 
developer. When the developer can’t afford to do that, it is a sort of like rolling the 
dice for the publisher (Paul – publisher producer). 
 
Another publisher producer confirms that he wouldn’t approve any milestones, unless the 
developer presents an upgraded and progressed version of the prototype: 
  
I would always ask for builds (prototypes). For me the proof is always in the build 
(prototype), I’m not interested in things that are done in people’s PCs, I’m not 
interested to see 50 assets, like 50 cars, made on PCs. I would ask to see those 50 
assets in the game, so the idea of hiding stuff becomes very difficult for them. Since 
all the milestones are quite based on builds (prototypes) that I can play and I can 
see, not documents, it makes it harder for them to hide stuff away (Matt – publisher 
producer). 
 
Here, the publisher producer believes that the prototype can provide more transparency on 
the development for the publisher, through which they can track the development progress 
much better and hold the developer accountable. In the quote below, Ken, an experienced 
developer producer, also suggests that the prototype maintains clarity. However, he 
complains that this transparency might not be as beneficial for the developer, which is why 
sometimes they prefer to not show all the changes to the publisher. Ken thinks submitting 
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the prototypes to the publisher might create some conflicts. This is because the publisher 
might disagree with the diversions from the original vision and game specifications that 
were documented and agreed upon in the contract and game design documents. In these 
circumstances, the producer himself intervenes to explain the prototype and negotiate the 
changes they have made to the game. Ken states: 
 
In my experience, the publisher would often like to have builds (prototypes), but 
we’ve always been slightly cynical about that and it comes from the fact that if you 
are not there to talk them through things, especially when you’ve introduced a new 
feature, for example if you want to try something out that it’s not budgeted for, then 
you get all these questions: why are you doing that? Why aren’t you doing what 
we’ve asked you to do? They start asking endless questions; most of the time you 
just prefer not showing it to them. The best way of showing them the build 
(prototype) is standing next to them and say, look this feature here, don’t worry 
about that, forget that, but if you are not there to say it, they may think you have 
focused on something that is broken (Ken – developer executive producer). 
 
The interview data showed that publishers and developers used dynamic boundary objects 
such as iterative planning methods, meetings and prototype at the later stages of production 
to facilitate their collaboration and knowledge integration. These boundary objects were 
utilised both within the development studio and between the studio and the publisher. The 
participants highlighted the unpredictable and complicated nature of videogame 
development, stating that detailed planning and implementing structures were only useful 
at the outset of the project to create stability and security for both parties. However, 
dependencies and unpredictability of the project necessitated the use of boundary objects 
that could be easily updated and upgraded. That was why the participants found dynamic 
boundary objects useful for the development process. The participants highlighted that 
through discussions and conversations they facilitated the use of dynamic boundary objects 
and created a better understanding of their dependencies, vision and the directions of the 
project. This refers to the role of brokers in mobilising the effective use of dynamic 
boundary objects through their mediating and negotiating abilities. Brokers or producers 
(as they are called in the videogames industry) are responsible for mediating and 
negotiating between the publisher and the developer. Brokers/producers are regarded as 
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key to the development success and the publisher-developer relationship, and they are also 
central in mobilising dynamic boundary objects. Therefore, I have allocated the 
penultimate section of this chapter to elaborate on their role in the videogame 
development. 
   
5.3. The Critical Role of Producers 
The interview data reveal that producers have a critical role in managing the publisher-
developer relationship and the development process. Producers or brokers are appointed by 
the publisher to work closely with the developer and to supervise the game development. 
Sometimes development studios on bigger projects assign internal producers too in order to 
oversee the production and connect with the publisher producer in managing the 
development. Whether it is a publisher producer or a developer producer, their role is 
considered as vital for the collaborative relationship. They have to constantly “review the 
game and make sure the quality level and the overall vision is maintained” (John – 
publisher producer). They also supervise how the developer is spending the money 
invested by the publisher. They have to “make sure that the developer is spending the 
money correctly, wisely and effectively” (Jing – publisher producer). Here, Matt, who is 
another publisher producer, describes how he reviews the game: 
 
I look at a game design and go, where is it strong? Where is it weak? And  I’ll run 
up a report and do talking through it all the way. I do the same thing for the 
product and then go on-site and actually fix it or fix might be a strong term but I’ll 
push it to the direction where it needs to be fixed. I am always that bridge between 
the developer and publisher (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
The participants of the study highlight the main responsibility of producers in bridging the 
gap between the publisher and developer. They explain that producers act as intermediary 
bringing different expertise together. An experienced publisher executive asserts: “I think 
it's a really critical role because they need to be able to serve both sides effectively. They 
kind of serve two masters and have to maintain the relationship, so they are the buffer 
between the publisher and the developer” (Allan – publisher executive).  
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Producers need to have much broader skill sets and have knowledge of the creative side, as 
well as the business side of game development. They should understand the marketing 
process, the localisation process, the QA process, the PR process, the strategic planning, 
the finance requirements and the development process, and also make sure that all different 
disciplines have an understanding of each other and are working towards the same goals. 
Laurence – a publisher executive – explains: 
 
If you've got like 200 people in the game studio and then you've got another 100 
people in the publisher, all working on the game, trying to coordinate the efforts of 
300 people is pretty difficult. You have to interface between these different 
disciplines and make sure they understand the vision and everybody is informed 
about it. It’s a dual facing role, you make sure the development team are aware of 
the business demands of the production and the marketing and sales guys are 
aware of the product vision (Laurence – publisher vice president). 
 
Angelo, who is a creative director working for a renowned development studio, also 
confirms that: 
 
The producers are like the hinge with which the whole thing works, they have to 
make sure that people are really solid together and they can go back in their 
respective directions and work properly in their individual teams (Angelo – 
developer director). 
 
Producers also claim that they act as catalysts for the communication and knowledge 
sharing between the publisher and developer. This is done by mobilising and negotiating 
boundary objects that are used in the development process. A publisher producer 
delineates: “I have to help out facilitate communication between the publisher and the 
developer, through negotiating the build, the plans and the milestones all the time, almost 
every day, making sure that that pipeline is clean and happy” (Rob – publisher producer). 
By "clean and happy", he means the producer has to make sure that both parties are well-
informed and happy about where the project is and whether there is a unified vision about 
the game and its directions. 
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The participants emphasise the role of producers in facilitating communication and 
"sharing information". However, the interview data suggest that producers have to share 
information selectively with both publishers and developers in order to maintain the 
relationship. Here Ken, a developer producer, talks about his struggles in sharing 
information with the publisher. He thinks if they stay transparent about everything, the 
relationship could fail. He says: 
 
It is all just politics. I have to just make sure, as a producer, that the company is 
being paid. It’s purely about the economics of making games. You have to create 
the dual balance between the two, you’ve got always that massive dilemma, 
between "do we tell people the truth and potentially cause a problem? Or keep 
quiet about certain things?" If we do so, it might blow up the whole thing entirely. I 
guess we have to often keep stuff under the radar purely, so that we [as the 
developer] could still get paid (Ken – developer executive producer). 
 
This is confirmed by Matt who is a producer working for a publisher. He highlights the 
role of producers in facilitating meetings between the publisher and developer, and also 
stressing that the producers should always be cautious in sharing the information between 
both parties:  
 
Sitting in the meetings between the publishers and the developers, I learnt a lot of 
the skills about knowing what information to surface at what levels. It’s crucial to 
know what does the team need to know, and what would be beneficial for them to 
know. With developers you always have to be careful in these meetings about what 
to say and how and when to choose to disagree with their build or plans (Matt – 
publisher producer). 
 
A developer producer called Andrew emphasises how critical and sensitive the producer’s 
role can be in managing transparency and knowledge: 
 
So it’s a very dynamic thing. You have to as often as possible remove all emotions, remove 
all ownership and just really coldly look at something and go [is it] good or bad? How does 
that help? How does that not? Then you zoom out and ask how does this manage the 
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relationship between all the different parties involved? So there are a lot of different layers 
to making a decision… when presenting spreadsheets [planning documents] or discussing 
the build [prototype] you sometimes need to lie and cheat, there’s a lot of politics involved. 
You don't want to ring alarm bells at the wrong time (Andrew – developer producer). 
 
The data show that the producer is a vital entity that facilitates the publisher-developer 
relationship in the complicated setting of videogame development. The producer seems to 
be able to interface and direct different parties through constantly reviewing and 
negotiating the boundary objects whether static or dynamic, such as game design, vision, 
contractual milestones, planning documents, prototype, etc. between them. But most 
importantly the producer seems to control knowledge that is formed and shared between 
parties. This role of producers in controlling knowledge will be presented in more detail in 
chapter seven. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter described how the publisher and developer bring together their various expert 
knowledge, manage their cross-boundary work and develop videogames. They do this by 
implementing a combination of static and dynamic boundary objects, as well as employing 
skilful producers/brokers to manage the collaboration. The data show that static objects, 
such as game design documents, planning documents and the contracts, were useful in 
forming the publisher-developer relationship and at the early stages of development. The 
participants highlighted that static boundary objects created perceptions of trust and 
stability, hence their effectiveness. However, due to the iterative and unpredictable nature 
of development, the static boundary objects were proven to be impractical, also hindering 
relationships in the later stages of the project. I also discussed that videogame development 
required dynamic/epistemic objects or processes that allowed some flexibility, creativity 
and responsiveness for the development. The dynamic objects, such as iterative planning 
methods, meetings and prototypes were found to be facilitating the communication and 
knowledge integration, by creating common points of understanding. It was also shown 
that due to high levels of dependencies and complexities in the publisher-developer cross-
boundary work, the producers/brokers were integral in mobilising the static and dynamic 
boundary objects, hence facilitating knowledge integration and collaboration.  
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Chapter Six: The Power Games in the Publisher-Developer 
Relationship 
 
In this chapter, I initially explore the participants' perspectives on the publisher-developer 
relationship. Then, I highlight the problems and challenges, focusing on the sources of the 
tensions between these parties and identifying an "us and them" culture in their 
relationship. Both parties emphasise that their discrepancies and differences in objectives 
have turned the relationship into a battle, rather than a collaboration. The participants also 
highlight that the existence of a power inequality is the reason behind a one-sided and 
asymmetrical collaboration, where the larger, wealthier party have the most power to shape 
the decision-making processes, hence the apparent irreconcilability between publishers and 
developers. However, the second level data find power dynamics rather than power 
inequalities, where surprisingly the developer has more control over the project in the later 
stages of the project.  
 
6.1. The Publisher-Developer Relationship 
Videogame publishers are large international organisations whose main function in this 
relationship is to sponsor the development of games and to provide development studios 
with the knowledge of the international market, distribution channels, and a pool of skills 
and resources, including art, design, programming, acting, etc. For instance, SEGA is a 
typical multinational videogame publisher, hiring almost 5,000 staff in their headquarters 
in Japan and their multiple offices around the world. SEGA owns internal studios 
developing videogames, but they also invest immensely in independent developers to draw 
upon their skills and expertise. Although a developer can use a different business model, 
independent from a publisher, this traditional business model is still prevalent within the 
industry. This is mainly because this publisher-developer relationship provides the partners 
access to multiple resources and as a result helps them maintain competitive advantage in a 
volatile and risky business environment. In this thesis, I have focused on this business 
relationship that is formed to create a big-budget videogame that requires a wide range of 
skills and expertise drawn from both companies (developers and publishers), as well as 
investments sometimes reaching to multi-million pounds for a two to three year project.  
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Although the developer's main contribution to the project is creating new ideas and 
developing these ideas into games, the publisher is also involved in the development 
process to different degrees, shaping the concept and supporting the process throughout the 
whole project. In a development studio, there are usually different disciplines that are 
distinct, yet interdependent and interactive. These different disciplines are programmers, 
artists, designers, the quality assurance team (QA) and sometimes the research and 
development team (R&D), each of which is headed by a team leader or team director. 
Depending on the size of the development studio, a producer or a production team 
composed of producers and project managers supervise the development team and the 
project/game development internally. In the case of large budget games, and in the three 
networks I have examined, all projects have one or two producers – this was highlighted in 
section 5.3. Developer producers are responsible for the interactions with their counterpart 
in the publishing organisation, called the publisher producer. Since the publisher is 
essentially responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of the game, the different 
departments that shape the organisation are sales, marketing, finance, legal, QA, executive 
management, etc. It should be noted that all the game production and the interactions 
between the two partners are supervised and managed by the publisher producer, who 
involves teams of artists, designers, programmers, etc. to assess and support the developer 
and development process. 
 
In the publisher-developer relationship, throughout an entire production cycle almost all 
departments within a development studio have to work (sometimes very closely) with 
different publisher departments, in order for this partnership to be successful. However, 
this is a problematic process, due to a number of areas of contention. Examples of the 
typical decisions that can be contentious between these two parties are outlined below. 
These points will be further referred to frequently in this chapter: 
 
• Design Decisions – This is one of the major tensions between the developer 
and publisher. Earlier in development, design decisions might be compromised 
and/or facilitated easily between the developer and the publisher. However, 
later on in the project, the need for stabilising the software, as well as the extra 
resources required to incur changes, make it difficult to accommodate changes, 
which becomes a contentious subject between the two.  
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• Release Date – All parties have a huge interest in making sure that the project 
is released on time and on budget. For the development studio a missed release 
date could incur additional development costs at their own expense or a 
reduction in royalties, depending on the terms of the contract. For the 
publisher, a missed release date could mean wasted marketing budget, lost 
ground to competitor products, lost revenue and a major impact on the 
financial year’s results. 
• Budget – Whilst an initial budget is agreed upon when the long-form contract 
is drawn up between the two parties, changes in market conditions, technology 
and further design requirements can necessitate additional funding to be called 
for, often leading to extreme differences. 
• Ad-Hoc Requests – Due to the complex make-up of a publishing organisation, 
demands from the publisher on the development team can often come at 
relatively short notice and cannot always be easily accommodated by the 
development schedule. These ad-hoc requests can be mainly design-related, 
such as adding a feature to the game, or changing a feature, etc. When these 
demands are repeated and extended over a period of time, it can put significant 
strain on the relationship.  
• Milestone Deliverables – These are pre-arranged deadlines, usually at four to 
eight week intervals, for which the developer has to deliver an interim/updated 
version of the game, in exchange for a pre-agreed payment to fund the next 
phase of development. Different publisher departments will assess the 
"deliverables" and upon their approval the payment for that stage will be 
processed. The production teams of both companies draw up the milestone 
criteria at the early stages of development. Whilst there is usually some 
flexibility, the agreed milestone schedule needs to be maintained in order to 
keep the publisher’s confidence in the schedule and overall project quality.  
 
As discussed earlier, the publisher and the developer form partnerships to share the high 
risk of game production and to mutually benefit from the collaboration. However, 
throughout the history of the videogames industry, the relationship between the developer 
and the publisher has been portrayed as challenging and problematic (Heaton, 2012). Some 
people in the industry believe the relationship is irreconcilable or as a developer explains 
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“the marriage is set out to fail” (Todd – developer executive); therefore, the dominant 
rhetoric suggests empowering the small developers to self-publish their own products, 
where there will be no need for them to collaborate with the publisher (Fahey, 2015). 
However, according to Mendez (2017), the traditional publisher-developer relationship is 
still deemed crucial to produce high-end products, due to the large sums invested, as well 
as the knowledge and expertise these types of products require. Therefore, regardless of 
conflicts and challenges, he suggests rethinking the relationship, creating a sustainable and 
workable collaboration.  
 
6.2. The “Natural Tension” Between the Publisher and the 
Developer 
The publisher-developer relationship is formed because the publisher looks for innovative 
ideas outside of their formal and structured establishments in a small independent studio, 
while the developer needs the publisher's investment, knowledge of the market and 
expertise in new technology. However, the data suggest a "natural" tension between these 
two parties due to their seemingly divergent characteristics. Leo, an industry veteran who 
has worked for a multinational publisher for nearly twenty years, elucidates this tension as 
follows: 
 
So this natural tension between the developer and the publisher whatever that 
period in history, has always been the same, has always been about the developer's 
desire to achieve the freedom to create what they want and keep going, keep paying 
themselves and the publisher's desire to continue to stay in business and to pay 
their staff and to become more successful and get return for their shareholders or 
their investors and the owners (Leo – publisher executive). 
 
Another publisher senior executive describes the relationship as “the friction between 
market-facing requirements and investment and tension relative to studio side, creativity, 
innovation and investment in product” (Timothy – publisher senior executive). In other 
words, he thinks there is a tension between the creative investment of the developers on 
one side and the financial investment, as well as marketing knowledge of the publishers on 
the other side. Then, he suggests that the success of a relationship and a product can be 
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achieved by creating a balance between these two poles. 
 
The tension between the publisher and the developer appears to be a "natural" outcome of 
the work across the boundaries that seem to have different skill sets and knowledge, 
engaging in a partnership with supposedly different priorities and objectives. Both the 
publisher and the developer in this study claim that these differences throughout the 
production gradually increase friction, which will result in more complications and 
misunderstandings. In the following sections, I elaborate on the factors that are said to be 
the cause of this "natural" tension between the developer and publisher, including: the 
differences in skill sets and knowledge, as well as disparate priorities and objectives.  
 
6.2.1. Differences in Skill Sets and Knowledge 
The interview data suggest that differences in skill sets and knowledge between the 
publisher and the developer are considered one of the main reasons behind the challenges 
in their relationship. The participants of the study claim that bringing together different 
disciplines creates clashes due to their different expertise and their lack of common 
knowledge. The publisher disciplines are finance experts, experienced marketers with high 
skills in market data analysis, the lawyers who are knowledgeable in international law, etc. 
but they all have minimum experience or knowledge of the technical aspects/limitations of 
game development. On the other hand, the developer is composed of creative individuals 
with technical expertise that have minimum knowledge of the marketplace, consumers, the 
financial and business side of development, etc. This is how Laurence, a publisher senior 
executive, talks about the collaboration between different disciplines:  
 
The relationship between the groups can be quite difficult sometimes, because the 
skill set is just different. So you're not talking to, necessarily, someone who is 
exactly the same as you, in terms of your makeup, your skills and everything else. 
These are the people who share some of the same insights, visions, skills, [but they 
have] actually different points of expertise (Laurence – publisher executive). 
 
Despite the clashes, the publisher views the involvement of the marketing, finance and 
legal teams in the game development processes as necessary. This is to reduce the risks of 
development. Sometimes, large sums of investment reaching tens or hundred millions of 
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pounds are required to produce high-end games. By appointing marketers, lawyers and 
accountants to supervise the production, the publisher will also make sure the project is on 
track and can make enough profit for the shareholders. As a result, the developer often has 
to comply with the publisher’s marketing, financial and legal requirements all throughout 
the game development regardless of their technical expertise and experience in the 
development. 
 
The data suggest that the differences in skill sets and knowledge can lead to lack of 
understanding between the parties, hence hindering the communication and collaboration. 
John, an experienced publisher producer, highlights here that both the developer and the 
publisher think the other partner does not have enough knowledge because they don’t have 
similar skill sets. He explains that this lack of understanding makes them feel frustrated. 
He continues: 
 
The number one source of frustration in my career is having disagreements with 
people with a lack of knowledge ….[the developers are] around talking to lawyers 
and marketing, and think, "what do they know about making a good game and 
selling it?!?" This can also happen where the publisher thinks the developer says 
something crazy, or seemingly crazy, and they don’t know the background or why 
they came out with this decision and the publishers go, "what are these guys doing? 
What do they know?" (John – a publisher producer). 
 
The publisher emphasises that the developer's lack of knowledge of the market and the 
business side of the production sometimes prevents them from fully appreciating and 
understanding the publisher's position. Gareth is an experienced designer who has worked 
for a publisher for a long period of time; he has also been appointed as a publisher 
representative in the development studio and has worked intensively with the developers to 
assist and supervise the game production. He explains that the developer makes games 
regardless of what the market needs and without considering the commercial aspects of the 
game development, highlighting the role of publishers to complement the developer's lack 
of skills in selling and marketing their games: 
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Developers don't understand that they have to make a commercial product, so they 
need a publisher to help them understand that. A lot of game makers think they are 
artists and they are making art. The thing is, they are spending the publishers' 
money, making their masterpiece, their art, but it's not commercial. No one wants 
it. No one will buy it. The developers think if they make something beautiful and 
amazing, they deserve financial success. But that's not the real world (Gareth – 
publisher designer). 
 
The differences in knowledge and skills seem to affect the relationship from the 
developer’s point of view too. Jordan, a developer producer, stresses that the publisher’s 
lack of knowledge and skills in the videogame development often creates problems for 
them. He claims that in many cases the publisher’s demands are not supported by technical 
knowledge. As a result, the discussions and arguments between the two parties become 
frustrating and fruitless:  
 
When you have publishers who have expectations that aren’t realistic because 
they’ve never worked [as a developer], and they don’t know the technical 
limitations, …. I think [it] is soul destroying, because it’s like arguing with this 
bottle [points to bottle on table]. There’s nothing there, I can’t have an argument 
with that bottle about anything because it doesn’t know the facts (Jordan – 
developer producer). 
 
The interview data show that both the developer and the publisher complain about their 
partner’s lack of knowledge and understanding of the game development. The developer 
refers to the publisher’s lack of skills and knowledge in technical aspects of the game 
development, while the publisher indicates the development team’s lack of knowledge of 
the markets and other business-related aspects of the game development as the source of 
their conflicts. They also claim that this lack of understanding between the two hinders 
discussions and communication. In the three following sub-sections, I will bring more 
examples and elaborate more on how differences of skills and knowledge can be the source 
of conflicts. There are three different areas where the participants think they have more 
clashes of skills and expertise: publisher producer vs. developers; marketing vs. 
developers; finance and legal vs. developers. 
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The Publisher Producer Vs. the Developer 
According to most participants, one of the challenges of the publisher-developer 
relationship is the difference in skill sets between the publisher producer and the developer. 
The publisher appoints a producer or executive producer to supervise the development 
process and make sure the game is on track and in line with the company goals and 
directions. The responsibilities of a producer vary from publisher to publisher, but 
generally the producer acts as a liaison between the development team and the publisher’s 
higher management and the other relevant publisher departments, such as, PR, Marketing, 
Finance, etc. The producer also negotiates contracts and develops and maintains budgets 
and timelines for the project, thus making sure the game is completed with the expected 
quality and delivered in a timely manner. This is how a publisher producer talks about his 
role: “I make sure that the quality level and the overall vision is maintained and keeps 
pushing forward, facilitating communication between the publishers and the dev., through 
negotiating stuff all the time, almost everyday” (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
Although the data reveals that the producer is the main point of contact for the developer 
and is supposed to facilitate the relationship, surprisingly most developers in this study 
complained that the producers do not have relevant development knowledge and skills, 
which can lead to a lack of understanding between the two parties. Because the producers 
have the power to influence the development, such as changing the game design, the 
developer’s perceptions regarding their lack of knowledge or skills can create clashes and 
conflicts in the relationship. Andrew, a developer producer, explains: 
 
Clashes come when publisher producers make decisions and influence the 
production in a way that isn’t really helpful for the project or the team, because 
they are not taking into consideration the whole myriad of different technical 
factors. If you are lucky, you get a producer who has hands-on experience in 
development, but you are not generally in that position (Andrew – developer 
producer).  
 
The publisher producers argue that in order to be able to interface with different disciplines 
and mediate between the publisher and the developer, they should have much broader skill 
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sets. That is the reason why they might not be purely development focused. Rob, a 
publisher producer, justifies that “being able to relate to the developer is just one part of 
my job, I should understand the marketing process, the localisation process, the QA 
process, the PR process, the strategic planning, the finance requirements and the 
development process. A good producer should have a handle on all these areas” (Rob – 
publisher producer). This section provides an example of how the participants attempted to 
highlight the differences between the publisher and the developer, depicting the 
relationship as challenging and irreconcilable. However, in section 6.4. and 6.5, I will 
present the data that reveal there is more to this rhetoric, than blaming the other party.  
 
The Publisher Marketing Department Vs. the Developer 
The relationship between the publisher marketing team and the development studio has 
been regarded as another source of conflict, where differences in expertise and knowledge 
apparently lead to lack of understanding. As explained earlier, the publisher contributes to 
the relationship by marketing and selling the game, hence the inevitability of the marketing 
team’s involvement in production. The marketing team’s aim is to adjust the game vision 
to what the market needs, thus making sure the game will turn into a profitable and 
successful product. But their attempts at improving the game vision are not always well 
received by the developer, but seen as interference. The developer feels the marketing team 
does not understand them or the game development limitations either. Both teams accuse 
each other of not having enough knowledge, thus leading to more friction and 
misunderstandings.  
 
Laurence, a publisher senior executive, confirms this clash between the development and 
the publisher marketing teams, explaining: “the marketing team just don't get the 
development team and they sometimes [complain] kind of like, ‘Why are these guys 
[developers] kind of forward and rude?’” (Laurence – publisher senior executive). This 
clash is also reported by a developer project manager saying: 
 
One key point of conflict on that project was between the design of the game and 
the marketing of the game. The publisher's approach was to directly involve the 
marketing team initially in directing the feature set of the game and then in the 
approval process for the implementation of those features. The problem with this 
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was that what the marketing team felt were marketable features tended to change 
quite frequently. To put it cynically, this was mostly based on what other games 
were successful at any one time, which led to a problem of 'shifting goalposts'. Also 
the game turned into a bit of a grab-bag of features, based purely on what the 
marketing team felt they needed to be able to market the game successfully (Jordan 
– developer producer). 
 
The marketing team’s feedback on the game was based on their abilities in analysing the 
market data, the consumer behaviour, etc. However, the developer here found the 
marketing team’s contribution to the game vision and design unhelpful because of the 
marketing team’s lack of knowledge in technical aspects of game development. 
 
Jing runs a very successful development studio at the moment, but he previously worked as 
a product manager in the publisher marketing department and was also the producer for 
Star Soldier. He believes he has insights into "both sides of the fence", because he has the 
experience as both a developer and publisher. He defends the marketing position in the 
relationship: 
 
It is a pity for me to see that developers think usually the marketing guys have no 
idea what they are talking about; they don't know games, they don't know how to 
market their game… The developers see it as just marketing [expletive]; they don't 
see it as a science. And marketing guys on the other side, they believe, the 
developers have no idea about the markets, which often is true. The developers 
usually don't know about the figures, about what's happening, about what works, 
what doesn't work, or how to calibrate a message, how you get it to the right 
audience, etc.” (Jing – publisher producer). 
 
The developer and the marketing team both feel the other does not have enough knowledge 
and expertise in each other’s field. The developer thinks the publisher marketers do not 
know what game production entails and the marketers say the developer team do not have 
the understanding of the market; hence, conflict arises between the two. Since the 
developer is required to amend/add game features based on what the marketing team 
suggests, this can lead to some on-going conflicts between the two parties.  
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Finance and Legal Vs. Developers 
Conflict in the relationship can also be found between the developer and the publisher’s 
legal and finance teams. Finance is an integral part of a publisher and there is much 
emphasis on the financial potential of the game production. A publisher senior executive 
highlights the importance of accountants and lawyers in the publisher-developer 
relationship as follows:  
 
Well, at the end of the day, a publisher is measured by its finances. It's plain and 
simple. Well, ok, a publisher is judged by its products as well as its finances. But 
most people within a publisher are a little bit further removed from the actual 
games, themselves. They're looking at the numbers, and they're all looking at the 
business from a financial perspective. I suspect there are more accountants and 
lawyers in our company than any other discipline (Simon – publisher senior 
executive). 
 
The publisher is dependent on professional lawyers and accountants in order to ensure the 
business is on track from the financial and legal perspectives. The finance and the legal 
team will be involved in all stages of the game development, from business pitch to 
milestone approvals, where their decisions have an impact on the developer’s production, 
including the features of the game and the length of the project, which are both highly 
controversial. But the collaboration between the finance and legal team and the developers 
can be problematic. A developer game director talks about this difference as below:  
 
The friction between the two probably comes down to different skill sets. Within a 
publisher mechanism, there are lots of people who actually don't know anything 
about games. An accountant [says], "I don't know about games, I have to run 
spreadsheets and I have to make financial calculations". Well, this can produce a 
bit of a divide, in terms of trying to understand the product that drives your 
business (Stanley – developer director). 
 
The publisher’s senior producers who are more oriented towards game development have 
asserted that sometimes they find it difficult to collaborate with the internal finance team 
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too. They believe justifying the development decisions and the discussions pertaining to 
that with the accountants and lawyers can sometimes be pointless. Due to their focus on the 
financial aspects of production and their lack of knowledge of the merits and limitations of 
the development process, there are also some internal conflicts between the publisher 
producers and the finance and legal team (Chris – publisher producer). Matt, a publisher 
producer explains how difficult he sometimes finds discussing a game’s features with "a 
group of people who are not as invested in the game development", namely the finance and 
legal team: 
 
So why am I going to keep pitching up to an accountant, (chuckle) trying to explain 
that game idea or that sort of direction? They are just like, “Look, just show me the 
money. How does that look on our sheet, our balance sheet?” And that's the 
biggest, that's the biggest issue, really. It's like they just want you to make money 
…you can have all the product discussions you like in the world and all the kind of 
great things about the developer, they would go, "guys, shut that down! We are not 
making any money there, we're moving out of there” (Matt – publisher producer).  
 
Although participants unanimously emphasised that the difference in skill sets and 
expertise is one of the main sources of conflict and misunderstanding between the 
publisher and the developer, the interview data (second level data) reveal that there is more 
to this story. As discussed in chapter six, the data show that there are high levels of distrust 
between the parties, where they seem to not give enough credibility to one another for their 
contribution to the game development.  
 
6.2.2. Disparate Objectives and Priorities 
Although the publisher and the developer seem to have one common interest – that is 
making a successful game – the interview data reveal that the difference in their interests 
and priorities is one of the other challenges between them. This relationship is 
fundamentally formed because of “competition for ideas” for the publisher and “access to 
funding” for the developer (Allan – publisher senior executive). Ethan, a developer studio 
head, explains how a disparity in objectives and priorities between the developers and the 
publishers affects the publisher-developer relationship: 
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The goal of the publisher [is] to maximize shareholder value, the ideal scenario is I 
don’t want to share any of the wealth with anyone other than my shareholders. 
That is the logic [behind] a lot of the breakdown in the relationship. There has 
always been this tension [between the publisher and developers] (Ethan – 
developer studio head).  
 
It seems the discrepancies between the objectives create some clashes between the 
publisher and the developer. One of the main reasons the developer forms a partnership 
with the publisher is because of their need for the publisher's funding. However, the 
developer emphasises that they are game enthusiasts and their central focus is on creating a 
game that is fun to play. The developer insists that the publisher's priority, on the other 
hand, is only the financial gain. Ben, an experienced development studio owner, states: 
“It's always been an industry which is just so aspirational and populated by people who just 
want to make the toys that they enjoy playing with… whereas a lot of the publishers, the 
senior management, just genuinely like money and power” (Ben –development studio 
owner). The developer describes the strain of the publisher-developer relationship as the 
tension between objectives, between the developer’s creative freedom and the publisher’s 
priorities to make money. 
 
While depicting themselves as product-driven, the developer claims that the publisher is 
not necessarily interested in the quality of the game. A developer creative director 
describes publishers as “being obsessed by the amount of money that they are investing” 
(Dylan – developer creative director). He continues to state that “it is funny how rarely [he] 
meets people in publishers who even seem to care of what are good games, they don’t 
seem to care much about that” (Dylan – developer creative director). As a result of the 
tension between objectives, one money-oriented and the other product-driven, there seems 
to be a divide between the two partners. 
 
Due to these differences in objectives, the developer insists that they are not able to 
communicate to the publisher. They express how difficult it is for them sometimes to relate 
to the publisher because they know the publisher doesn’t care about the games. Nigel, a 
developer director, admits that “[he] never ever respected any of them [the publisher team] 
as game developers themselves or even games players, cause they [the publisher] don’t 
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seem to care much about games. It’s all about the money for them” (Nigel – a developer 
director). Paul who has worked as both a publisher producer and a developer producer 
explains that developers feel more invested in the game they are developing, therefore they 
find it difficult to be directed by the publisher's team "whose only concern is money". He 
says:  
 
Studios make games, and they're in there every day, and have heart-felt discussions 
on what's going to make a great product, what's the vision for this thing and so 
forth, and I think, it's a difficult kind of parameter to take all that passion and take 
all that kind of day-to-day vision and sweat and everything you're putting into it, 
and have what's perceived as a slightly cold publishing team, kind of walking into a 
meeting room saying, "Well, we're not sure we like that bit. And what's that bit all 
about? And why don't you cut that out?" (Paul – publisher producer). 
 
Here Paul points out that the directions from the publisher are not received well by the 
developers, because they feel that the publisher’s feedback and impact on the game is only 
driven by their financial intentions for production.  
 
The interview data suggest that there are some inherent differences between the publisher 
and the developer that will create tension in their relationship. Both parties regard 
themselves as "different machines" whose relationships always have a "missing link" 
(Laurence – publisher senior executive). They persist that the differences in knowledge and 
skill sets, as well as their disparate objectives and priorities, create a lack of understanding 
between the two. If one peruses the structure of the companies and the skills employed in 
each, it is evident that one is creative and the other is more finance oriented. Perhaps these 
differences in skill sets and expertise justify the dependencies and the collaboration 
between the two.  
 
In order to explain the nature of their cross-boundary work, the participants not only 
repeatedly referred to the "natural" tension between the two parties, they also highlighted 
the power inequalities between them. They insisted that these differences and inequalities 
would lead to an "unending battle between the publisher and developer" (Adrian – owner 
of a renowned development studio), or "a one-sided toxic relationship" (Jacob – developer 
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creative director). The general picture that the industry portrays of this relationship is that 
of a monstrous publisher versus an innocent developer, where one is formidable and the 
other weak and frail. The nature and impact of these seemingly unequal powers are 
elaborated in the next section. 
 
6.3. Power Inequalities: Evil Monsters Vs. Fluffy Bunnies? 
According to the participants of this research, power inequalities play a principal part in 
the conflicts within the publisher and developer relationship. It is predominantly believed 
that "whoever provides the money has the power in the relationship" (Adam – development 
studio head). This implies that the publisher is the most influential party in the relationship. 
As well as affecting decision-making, to a great extent all throughout the production cycle, 
this unequal wielding of power seems to have had a role in the demise of many 
development studios. The almost five decade history of the videogames industry is replete 
with stories about the small development studios that have gone out of business because of 
lack of access to money to fund their projects. Failing to secure a relationship with a 
publisher, or sometimes the publisher’s decision to cancel the projects have led to the 
closure of many development studios, hence the depiction (mainly by developers) of 
publishers as "evil monsters" and the developers as "fluffy bunnies" (Matt – publisher 
producer). Fahey (2015) also takes a further step and accuses the publisher of abusing the 
developer and calls for this "cycle of abuse" to end. 
 
The data suggest that the developer would like to have full authority and flexibility on 
production decisions, including game design, budget and release date, which often cannot 
be the case and creates clashes. This is because the publisher is involved in decision-
making at all stages of game development from concept formation to releasing the game, 
and they exert power and influence on the game development in order to secure their large 
sums of investment and increase their revenue, as a result of which, the developer often 
feels helpless and impotent. An experienced developer explains: “Sometimes it's hard to 
[disagree with the publishers], well at the end of the day, you're the little one in that 
relationship anyway” (Mike – developer creative director). Another high profile 
development studio owner adds: “The problem is when you have a publisher that's 
basically paying the bills, then they call all the shots, because they have the money” (Ethan 
– developer executive). Although the relationship seems to be reciprocal, the developer 
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claims that the publisher uses their position of power in order to pursue and favour their 
own interests, creating an imbalance in the relationship. 
 
Conversely, a few participants express a different opinion towards this seemingly 
"asymmetrical" and "toxic" relationship. Depicting the publisher as a formidable partner, 
some developers think the publisher is indeed entitled to more rights and financial gains in 
the relationship. This is because they believe the publisher's multi-million investment in 
the project entails a bigger financial risk for the publisher. For this reason these developers 
feel obligated to follow the publisher's directions and allow the publisher to make the final 
decisions. Francis, a studio head, appreciates the publisher’s significant financial 
contribution to the project, saying:  
 
There are absolute lines in the contract and they are given. I think the bottom line 
of the contract is when you're spending someone else’s money; they have a right to 
say "here are some guidelines". If you use someone else’s money, you’ve got to 
move faster than them. They provide the money; you provide the pace. If they want 
something, you’ve got to deliver it before they ask a second time, because it’s their 
money (Francis – development studio head).  
 
Similarly, a few participants feel they should show some respect to the publisher, because 
of their expertise and experience in game development. Yousef argues that "publishers' 
opinions carry weight, ... especially some of [their] senior people are kind of behind the 
glass wall and they are there, lifting the developer to make something” (Yousef – 
developer director). Adrian, a very successful game developer, also feels that the publisher 
should be respected due to their expertise and the fact that they own the product, so the 
developer needs to follow what the publisher asks for:  
 
If someone who holds the IP like Reload Media [a renowned publisher], we have to 
respect their IP and, you know, they have very strong plans, and you have to kind 
of fit in with that and the brand team and stuff like that (Adrian – development 
studio head). 
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Highlighting the publisher's contribution to game development, a few participants 
(developers) insisted that it sounded unreasonable to ask the publisher to stay detached 
from the development, especially due to the publisher's hefty investments in the project. 
However, this was found to be a rare attitude towards the publisher and most developers 
did not welcome the publisher’s involvement in decision-making. Instead, they emphasised 
how unfair and asymmetrical the power distribution is between the parties and they felt 
they were abused in the relationship. The next section focuses on the developer's resistance 
to the publisher's involvement in the project. 
 
6.3.1. Developer's Resistance to the Publisher’s Wishes 
The data showed that most of the participants felt bitter about having to comply with what 
were perceived as the publisher's whims. Although these negative feelings varied from one 
developer to another, they persisted among the developers in the research. Nigel, an 
experienced developer director, complains that:  
 
Publishers are incredibly nervous and they want to micromanage everything. They 
try to manage something that is remote from their control. This makes the 
relationship difficult and fundamentally one-sided (Nigel – developer director). 
 
Developers’ resistance to publishers’ demands was partly emotional. As they themselves 
put it, the development team can develop a "sense of ownership" for the game they are 
working on: they gradually grow emotionally attached to it. They develop a sense of 
satisfaction by creating games and they feel most proud when they can put the stamp of 
ownership on the game, when they feel that they are in control of what they make. 
However, they experience a loss of control when they form a partnership with a publisher 
or when the publisher is too involved in the production. James, a developer programmer, 
says, “Historically and traditionally the moment the publisher gets involved, you hand over 
your ownership” (James – developer programmer). Therefore, the developer might show 
resistance to the publisher's involvement, due to the fact that they feel strongly invested in 
the game they are creating.  
 
Ken has almost twenty years of experience in the videogames industry and has worked 
both for publishers and developers as a producer and creative director. He explains how 
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difficult it is for a development team to respond to the publisher's changes, and sometimes 
due to the level of the publisher interference, they are often confused about the vision of 
the game. He says,  
 
We lose sight of what the game is supposed to be, yeah it is difficult, but we have to 
do what the person who is paying for the project told us to do (Ken – developer 
executive producer).  
 
Here, Ken emphasises how disheartening it can be to give in to the publisher’s pressure to 
change the vision of the game constantly, make changes or add features to the game. 
 
This resistance to the publisher is not only because of losing the sense of ownership on the 
part of the developer, but it is also due to some significant financial disagreements. At the 
outset of a project the general concept of the game, features and specifications of the game, 
as well as the length of the project and the resources required for the completion of the 
project are all specified and agreed upon. However, during the course of the project, the 
publisher demands continuous assessment of the game where they approve whether the 
developer can progress to the next stage of development. Upon the approval of each 
milestone, the publisher pays the developer. During this assessment and approval 
procedure, the publisher might request changes to the design and the game features. The 
developer sometimes shows resistance to these changes due to the costs that these changes 
and modifications might incur to the project. Jordan, a developer producer complains:   
 
They [the publisher] kept asking for changes and asking for rework, but they didn't 
rebuild these [the cost of these changes] into their budget. It was ridiculous – we 
had to fund those changes ourselves (Jordan – developer producer).  
 
To implement the changes, the developer most often needs more resources, such as time, 
people and money, depending on what the changes are and at which stage of the 
development they are. Jacob, a developer director, explains how the publisher’s constant 
request for changes was perceived as a financial gain for the publisher, implying that the 
publisher was taking advantage of the power inequality in the relationship, trying to gain 
more than they had paid for: 
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The publisher repeatedly tried to insert more content and features into the game 
than were originally agreed, in the words of one producer I worked with, in order 
to "get more for their money". Again, this can frequently turn into a point of 
conflict since the developer doesn't want to deliver more content and features than 
they are being paid for (Jacob – developer director). 
 
In contrast to this negative and distrustful attitude, there were some developers who 
claimed that "it [was] unreasonable to expect the publishers to stay detached from the 
project" (Dylan – developer creative director), expressing respect and empathy towards the 
publisher. Interestingly, from the publisher's perspective, it was their "absolute right" to 
have full authority in shaping the game and visibility on the development process (John – 
publisher producer). The publisher perceived their large sums of investment as a 
justification for their full access to the project. The publisher claimed the changes to the 
game and their contribution to development were critical in reducing their investment 
risks, and ultimately benefiting both parties involved, including the developer. 
 
Since the level of financial investment in game development can be significant and risky, 
publishers typically insist on having control over the game production. However, they are 
aware that the developer does not always fulfil their demands for visibility and 
transparency over the project. Allan, an ex publisher senior executive, outlines how 
difficult it was when the developer would not acknowledge their direction and their 
constant request for clarity and transparency on the project:  
  
We are giving you [the developer] tens of millions of dollars to make a videogame. 
That in itself is a privilege, that is a serious and risky investment and we are 
investing our money that we can put on shares and other areas of business. This is 
our money; this isn’t your money. You’re making a project for us, and you need to 
behave professionally, so it’s very hard if they [the developers] don’t want to 
(Allan – publisher senior executive). 
 
This section discussed the developer’s resistance to the publisher’s influence on game 
development. The data showed that the developer’s sense of ownership for the game and 
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the extra costs for changes, made the developer unhappy to receive recurrent directions and 
changes from the publisher. Despite this emotional and financial resistance, however, the 
developer claimed that they felt obliged to comply with the publisher’s demands, and as a 
result they felt abused in the relationship. The next section explains how the developer may 
feel taken advantage of and victimised by the publisher they work with. 
 
6.3.2. Victimisation  
Despite all the limitations and discontent, developers often feel they have to submit to the 
will of their publisher, due to the power inequalities of the relationship. Most of the 
developers in this study claim they feel impotent due to their financial instabilities and 
them being highly reliant on the publisher to run their business. Francis, the head of a 
development studio, says: 
 
Sometimes you have to bite the bullet and do what they want. You don’t have a 
choice. You're in the middle something that you have no control of. You're getting 
feedback from  the publisher – they want something that is incorrect and doesn't fit 
in with the game ...you have no choice! (Francis – developer studio head). 
 
The development budget paid by the publisher covers all the cost to run the studio 
including the staff salaries and office overhead. Therefore, without securing a contract with 
the publisher, it is quite a rarity that the development studios can survive. This feeling of 
insecurity is also felt throughout production because the publisher has the power to 
terminate the contract at any point if they think the project is either unsuccessful or not in 
line with the company’s direction and objectives anymore. Leo, a publisher executive, 
explains how the developer will be affected when the relationship with the publisher goes 
wrong: “One failed project to a developer could mean people not being able to pay the 
rent, not being able to buy food; the whole business will fail” (Leo – a publisher 
executive). This insecurity, along with the financial dependence on the publisher forces the 
developer to comply with the publisher’s demands, hence they feel emotionally hurt and 
victimised in the relationship. 
 
Due to the pressure exerted by the publisher, some developers claim that they sometimes 
have no option other than submit to what they are told. Brian recalls their precarious 
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situation with nearly 200 staff in the development studio. He said that they had to agree to 
make changes that seemed to be unrealistic and undoable only because they were desperate 
for the publisher’s milestone approval and payments: 
 
I was trying to make sure we have a life raft … we were trying to save our future. 
They wanted to make an impossible thing. And, we had to agree to make an 
impossible thing because otherwise we would be out of business (Brian – developer 
studio head). 
 
Brian explains that as the studio head, he felt responsible for the 200 people working for 
him. He knew they were not able to produce what the publisher had demanded, because the 
core technology they were using to make the game was not sophisticated enough to match 
the requested features and the timeframe was too short. In hindsight, he thinks it was 
"stupid" to accept those terms, but he still thinks they had no way out. 
 
The developer’s dependence on the publisher’s funding seems to influence the dynamic of 
the relationship. But the developer also blames the publisher for using their power and 
exerting pressure on the development team in order to gain control and influence over the 
project. Todd, another studio head, explains that the publisher reminded them relentlessly 
about their huge sums of investment in their project. Hence, putting the team in an 
awkward position so that they felt they had to give in to demands: 
 
We had made top-rated games and had considerable achievements and we were so 
proud of it. We knew how to do this job. That [the way the publisher treated us] 
wasn’t the way to do things with our team, treating us like children and you have 
no ability to say no to them …We were locked in and it was difficult to change the 
course. We found it difficult to handle. It always comes down to money. They were 
constantly telling us how expensive the budget was. We felt guilty (Todd – 
development studio head). 
 
According to some developers, the publisher sometimes even resorts to direct threats in 
order to gain what they want from the relationship, and due to their financial instability, the 
developer has no choice except agreeing to the terms and conditions. But, as a result of 
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this, they end up feeling resentful and abused. Matt talks about his experience in dealing 
with the publisher’s pressures on production. He delineates:  
 
They [the publisher] would say, "you have to change this, this and this and if you 
don’t change it, we are not going to pay the milestone". We were on a relatively 
small budget, but if we were not getting that 100 grand, I knew the boss had to go 
to the bank and borrow a 100 grand and pay the people their salaries, this was 
[expletive]. So it was a big deal when they threatened us like that (Matt – developer 
producer). 
 
Another example of the publisher's threats can be seen in Ken's statement below. Ken, as a 
developer producer, explains how the publisher threatened them to agree to some new 
timelines in the production, and how futile he found the discussions. When Ken failed to 
convince the publisher director that the timeline was too short for the production, the 
director simply resorted to warning him that this might be relayed to the shareholders, and 
might result in the termination of the project, so the developer had to agree with the terms: 
 
They said "you have to release the game in nine months" and I said, "It can’t be 
done". They said, "You're just being really negative". I said, "It doesn’t matter, but 
I'm just telling you it can't be done". We had these long arguments and I couldn't 
understand why they wouldn't believe me, they would not accept it. In one 
particular heated discussion the [publisher] producer said, "Well, I'm going to 
have to go and tell my shareholders that they are not going to get their bonus" (Ken 
– developer executive producer). 
 
While the developer insists on depicting themselves as a victim in the relationship, the 
publisher presents a different perspective. As explained earlier, the publisher feels the 
game production should be a collaborative experience, in which the publisher’s 
contribution and knowledge has a critical role in making a profitable product. The 
publisher also justifies their need to have influence and visibility on all stages of game 
development; they highlight that their technical input is critical to the development process 
and more importantly their large investment necessitates having some visibility on how 
their money is being spent. Allan explains: “Ultimately the developer has the choice to 
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sign the deal with the publisher or not? They can walk away, it is a democracy, they don’t 
have to sign that contract. So they have to be very clear in their own mind on what that 
relationship is based on” (Allan – a publisher senior executive). Here, Allan claims the 
developer is not at all a victim and that the developer is aware of the publisher’s demands 
and the terms of the contract, so they should act accordingly. 
 
The publisher also states that cancelling the project with the developer is not always an 
easy decision for them, despite how it appears. Here a publisher senior executive outlines 
that these decisions are most of the time down to "shareholders and obligations to financial 
stakeholders". He continues:  
 
This is always the worst side of the business, we have to always make difficult 
decisions like cancel that project, close that studio, shut down that area of business. 
Yeah, it happens a lot, it's a really difficult situation (Laurence – publisher senior 
executive).  
 
Leo adds that they sometimes have to cancel the projects, because some projects seem to 
be making a loss, therefore, they have to prevent more loss, like what other businesses in 
other industries do. He, then, compares the situation to how manufacturing companies deal 
with their faulty vehicles, highlighting the emotional versus rational attitude of the 
developer and the publisher, respectively towards game production and the problems 
arising from their collaboration: 
 
[The publishers] have to make that call, it's just like in Fight Club or auto 
manufacturing and their failure rates on vehicles. If the amount to the payouts is 
going to be less for a faulty vehicle, than cost of fixing the vehicle, then let the 
accidents happen and we will do the payouts. So it's likely the same; it's purely 
financial decision and an insurance-based risk (Leo – publisher executive). 
 
This section outlined the power inequalities between the publisher and the developer. 
Developers in this study highlighted that the publisher has more access to power and as a 
result they felt impotent and under pressure. However, the data show that the publishers 
had a different perspective on these claims of power inequalities. Interestingly, the 
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secondary data show that the positions of power change throughout the production cycle 
and it is this change in the balance of power which is examined next.  
 
6.4. David Vs. Goliath? 
The second level data (the contradictory data) reveal that power inequalities are not 
constant throughout the development process, but they change significantly over the course 
of a project. The dominant rhetoric in the industry depicts the work between the publisher 
and developer as a "toxic" and "abusive" relationship (Jacob – a developer director; Fahey, 
2015), where the developer is the vulnerable party. Similarly, most of the participants in 
this research (mainly the developers) attempted to highlight that there were power 
inequalities in the relationship, and the developer did not have access to power resources. 
Interestingly, the second level data show that it was the developer's wielding of power that 
controlled and shaped the relationship at the later stages of the project and this power 
dynamic between the two parties had a significant impact on knowledge practices and 
processes. 
 
A striking sign for the developer's wielding of power and control on the project was the 
anxiety and fear that all the publishers and publisher producers in the study expressed, 
while recalling their experiences working with the development studios. These publishers 
unanimously stressed how vital it was for them to finish the game with the quality, time 
and budget that was agreed upon. But they stated that there was "a growing suspicion and 
fear that the developers [were] not going to deliver" (Simon – a publisher executive). They 
explained that at the later stages of the development process, the developer tends to ask for 
more resources in order to implement changes to the project, and changes most of the time 
require more time and more money. Considering the multi-million investments the 
publisher makes on each project, it seems to be reasonable to ask for a return on 
investment. In some cases, it was reported that if the developer failed to complete the 
project, it was the publisher's stakeholders who were at risk. Allan – an ex publisher 
executive – highlights that "if the [developer] doesn’t deliver what they had promised, [the 
publisher] could go under... the developers have proven that they don't deliver what they 
have been asked". Rob – a publisher executive – adds that “there is an intrinsic fear 
[among publishers] that [they] are going to get abused [by the developer]" (Rob – publisher 
producer).  
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The data reveal that developers resort to knowledge hiding and deceptive practices during 
a project in order to control the relationship – I present the data and elaborate on 
knowledge hiding and deception in chapter seven. Chris, a publisher producer, admits that 
"developers deny access to the project and that is what a lot of them do". The data 
highlight that publishers show more flexibility and leniency towards the developer when a 
project has progressed and they are at the later stages of the development. This is perceived 
to be due to the large sums of cash that the publisher has already invested in the project, 
thus at this stage completing the project and making some return on the investment is seen 
as the publisher's priority. Adam, the head of a development studio, explains: 
 
Once we got well underway and we were proving [to the publisher] that the game 
was awesome, then we would worry about asking for the extra money (Adam – 
developer studio head). 
 
Similarly Todd, the head of a development studio, admits that at the outset of the project 
they can't influence the decision making, but at the later stages of the project when the 
publisher is fully and financially involved they have more leverage in the relationship:  
 
It's actually easier to ask for more money when the [publisher] likes the game and 
it's nearly done. We used to use the phrase – "get them nice and pregnant". Asking 
for another ten per cent more money up front in a negotiation is hard. Asking for 
an extra ten per cent more time is easier if the game is looking good and we've 
nearly delivered (Todd – development studio head). 
 
Having recognised this publisher's weakness, the developer, in return, uses opportunistic 
behaviour and practices to be on equal grounds (I focus on these practices in chapter 
seven). By doing these, the developer (1) secures the project and their business, (2) reduces 
the risks of project cancellation and (3) makes some profit. The developer states: 
  
You don't want to fail; they [the publisher] can knock you down ... it's hard to have 
a conversation [with them] about what is going wrong (Nigel – development studio 
head).  
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This statement reiterates that by sharing knowledge with the publisher, the developer feels 
they might risk the project and the publisher might cancel the development or not approve 
the milestone. This might be true at the earlier stages of the project, however, this dynamic 
changes at the final stages. This is when the developer might actually reveal changes to the 
project and ask for more resources, knowing that they have more leverage over decision 
making compared to the publisher at this stage.  
 
An interesting finding here is that the knowledge hiding and deception seem to empower 
the weaker party in the publisher-developer relationship and somehow this power dynamic 
becomes a productive force in the relationship, enabling the work between two seemingly 
unequal parties. According to Ben, they have to "use any tricks .... to keep [themselves] in 
business” (Ben – development studio head). Ken, a development producer, admits that they 
"often keep stuff under the radar [conceal stuff], purely so that [they] could still get paid”. 
In other words, the developer suggests that they use knowledge practices and power games 
to secure themselves in the relationship. 
 
While the prevalent rhetoric in the interviews and industry publications emphasises the 
existence of power inequalities between the developer and publisher, probing helped me 
generate another level of data that show "this is a myth that publishers are evil and 
developers are fluffy bunnies" (Paul – publisher producer). The interview data highlighted 
that the publisher-developer dynamic changes in the course of a project and developers 
gain more leverage in the relationship at the later stages of development.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the power structures in the publisher-developer relationship. I 
explained that both parties attempted to portray a challenging and irreconcilable 
relationship ruled by a "natural tension" between the parties. The participants claimed that 
inherent differences in knowledge and skill sets made it difficult for different disciplines to 
work across boundaries. They also introduced disparate objectives and interests as the 
cause of conflicts, saying publishers were more rational and financially oriented, while 
developers were strongly emotional and product-driven. The dominant rhetoric within 
industry and the research depicted the publisher as an "evil monster", and the developer as 
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a "fluffy bunny", emphasising the power-inequality between these two. It was stated that 
these power inequalities were another source of conflict in the relationship and this 
resulted in the developer feeling victimised and mistreated.  
 
It was concluded that the differences in knowledge and skill sets, as well as the disparate 
objectives might exist to some levels, but they might not be as strong or black and white as 
the participants try to depict. Despite what the publisher and developer claim, lack of 
understanding also might not be of paramount cause for the challenges. Instead, the second 
level of data implies that the partners start the relationship from a position of conflict and 
antagonism, where both use their positions of power to manage their conflicts, thus this 
lack of understanding with which they try to describe their relationship might not be as 
bold as they want it to be. The data show that the publisher and developer are involved in a 
power game where both have access to resources at different stages of the project, and this 
helps them maintain a working relationship, adding another side to the story of good versus 
bad that they (mostly the developers) attempt to portray.  
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Chapter Seven: Trust and Knowledge Sharing in the Publisher-
Developer Cross-Boundary Work 
 
This chapter presents the data to explain how the publisher and developer manage their 
cross-boundary work. I start with presenting the first level accounts, highlighting the role 
of trust, communication and honesty in facilitating the publisher-developer relationship. 
Moving to the second level of data (as presented in chapter four, section 4.4), I reveal the 
role of distrust in this cross-boundary collaboration. I should highlight here that I have not 
discussed the concept of distrust in my literature review chapter because this concept 
emerged as a key finding when I was generating and analysing my data. Here I introduce 
the concept of distrust, presenting the relevant data. However, it is in the discussion 
chapter that I define and develop the concept more in detail. In this chapter, I also show 
how the publisher and developer use knowledge hiding, collusion and deception in order to 
create a working relationship. 
 
7.1. Trust, Communication and Honesty 
According to the participants of the study, trust, open communication and honesty facilitate 
knowledge integration and lead to a successful relationship. The first level data highlight 
these elements as crucial for development both within the development studio and in the 
developer-publisher relationship. Angelo, a creative director from a development studio, 
explains: 
 
When you have open and honest communications on open accounts, then the 
publisher can see what you are doing, that’s the best way to work. Creativity is 
about full disclosure, face-to-face interaction and honesty with each other (Angelo 
– developer creative director). 
 
A publisher producer emphasises that transparency in the development process, decision-
making, and sharing the knowledge between different disciplines are instrumental in the 
publisher-developer relationship. He puts it: 
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I advocate transparency as the main method of working, with acknowledgment that, 
you don't have to micro-manage every single different aspect of every single 
different discipline. The more transparent any group is with another, the better 
they're going to work together and the better the communication is going to be 
(Laurence – publisher executive). 
 
Matt, another publisher executive, suggests: 
 
When we can communicate clearly, regularly and efficiently, and with as little 
friction as possible, the project is going to work. Being transparent and honest is 
all part of that too. Communication is really a big factor (Matt – publisher 
executive). 
 
Respondents claim that open communication will help build trust between partners, as 
another developer highlights that: “This [publisher-developer] relationship is just all about 
honesty and about trust” (Jordan – developer producer). Apparently, both the publisher and 
the developer regard communication, trust and honesty/transparency as critical factors in 
maintaining an efficient relationship. However, the data analysis reveals that this was in 
fact an idealised portrait of the publisher-developer collaboration. Although adamant that 
openness and honesty were key, in practice this was a significant challenge. A publisher 
producer confirms: 
 
The key to the relationship is maintaining and creating that transparency, having 
consistent communication when priorities have changed and explaining to each 
other about those priorities. But keeping that communication line open and honest 
and transparent as possible is always a challenge (John – publisher producer). 
 
This suggests that this idealistic picture presents some challenges and what works between 
the publisher and developer is the opposite. The publisher producer explains above that the 
parties’ priorities might change throughout the development process. In other words, he is 
implying that the creative process of development necessitates change, but communicating 
these changes with the other parties is not always possible. He calls it a challenge, but the 
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interview data show that it is not always beneficial to the parties to share all the 
information with each other.  
 
In spite of this ubiquitous rhetoric that open communication, trust and transparency are 
instrumental in managing the cross-boundary work between the publisher and developer, 
the second-level data analysis reveals that the publisher and developer are, instead, 
engaged in a highly political and distrustful relationship (the relevant data is presented in 
the following section), where specific tactics other than open communication and 
transparency are being utilised to facilitate the collaboration and knowledge integration in 
the relationship. These tactics will be presented in the following sections of this chapter. 
But before addressing these tactics, the very next section elaborates on accounts of distrust 
in the publisher-developer relationship.  
 
7.2. A Distrustful Relationship 
The second level data analysis reveals that the partners actually begin their relationship 
with high levels of distrust and they sustain this distrustful relationship all throughout the 
process. The participants occasionally hint at how fearful they are of each other. They feel 
they might be abused or misled by the other party, which they think might result in great 
financial loss for them. In this section, I firstly present some data that portrays these 
general negative feelings of distrust on both sides and their roots before examining in detail 
the challenges of this collaboration. 
 
Every respondent at the senior management level, including both developers and 
publishers, had something negative to say about people on the opposite side. A developer 
creative director explains that in the publisher-developer relationship “from the start, 
everything sounds incredibly negative. Right from the start, things are ‘we do it this way, 
you do it that way’” (Ken – developer executive producer). This developer emphasises that 
from the very beginning of the relationship, both parties do not trust each other; they are 
more focused on securing their own interests rather than integrating with each other and 
developing a common understanding. This is another indication of the "us and them" 
culture, discussed in chapter six, that seems to be prevalent in the publisher-developer 
relationship. Another developer highlights the general negativity of both parties towards 
each other in this statement: “We didn’t believe half the things the publisher said to us. 
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Publishers didn't believe half the things we said to them” (Jordan – developer producer). A 
publisher executive also expresses their lack of trust towards the developer by stressing 
that they are always "irritated" by the developer: 
 
The publisher is always irritated because the developers are not delivering what 
they said they would. And it just continues like this and it's a vicious circle. There is 
a growing suspicion and fear that the developers are not going to deliver (Simon – 
publisher executive). 
 
Here, the publisher executive refers to their worries over the developer’s performance. The 
publisher seems to be constantly anxious that the developer is overpromising, or they 
might not deliver the game with the quality and within the time frames agreed and 
expected by the publisher. In the next two sections, I elaborate on the sources for the 
developer and publisher’s negativity towards each other, explaining that this feeling of 
negativity forms the distrust between the two parties in the relationship. This develops a 
better understanding of the intricacies of the publisher-developer collaboration and their 
distrustful relationship. 
 
7.2.1. Sources of the Developer’s Fears and Negativity Towards the 
Publisher 
The data analysis shows that there are high levels of negativity and distrust among 
developers towards the publishers. While there is all this rhetoric about trust, at the same 
time the respondents conceptualise each other in a negative way. The data analysis shows 
that the developer's negativity is rooted in their fears that they might be let down or 
exploited by the publisher. Below, I discuss the sources of this fear and negativity, in order 
to elaborate on the lack of trust in the publisher-developer collaboration (see Table 10 on 
the next page). 
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          Table 10. Sources of the Developer’s Fear and Negativity Towards the Publisher 
 
Milestone Payments  
The milestone payments are the developer’s biggest concern. Milestone payments are the 
publisher’s periodic payment to the developer that has been agreed upon in the contract. 
Each payment is contingent upon the developer’s successful completion of contractual 
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milestone deliverables. At the end of each cycle, the publisher reviews the updated product 
and the progress of the work. However, the publisher completes the next payment only if 
they approve the developer’s milestone deliverable for the previous phase. This means that 
every four to six weeks, the developer faces the risk of losing their payments or potentially 
losing the whole project. Andrew, a developer producer, explains: 
 
I think what puts some strain between the two is always the fear from the developer 
that the publisher is not going to sign something, or pay when they’re supposed to 
pay or change stuff (Andrew – developer producer). 
 
Here, the developer suggests how important it is for them that the publisher approves or as 
he puts it "signs" the milestone deliverables. The developer is constantly anxious about the 
approvals and the periodic payments, because the studio is financially dependent on these 
payments. However, due to the creative nature of the game development, the approval 
criteria are not always written or specified. Therefore, the approvals are often highly 
subjective, leaving the developer unsure and concerned whether they have met all the 
requirements, or if they have done enough to secure the next payment. A developer 
executive confirms: “The evaluations of milestones is always subjective on the publisher's 
side” (Ben – developer executive).  
 
The publisher’s assessment is considered subjective mainly because the publisher 
sometimes does not specify the exact criteria they are looking for – this is due to the fact 
that the publisher claims that they would like the game to be enjoyable but this aspect of 
the game is almost immeasurable, hard to define and completely subjective. Timothy, a 
publisher executive, confirms:  
 
The game’s got to be fun, but it's tricky, because it's incredibly subjective, because 
what somebody might find as fun, might not be fun for the other (Timothy – 
publisher executive). 
 
Ethan, a developer director, also explains how the subjectivity of the game assessment 
creates confusion and lack of certainty for the developer: 
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There are some grey areas that can’t be measured properly, these are milestone 
criteria that are mainly subjective themes, and they are not black and white. The 
contract says this feature should be completed seventy per cent and the game 
should be fun. But how can you measure fun? We’ve been stuck in that kind of 
situation where you can have all of the logic and common sense and great ideas in 
the world but the guy who is on the other side is an idiot, he doesn’t think it’s fun. 
What do you do? (Ethan – developer director). 
 
This puts so much pressure on the developer, because they believe that the subjectivity of 
the milestone approval will give the publisher the opportunity to blame the developer, 
without providing any solid reasons for why they have cancelled the project. So the 
creative and iterative process of the game development, as well as the subjectivity of the 
publisher’s assessment all lead to the developer’s lack of trust and constant fear and 
uncertainty regarding crucial milestone payments. 
 
Project Cancellation 
Project cancellations can impact hugely on a development studio, leading to its demise, 
while it might only affect the publisher slightly, thus highlighting the developer's 
dependency on the publisher's funding. The publisher is generally the sole source of 
funding for the developer. In addition to covering the production costs, a publisher’s 
periodic payments will run the developer’s company costs and overheads. In other words, 
these payments keep the developer afloat. Recalling their experience with a publisher, a 
studio head complained that when the publisher decided to cancel their project, it resulted 
in the death of the company:  
 
It really hurt us; they decided just to tear our clothes out. I have many examples of 
these cases (Ben – developer studio head). 
 
Here the developer uses the metaphor "tear our clothes out", to emphasise how destructive 
it was for the development studio when the publisher decided to cancel the project. The 
metaphor highlights the perceived cruelty and unfairness of this decision, which nearly led 
the company into administration. 
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The data show that the developer feels the threat of losing the project and feels anxious, by 
the same token, throughout the whole development process. Adam – a developer producer 
– confirms: 
  
If the publisher cancels the contract, then I’ve got these big staff overhead. I either 
have to keep all those people till I have the next project, or I have to pay at least a 
month of all of that salary out of my bank account. That’s a lot of money and that 
can cause me to go out of business. So I’m scared, if they cancel the project, I am 
in big trouble (Adam – developer producer).  
 
Nigel, another development studio head, complains that this is an on-going worry and the 
developer never feels secure in the relationship. He states that: “the publishers shouldn’t be 
putting the project at risk every month” (Nigel – developer studio head).  
 
Despite their massive investments, the publisher can cancel projects for various reasons. 
As I have shown, videogame development requires a significant investment, and the 
creative nature of development does not allow the publisher and developer to have a clear 
picture of the game with the exact specifications, budget and timelines formed at the very 
beginning of the project. The production cycle is an iterative process, in which game 
features and its requirements will evolve gradually (Chandler, 2009). As a result, this can 
be a highly risky investment for the publisher. Therefore, at any point in the production 
process if the publisher is confident that the project will not finish within the terms that are 
in line with company interests or if they feel the project might not return their investment, 
they may cancel the contract to prevent any further financial loss and in order to protect 
themselves. Below a publisher producer explains how they had to terminate their contract 
with the developer because, after spending nearly nine million pounds, they were still 
unhappy with the technical aspects of the game and thought the faults could not be easily 
fixed. At once, they decided to halt additional investment and terminated their 
collaboration with the developer: 
 
It’s always uncomfortable to cancel the projects. In our project, I knew well that we 
could never make the game that we’ve been describing, for three and a half million 
pounds, but my boss’s attitude was, well let’s just start making the game, and then 
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if it is good we’ll finish it, and if it’s not good, we’ll cancel it anyway. So they 
proceeded with the project and they spent about eight to nine million on it, but later 
they cancelled the project, because they weren’t happy with the tech [technology]. 
It was terrible, they made the team redundant and the developer wasn’t impressed 
of course (Paul – publisher producer).  
 
Simon, another publisher producer, delineates the rationale for the publisher’s decisions to 
cancel projects:  
 
The publisher wants more security and assurance that they are not wasting their 
money. So they are willing to spend forty per cent of the budget to de-risk that 
massive chunk of money that they are going to spend [secure their investment], 
because half way through the project, they know better what the game is going to 
be like (Simon – publisher producer). 
 
This producer confirms that even if the contract is signed and even half way through the 
development process, if they are not happy with the game and its progress, they will cancel 
it. As discussed earlier, for a large multinational organisation, it seems that discarding 
some investment and one project might not be a big deal. However, for a small 
development studio this can be the death of the company. In sum, my data reveal that the 
developer’s financial dependence together with the publisher’s financial power create 
insecurity, and with it fear and negativity on the part of developers.   
 
Budget 
The interview data revealed that the developer has uncertainties and worries about the 
project budget spent by the publisher. Before signing a contract, the production budget is 
estimated and approved by the two parties. The project is fully or sometimes partly funded 
by the publisher. However, in most cases the publisher also deducts parts of the budget for 
the areas they would contribute to the project, such as concept art, voice recording, 
marketing, etc. In these cases, the publisher accepts the responsibility to cover the costs of 
certain services. The developer argues that there is no guarantee for any of those promises 
made by the publisher, or that they might deliver the service but not with the quality they 
had promised. As a result, this adds to the developer’s fear and distrust noted above.  
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The developer’s biggest budget worry is allotted to marketing. The participants believe the 
marketing and PR budget has an important role in increasing the game sales. However, in a 
sizeable corporation with a big portfolio of projects with various developers, sometimes 
they reallocate their marketing budget and put more emphasis on the games that seem to be 
more profitable. So if the publisher decides to cut a game’s marketing budget and re-invest 
it in another project that potentially offers greater reward, this could massively affect the 
game’s and the studio’s profitability – even their survival. The fact that the publisher does 
not always stick to marketing promises made at the outset is a cause of deep, on-going 
anxiety amongst the developer respondents. Worse still, they have no power to fight back 
or challenge the decision. Ethan, a developer executive, describes:  
 
Whether we are successful or not is down to the publisher. Because they need to 
market the game and they need to have spotted a market niche that they wanted to 
fill and believe in that enough. If they don’t keep their promise [and don’t spend the 
budget they promised us], we would fail (Ethan – developer executive). 
 
In other words, the developer is never sure if the promised amount has been actually 
allocated to the marketing. This financial dependence and not having enough negotiation 
power creates high levels of distrust and fear for the developer towards the publisher.  
  
Making a Profit Disproportionate to Their Input 
The data show that another source of the developer respondents' distrust is rooted in their 
perception of their contract and how the royalties are split between them and the publisher. 
The developer often feels the publisher contract is unfair, and that the royalty they receive 
is not proportionate to their input. Here a developer director insists that the profit is split 
unfairly between the parties: 
 
So you are never going to make any royalties. The problem is there’s not much 
money in the pot to begin with because the retailer takes so much, the market is 
very competitive and the publisher takes a cut that allows the publisher to run. If 
you are very lucky, you have a ten per cent margin that will be split unfairly 
between you and the publisher (Mike – developer director). 
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Similarly, all developers believe that the contract is designed only to benefit and protect 
the publisher. Here, a renowned development studio owner explains:  
 
The publisher seems to want a contract set up, so that if the game made the loss, 
the developer takes the loss. If the game made a profit, the publisher would keep 
the profit (Todd – developer studio head).  
 
Leo, a publisher executive also indirectly confirms this lack of trust on the side of the 
developer by using the metaphor "crush", etc. to show his awareness of the developer’s 
distrust towards the publisher. He says: 
 
My biggest challenge with a developer is to convince them that we aren’t about to 
screw them, and that we're trustworthy. The developer is a tiny team; we are a big 
entity, so I have to prove to them in a short period of time that we're not going to 
step on them and crush them (Leo – publisher executive). 
 
As highlighted above, there is a general negative perspective toward the publisher among 
the developer that the risk and the profit are both shared disproportionately between the 
parties, and that the developer feels more at risk, with little prospect of financial gains at 
the end of the project. Allan, a publisher executive, disputes this as below: 
 
Ultimately the developer has the choice to sign the deal with the publisher or not? 
They can walk away, it is a democracy, they don’t have to sign that contract if they 
are not happy with it (Allan – publisher executive). 
 
This publisher executive believes that the developer is completely aware of the contract’s 
terms and conditions, and it is their decision to start the project with the publisher. 
However, the developer believes that most of the time they only have two options: “We 
either refuse to sign the contract and go out of business, or we sign the deal for a minimum 
profit” (Andrew – developer producer). The developer’s financial dependencies seem to 
give them less negotiation power, where they yield to any terms only to secure a project. 
However, this will result in some resentment that resides all through the project. 
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7.2.2. Sources of the Publisher’s Fears 
The interview data reveal that the publisher likewise distrusts the developer. The publisher 
feels they might be let down by their partner and, as a result, incur a financial loss. 
Laurence, a publisher executive, asserts: “I just wonder how these two parties can trust 
each other in such a relationship? Well, they often don't. I don't know any publisher who 
trusts their developers” (Laurence – publisher executive). Table 11 and the following two 
sections elaborate on the areas where the publisher feels insecure and concerned about 
their collaboration with a development studio. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Sources of the Publisher’s Fears and Negativity Towards the Developer 
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The Developer’s Failure in Quality Delivery of the Game  
Developers failing to deliver the game with the expected quality as agreed and approved by 
the publisher is one of the publisher’s main worries in their collaboration with a 
development studio. This quality refers to the game features, concept, technology and the 
scope that the publisher expects the game to reflect. Since videogame development is a 
highly creative and iterative process, the game specifications will evolve gradually and it is 
almost impossible to determine the game features and scope at the outset of the contract. 
That is the reason why the publisher fears receiving a game that is different from what they 
expected. Here, a former publisher producer admits that changes in the game are 
unavoidable and an indispensable part of the creative process. He says: 
 
It's quite difficult sometimes to nail people down on what the game is earlier on. 
The game evolves and gets even better, I don’t think I ever started a game where I 
had a really clear idea of what it would be in the end and even if I did, it would 
have never been mapped and I think that's just because they’re very complicated 
things – even with really simple games you want to evolve a little bit in time (Yousef 
– ex publisher producer).  
 
This lack of clarity on what the game is going to be like at the end of the project makes the 
publisher’s investment highly risky. So in order to protect themselves the publisher expects 
to be involved in the production throughout design and development. However, the 
publisher’s involvement differs from project to project, and from studio to studio, 
depending to a large extent on the publisher’s level of investment. If the publisher has 
invested large sums into the project, they allocate more resources to monitor and supervise 
the project in order to secure a sound return. As a result, they will be more concerned about 
the quality delivery of the game. Therefore, the publisher’s presence at the studio to 
monitor the project varies from weekly to monthly or sometimes quarterly.  
 
The interview data show that the creative and iterative process of the game development, 
and as a result, the unpredictability of the game development makes the publisher’s 
investment highly risky. Sometimes lack of proximity to the studio also makes it difficult 
for the publisher to have full transparency on the project. This makes the publisher 
extremely nervous for their investment. This issue is returned to in section 7.3. and 7.3.1 
 
 
176 
where I discuss knowledge hiding practices – these sections develop our understanding of 
the publisher’s distrust and their lack of transparency over the project. 
 
The Developer’s Failure in Delivering the Game on Time and Budget                 
Timely delivery refers to the completion of the project within the timelines expected, 
agreed and approved by the publisher. The term "on budget" is frequently used by the 
participants referring to the completion of a project within the anticipated financial limits 
that are approved and paid by the publisher. For the publisher, it is critical that the game is 
delivered within the set timelines and budget. The data also suggest that one of the 
publisher’s main concerns is the developer’s failure to achieve this. 
 
The publisher sometimes plans the game to be released concurrently with a movie or at a 
special time of the year when the sales are predicted to be the highest. This is another 
reason why the completion of the game within the projected timelines has paramount 
significance. The following statement by Jing, a publisher producer, provides an example 
of this case: 
  
So it was a big deal for us, we really needed that game to come out on the day that 
the film came out, we needed it far more than anything else. We’d paid £110 
million to company X for the licence [of the game], so that’s a lot of money, so we 
really needed to recoup money on that investment. We had discussed [with the 
developer] that over the course of the project, changes could be made a little bit, 
but if we wouldn’t get this game out in time, we were missing a massive opportunity 
to make millions (Jing – publisher producer).  
 
The game production budget sometimes reaches multi-million pounds. Since game 
development is an iterative and creative process, the changes incurred to the game 
sometimes require extra investment. The publisher does not welcome this additional 
investment. However, where they have already made a significant investment, they 
sometimes have to consent to the additional expenditure simply in order to get the project 
through to completion. Allan, a publisher executive, explains:  
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It is very tricky when the budget is so high, and literally if the studio [developer] 
doesn’t deliver what they had promised, the company [the publisher] could go 
under (Allan – publisher executive).  
 
Here, the publisher is referring to the quality delivery, timely delivery or delivering the 
game "on budget". 
 
The data suggest that finances play a big role in creating the tensions between the publisher 
and the developer. Any changes to the timelines and the budget inflicted on the game by 
the developer might affect the publisher financially; that is why the publisher is constantly 
concerned about these changes. While the publisher expects the developer’s loyalty to the 
original plans and timelines, the developer justifies the changes by stressing how 
unpredictable the process of game development is and regards the changes as an 
“indispensable part of creative process” (Marcus – developer lead artist).  
 
Although the unpredictable and iterative nature of videogame development plays a great 
part in the publisher’s investment concerns, other factors also contribute to the publisher’s 
lack of trust in the developer. Discussing his anxieties about quality and timeliness, a 
publisher producer hints at the fact that the developer might fail to deliver. He states: 
 
The publisher is always irritated because the developers are not delivering what 
they said they would. And it just continues like this and it's a vicious circle. There is 
a growing suspicion and fear that the developers are not going to deliver (Chris – 
publisher producer). 
 
While depicting themselves as highly professional and collaborative, the publishers in the 
research often accuse the developer of treating them unfairly and acting unprofessionally. 
A publisher producer uses the word "abuse" in order to highlight his distrust: “There is an 
intrinsic fear [among publishers] that you are going to get abused [by the developer]. So 
you end up being guarded because you don't want to get hurt” (Rob – publisher producer). 
Allan, a publisher executive, adds: 
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The publisher doesn’t trust their developers, because, I think a lot of developers are 
pretty badly behaving, and this is part of the tension between publisher and 
developer all the time (Allan – publisher executive). 
 
In this quote, the publisher blames the developer for the tension in the relationship: he 
rather vaguely explains that the developer does not always act professionally and their 
actions have had consequences for the publisher. In his view, the consequence is mutual 
distrust.  
 
This section has elaborated on the publisher-developer distrustful relationship, presenting 
the participants’ perspectives on the sources for the tension between them. The "us and 
them" culture dominates the publisher-developer relationship, where both parties distrust 
each other from the outset and blame the other party for their conflicts and challenges. So 
participants from both sides talked about their fears in the relationship and explained that 
the creative and iterative process of videogame development, the risky investment, the 
developer’s financial dependencies, as well as their uneven access to power resources were 
the main reasons behind their mutual distrust. The next two sections (7.3. and 7.4.) present 
a second level analysis, interpreting participants’ sporadic and contradictory comments on 
the tensions and challenges of their collaboration and revealing that there is another layer 
to the story, which is opposite to the idealistic picture all participants attempted to depict at 
the beginning of their interview session. The second level analysis reveals that both the 
publisher and developer use some tactics other than open communication and transparency 
to protect their own interests and make the collaboration successful; this will shed more 
light on why both sides felt they were being abused or exploited.  
 
7.3. Knowledge Hiding  
I discussed earlier that both the publisher and the developer felt anxious in the relationship 
and didn’t trust each other. In this section, I talk about the tactics the parties use to 
maintain a working relationship in their collaboration, thus clarifying why the parties feel 
they may be being exploited and abused.  
 
 
 
179 
I mentioned in section 7.1 that when I asked the participants how they could maintain a 
successful collaboration, they all unanimously emphasised transparency and knowledge 
sharing as the key to their relationship. However, at later points in their interviews both 
developers and publishers either directly or indirectly accused the other partner of not 
being transparent and open in the relationship. Olly, a publisher producer, confirms:  
 
Transparency might make things easy. However, that's not always possible, and 
that is just the nature of business (Olly – publisher producer). 
 
The publisher asks for transparency from the developer over the quality, time and the 
budget required and spent on the project because they want to make sure the developer will 
deliver a game with the specifications and within the approved temporal and financial 
limits (see Table 11 for more explanation). On the other hand, the developer expects the 
publisher to be transparent in their decisions pertaining to the project cancellation or 
milestone failure (see Table 10 for more explanation). However, the data show that gaining 
transparency over the above areas is a challenge for the parties. In other words, not being 
transparent works better for the collaboration. As a result, both sides are involved in an on-
going power struggle to gain knowledge over the project, as withholding knowledge and 
not being transparent can empower the partners in the relationship. The data show that the 
parties gain control over the project and can secure themselves by withholding some levels 
of information. This is Chris's perspective on transparency in the publisher-developer 
relationship: 
  
I say a big challenge for us is simply visibility. Developers have become jaded 
because of previous experiences where they felt that the publisher has demanded 
too much visibility in terms of how they manage their projects. Developers deny 
access to the project and that is what a lot of them do (Chris – senior publisher 
producer). 
 
Yousef, an industry informant, explains that knowledge hiding is a common practice in the 
industry, but people refer to it as lack of "transparency" because they do not want to 
directly accuse each other of dishonesty or lying. He explains: 
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These days, people swap the word transparency with honesty. Saying someone has 
been dishonest seems to be a bit harsher than saying someone hasn’t been 
transparent. But, the reality is that publishers are hiding things from developers, 
developers are hiding things from publishers. That’s how it works (Yousef –  
developer director and ex publisher producer). 
 
The interview data suggest that both the developer and publisher hide knowledge to some 
degree from each other in order to protect themselves and reduce the risks in their 
relationship. Table 12 outlines the areas that the developer and publisher are more likely to 
hide knowledge from each other. The following two sections also elaborate on Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Knowledge Hiding Based on the Second Level Analysis 
 
7.3.1. The Developer’s Knowledge Hiding 
The interview data reveal that the developer sometimes withholds knowledge from the 
publisher mainly in the following areas: 
 
Game Specifications and Its Scope                    
Due to the creative and iterative development process of videogame production, changes to 
the game concept and features are inevitable. But sometimes the developer intentionally 
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does not reveal the changes made to the game or existing problems in the development to 
the publisher. According to Adrian, an industry informant: 
 
The publishers can’t trust the developer, because the developers are not honest 
about things. So rather than invest time and resources in explaining the 
consequences of decisions [pertaining to the game] in a mature way, most of them 
hold information (Adrian – developer studio head).  
 
Thus the developer regularly ceases to share knowledge about the details of the game in 
order to prevent any creative clashes with the publishers. The developer fears that the 
publisher might not approve the new ideas or changes to the project, thus jeopardising their 
milestone payment. However, the publisher regards this as unprofessional. Matt, a 
publisher producer, complains: 
 
Well it’s terrible! They need to know that ultimately this is our [publisher's] money, 
this isn’t their [developer's] money. They are making a project for us, and they 
need to behave professionally, but they don't and it’s very hard when they don’t 
want to (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
A development studio head admits that they often refuse to share some details about the 
game, especially the changes or new directions in the game with their publisher, because 
he believes this would make the publisher more anxious about the project. In other words, 
due to their risky investments and the risky market they are facing, the developer feels the 
publisher is already extremely nervous about the project. So they withhold this information 
from the publisher because they are worried that the publisher might panic and cancel the 
project or withdraw payments. Brian, a studio head, explains:  
 
The publishers just make themselves more worried by knowing more. They want to 
dig in everything [know everything about the project], in individual teams but we 
always have to keep things at high levels [hide things from them] and keep their 
relationship at that level, but they are always insisting on digging deeper [the more 
information you give them, they want to know more]. We never exactly like that 
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because this information could work against us. This is very complicated, but we 
always thought it was none of their business (Brian – developer studio head). 
 
As indicated in the above quote, the developer is worried that if the publisher is aware of 
new directions or problems in the development, they might doubt the whole project and 
this might “work against” them, resulting in the cancellation of the project. The developer 
generally perceives this departure from the original idea, as an unavoidable and intrinsic 
part of the creative process. However, this iterative development process, with constant 
changes to the game specification creates continuous tension between the parties.  
 
Need for Additional Resources 
Since videogame development is an iterative process, the developer often realises, in the 
further stages of development, that because of changes made to the original concept, they 
might require additional resources, such as money and/or time. However, the developer is 
reluctant to communicate those needs to the publisher, especially in the early stages. A 
publisher executive explains:  
 
A lot of developers wouldn’t give you that information [project plans and 
timelines]. Todd [developer studio head] never gave us project plans or data with 
any details (Laurence – publisher executive).  
 
The developer believes that although predicting what resources are required for a vague 
concept at the pre-production phase is difficult, they have to agree to some hypothetical 
plans to convince the publisher to invest. The publisher obviously does not welcome any 
changes to the timelines, budget and plans because these changes either mean the late 
release of the game, and/or increasing their already large investment. Simon, a publisher 
producer, explains that as a result of withholding knowledge, the developer is putting the 
project at risk:  
 
Some of the studios are not honest and conceal the truth. A lot of developers try to 
keep their cards close to their chest and our projects have run late because of it 
and because there wasn’t honesty and early enough warning about things that had 
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gone wrong or changed. When they conceal issues, things might fall apart (Simon – 
publisher producer).  
 
The developer thinks the opposite: from the developer's perspective, knowledge sharing 
and open communication actually put the project at risk. They believe they are in a 
relationship with a partner who has more resources and power. They believe the publisher 
would use their financial leverage in order to pursue their own interests, whereas the 
developer has to work under the threat of losing the project at each milestone, as well as 
having a much smaller cut of the profit. The data show that knowledge hiding helps the 
developer maintain some control over this uneven relationship. Jacob, a developer director, 
talks about his frustrations: 
 
You want to be as honest as possible with people. But it's really hard to say what a 
good strategy would be [to maintain a good relationship with a publisher], because 
often if you're honest you get exploited [they cancel the project or you end up with 
zero profit]. That’s when you start to be careful and more guarded with what you 
reveal to people (Jacob – developer creative director). 
 
The developer believes that the publisher has a big portfolio of projects and cancelling one 
project does not have much impact on the publisher. However, it could ruin the whole 
development studio. This is why the developer does everything in their power to protect 
themselves and secure the project. Allan, a publisher executive producer, confirms:   
 
Developers deny access to the project and that is what a lot of them do. And they 
use it as a means of control so that the publisher can’t influence the outcome of the 
projects (Allan – publisher executive producer). 
 
Many developers believe that the publisher takes cancellation lightly, but they react 
differently when the project has progressed well and the development is at the later stages. 
The publisher shows more flexibility towards the developer’s decisions and demands when 
they have already paid a large sum to the studio. Chris, another publisher producer, 
explains: 
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Things have become much trickier [for the publisher] because the budget is so high 
[these days] and literally the company [the publisher] could go under. The 
developers have become savvy, depending on how confident they are and how 
much other opportunities they’ve got [they might have lined up other contracts with 
other publishers]. [So they would say] if you don’t want to pay us what we want, 
then we’ll walk away. I know some developers who have done that successfully and 
then they won every single time because the publisher has to [submit to them] and 
do not sacrifice the budget [they have already spent on the project] unless essential 
(Chris – publisher producer). 
  
A developer creative director confirms: “If you're open with them [about the changes or the 
problems you have in production], you run the risk of getting your product cancelled” 
(Mike – developer creative director). The problems in production can refer to the 
developer’s realisation that they cannot finish the game within the timelines and the budget 
approved by the publisher. Or it means they have issues with the new technology, thus 
needing to hire experts to help them; hence more time and money will be required. A 
developer studio head explains that if they communicate their problems, and share with the 
publisher the knowledge over the issues they have, they could risk losing the project: 
 
You don't want to fail; they can knock you down for it. It’s hard to have a 
conversation about your fears for what might go wrong, or what you know is going 
wrong (Nigel – developer studio head).  
 
The developer uses knowledge hiding to secure their milestone payments. A developer 
studio head states: “You use any tricks you know in order to just keep yourself in business; 
otherwise, you might lose the project and the whole studio” (Ben – developer studio head). 
As another developer adds, “We often keep stuff under the radar [conceal stuff], purely so 
that we could still get paid” (Ken – developer executive producer), highlighting how 
important it is for the developer to keep the publisher happy at all costs. 
 
7.3.2. The Publisher’s Knowledge Hiding 
The publishers in this research accuse the developer of withholding knowledge and not 
being transparent. But from the developers’ perspective, the publisher also hides 
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information, and this escalates the tension between the parties. A development studio head 
states, “Transparency on the publisher side is virtually none!!” (Francis – development 
studio head). But, the developer is not permitted to question the publisher’s knowledge 
hiding, and it seems this is due to their uneven access to resources and the developer’s 
limited power to negotiate. Finance plays a great role in the relationship, defining the 
boundaries, and as expressed in the above section, developers are always worried about 
losing the milestones or the project. In the following two sections I present the data on 
publisher knowledge hiding.   
 
The Motives for Decisions 
The developer complains that the publisher is not honest about the motives behind the 
decisions they make with regards to the project, thus leaving them with a feeling of 
impotence. As it was mentioned earlier, the milestones are the points in the publisher-
developer relationship at which the project is assessed and approved, as a result of which 
the developer gets paid. There are some milestone criteria, but due to the iterative and 
creative nature of videogame development, this list is defined rather loosely, thus it can be 
difficult to predict if the game has met the criteria based on those plans and definitions at 
the outset of the project. The "fun factor", described in previous sections in this chapter, 
also adds to the subjectivity and ambiguity of the milestone assessment. This situation 
leaves the developer feeling vulnerable: that they can never do enough and constantly have 
to defend their position. The developer claims that the publisher benefits from this 
uncertainty because at any point in the relationship the publisher can pull the plug on the 
project with no legal obligation to explain why – apart from simply that the developer has 
not met the criteria. This puts a lot of pressure on the developer and contributes to their 
lack of trust in the publisher. Ben, a developer studio head, talks about one of his projects 
that was cancelled by the publisher, forcing them into administration. He recalls:  
 
Out of blue, one day management in the US changed, they had a new management 
team now and they wanted to be out of contract with IP owned developers in the 
UK and they ended their contract with nine other UK studios, they moved to the 
movie licensing because apparently it was a more successful theme/business at that 
period. We referred to the contract but they said we had failed in our last 
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submission [milestone], they came up with a very vague rejection criteria and we 
had to compromise due to our financial needs (Ben – developer studio head). 
 
Below, another developer producer complains that the publisher lost interest in their game 
because they found other projects more profitable in the new market, so they cancelled the 
project without being honest about the reasons. Again the publisher referred to a spurious 
failure to meet criteria. They "manufactured" the developer’s failure and blamed the 
developer for not delivering the promised quality:  
 
The publisher had another agenda and that was why they wanted to kill our project. 
So they decided that they should be spending the money on something else than us. 
Then they tried to manufacture our failure, and that was a very unpleasant 
situation for the whole studio. I think it's incredibly common in the industry that 
publishers knock the studio down due to change of their plans (Jordan – developer 
producer). 
 
The developer believes that the unpredictability of videogame development allows the 
publisher to "make excuses" for cancelling the project. However, this leaves the developer 
tremendously anxious all the way through the development process. 
 
Budget 
The budget is estimated and approved by both the developer and publisher. The publisher 
funds the project and pays the developer, based on the estimated budget. However, some 
parts of this budget stay with the publisher for the areas that the publisher is contributing to 
the project. These areas are mainly marketing, or other areas of expertise, such as concept 
art, animation, voice recording, etc. The interview data suggest that the developer does not 
trust the publisher to pay all these expenses. The developer also claims that the publisher 
refuses to share any details about the costs of the services they provide to the development 
studio. Brian, a studio head, explains: 
 
I asked how much the concept art is going to cost, and they started laughing, they 
acted like, "You’ll never know". And I said, "But you are cutting a budget for it 
from my budget". And then they were like, "Well this is how it’s going to work". It’s 
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like you get a builder to build your house and they go, "I can’t tell you how much 
it’s going to cost". That's insane. And it still causes me sleepless nights now. You 
shouldn’t ask as a developer, because you never get the answer. I just don’t 
understand it as a business model where they're giving you things but they won't 
tell you how much their services cost (Brian – studio head). 
 
In this instance, the publisher’s refusal to share details about the costs of their services 
leaves the developer feeling they might have been ripped off. The developer complains that 
his request for some information about their collaboration was blatantly denied.  
 
Another developer director adds that there are some unwritten rules about the publisher-
developer relationship and in order to have a working relationship with the publisher you 
should follow these rules without disputing them. He confirms that the publisher conceals 
some information, but the developer does not have the right to question these practices:  
 
Occasionally they tell us things by accident. They told us the music budget and the 
voice talent budget, but normally that stuff isn’t disclosed. That can be quite weird, 
but this is the bottom line with the publisher (Mike – developer creative director). 
 
The most controversial part of the publisher’s knowledge hiding is the marketing budget. 
As noted, the marketing budget for a game has a crucial role in raising the product 
awareness and increasing the sales. In the traditional publisher-developer collaboration, the 
publisher is responsible for bringing in the knowledge of the market for investing in 
marketing and PR for the game. At the outset of the contract, the publisher commits to x 
amount of budget on marketing and PR. This is done either verbally or it is written in the 
contract. This marketing budget works more like a carrot on a stick to encourage and 
inspire the developer, but in reality, it is difficult for the developer to hold the publisher 
accountable for their initial promises. The publisher also does not reveal documents that 
prove they have spent the amount they had promised they would spend to market the game. 
The developer believes that the publisher has a big portfolio of games and they tend to 
spend more on the projects that seem to sell more, at times leaving the rest of the projects 
with no marketing budget at all. Adam, a developer producer, describes:  
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Whether we are successful or not is down to the publisher to be honest. Because 
they need to market the game and they need to have spotted a market niche that 
they wanted to fill and believe in that enough. If they don’t keep their promise, we 
would fail [to make any profit] (Adam – developer producer). 
 
In the following extract, a developer studio head explains how he was let down by the 
publisher, when they withheld any information with regards to their marketing budget and 
how this led to their project not making any profit.  
 
Another very disappointing experience was when we ended up working with our 
publisher for the previous project. They were charming and wonderful and 
promised the earth to us very early on in the relationship, but when it came to 
going to market, they just lost interest in the project entirely, because they had 
other things that were more important to them. When we asked them to give us 
numbers, they simply refused to answer. What could we do? We had no money to 
take them to court (Nigel modeveloper studio head). 
 
As explained earlier, the developer’s financial dependence gives them less negotiating 
power and they feel vulnerable and exposed in their collaboration with the publisher. From 
the publisher’s point of view, the project is a significant and risky investment, so they are 
entitled to have full visibility over the project to protect their investment and secure a 
return for the corporation. The data reveal that in this highly creative, novel and political 
setting, knowledge hiding is the key driving force for maintaining positions of power. 
However, it seems knowledge hiding is not the only method to manage the relationship 
between the publishers and developers. The data also reveal that at points the developer 
uses deception and the publisher colludes with the developer in order to maintain a 
working relationship. The next section elaborates on how the developer’s financial 
dependence, the creative nature of their cross-boundary work and the high levels of distrust 
can lead them to share misleading information with the publisher, while the publisher 
resorts to collusion to create a sustainable collaboration with the development studio. 
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7.4. Developer’s Deception 
I have argued that both the developer and publisher withhold knowledge from each other at 
different stages of their collaboration. However, the second level of analysis also reveals 
that developers resort to other tactics, such as deception, to make a profit. Although this 
apparently creates negativity and feelings of distrust in the publisher, it helps the developer 
to reduce the risks of their collaboration. The developer’s strategic use of deception is 
examined in the following sections.  
 
7.4.1. Making a Profit on the "Man-Month Rate" 
The developer can deceive the publisher on their "man-month rate" and make a profit. As 
described in the previous sections of this chapter, the publisher funds the full budget for 
production and pays it to the developer by instalment. The budget is estimated and 
approved by both the developer and publisher at the outset of the collaboration based on a 
"man-month rate". The "man-month rate" is the amount required for a certain number of 
staff for a certain number of months. For example, the developer announces to the 
publisher that they can complete the game with five members of staff in twenty four 
months. There is an average rate for an average workforce for each month, such as £3,000. 
So the budget is estimated by this average amount for five members of staff, multiplied by 
twenty four months. This amount is reviewed and approved by the publisher. However, the 
data show that the developer sometimes fakes and manufactures documents to convince the 
publisher to approve a larger budget than they need, and in reality they use fewer people 
than they have specified in their contract. As a result of this, they spend less of the budget 
and save up some profit. This practice is described in the following quote from Adam, a 
developer producer. Interestingly, he does not admit that this is a dishonest tactic, and he 
insists this is the only way the developer can secure his business. He says: 
 
There is a margin on every man-month. You hide your profit margins as much as 
possible as a developer. You can quote a man-month rate to charge [the publisher], 
but you will hire cheap people. Most of the cost is salary and that's where you can 
get the most obvious margin. You can also reduce costs by outsourcing things [so 
you end up paying less money for the workforce], but you can still charge the 
publisher full man-months (Adam – developer producer). 
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When asked about the man-month rate, another developer executive tries to justify the 
developer’s deceptive tactics by referring to the fact that the developer is not making a 
profit proportionate to their input, thus implying that the publisher gets the most profit 
from sales. He states:  
 
The temptation is enormous; the developer doesn’t make any profit. The developer 
feels the need to bump up these man-months cost because they also got ripped off 
last time [by the publisher]. Then on the publisher's side, they are aware of it and 
then it becomes an escalating distrust. Because everyone knows everyone's trying 
to cheat (Ben – developer executive).  
 
The respondent suggests that the publisher is aware of the developer’s dishonesty and 
deception. According to a publisher executive, “What frustrates the publisher the most is 
when the developer doesn’t have total transparency about the amount of money the 
publisher spends” (Laurence – publisher executive). This statement refers again to the fact 
that while the publisher demands the developer to submit all the details about the 
production, including resources, plans and timelines regularly throughout the development, 
the developer still fakes documents and information to conceal the actual costs of their 
production in order to generate some profit for the studio. In line with this, a publisher 
producer expresses: 
  
I say a big challenge for us is simply visibility [over the project], that’s why I 
would always want my producer on-site with the developer and I have it in the 
contract. I would try to get a desk in their office somewhere, anywhere. It’s partly 
to see, literally to see, for example, how many people we are paying for, because 
some developers are sneaky. Sometimes you are paying for twenty, but you’d find 
out actually you are only getting ten [people working on your project]. Our full-
time presence at the studio will make it quite hard for them to lie and to be 
dishonest (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
Another example of developer deception can be found in the following quote:  
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The studio head would ship people in from a different studio just to sit in the studio 
when publishers came to visit. So you see this big team working on your game and 
you think “oh, it’s great”. But then, of course, when the publisher leaves, they all 
go back to the other studio. That sort of thing creates deep distrust (Allan – 
publisher executive producer). 
 
This quote is another indication of the developer faking the number of people working on 
their project. 
 
7.4.2. Asking for More Resources Later in Production 
The data suggest that the developer can also regularly deceive the publisher by asking for 
more resources, such as time and staff, particularly in the later stages of production, when 
the publisher has already invested a large sum and so is less likely to disagree or cancel the 
project. In this section, I show how the developer hides information about their need for 
more resources from the publisher at the beginning of the collaboration and reveals it to 
them at the later stages of development. In this case, the developer might genuinely be not 
aware of these needs at the time of the contract with the publisher and these needs might 
arise later in the production as the game evolves. This can be quite common in an iterative 
process of development. However, the developer acts deceptively when they inadvertently 
agree to some terms in the contract, such as the budget and time, knowing full well they 
cannot complete the game within those terms. So they only seek to secure a contract and 
the funding for their company, but later ask for more money to finish the game. Andrew, a 
developer producer, explains: 
 
In this project, I knew well that we could never make the game that we had 
promised, for three and a half million pounds, but you know that kind of "developer 
trick" – that, “Keep quiet and let's see what we can do” and then once we got well 
underway and we were proving [to the publisher] that the game was awesome, then 
we would worry about asking for the extra money (Andrew – developer producer). 
 
The developer also actively deceives the publisher by asking for more money to make a 
profit, and they demand extra investment when the publisher is less likely to pull out of the 
contract. In addition, they fake documents to prove they need this money to finish the 
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project and that without it they cannot complete the game. Todd, a development studio 
head, admits: 
 
If the game is good enough, then the publisher will be locked in the process and 
they will definitely pay for the project to the end and they might even pay for it 
more and the developer is aware of this, leading them to ask for more investment or 
more time. However, this is like a vicious circle that might lead to lack of trust 
(Todd – developer studio head). 
 
An experienced publisher executive confirms that as a project progresses, the developer is 
more able to convince the publisher to release more funds. At the later stages, the publisher 
is financially committed, and thus much more likely to agree to the developer’s demands: 
  
No one says, “That's a five million project, but please give us seven million 
dollars.” They rather say, “No, the project needs five million dollars at the 
beginning”, but they’ll beg for extra two millions when we get to the end. It’s just 
the universal truth and it’s stupidity I know, but it’s just the way it works (Simon – 
publisher executive). 
 
Some participants expressed their great dismay with and disapproval of knowledge hiding 
and collusion, while others believed that these practices would escalate distrust between 
the parties. However, it seems these practices are common in the industry, and some 
respondents even consider them normal, or as the only way forward for the publisher-
developer relationship. As stated in the quote above, “it’s just the way it works” (Simon – 
publisher executive). In the next section, I discuss the publisher’s reaction to the 
developer’s deceptive behaviour and knowledge hiding. 
 
7.5. Publisher’s Collusion 
In the previous sections, I highlighted that the developer sometimes engages in deceptive 
behaviour and hides knowledge from the publisher in order to secure their business and 
make some profit. As noted, for some developers these activities are perceived to be "the 
only way forward", a way of securing themselves in the collaboration in order to survive. 
But it is important to appreciate what the publisher’s perspective is with regards to the 
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developer’s deception and knowledge hiding. Some publishers condemn the developer’s 
deceptive behaviour and call it forgery. Laurence, a publisher executive, says: “We signed 
the contract for fifteen people and they put ten on it. That’s kind of forgery unfortunately” 
(Laurence – publisher executive). However, the data suggest that not all publishers have 
the same attitude towards the developer’s deceptive tactics, and the publisher might even 
collude with the developer in these activities. John, a publisher producer, states: 
 
I think everyone knows this. Publishers know this; developers know this. It's 
completely okay to charge a man-month rate, a man-month rate necessarily higher 
than they used to be because there's a profit margin built into that [for the 
developer] (John – publisher producer). 
 
In the statement below, a publisher producer admits that they often turn a blind eye to the 
developer’s deception/knowledge hiding because in some cases (particularly at the later 
stages) cancelling the project will result in financial loss. So it makes economic sense for 
the publisher to ignore the ill-doings for the sake of the project and their multi-million 
investment. Matt expounds: 
 
What they do is forgery, now obviously I have to make a call of it [make a 
decision], do I want to cancel the project and lose? Or does the project want to go 
on? (Matt – publisher producer). 
 
 
Here Jing, another publisher producer, also explains that they have learnt from past 
experiences that they might be given wrong figures, dates and numbers, and therefore they 
build some contingencies in their calculations for the project budget and schedules, just to 
protect themselves. He puts it: 
 
Although it’s assumed, it’s not always the case. But the publisher actually set aside 
X million dollars extra for when they are running late, even though no one is saying 
they're running late, and the contract has a fixed schedule but still the publisher 
always tuck away a little bit, so I know I have three more months. The developer 
doesn’t know this but I know this. But this is the general rule of thumb, which is the 
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budget and time required plus twenty per cent give or take (Jing – publisher 
producer). 
 
This publisher’s decision to ignore the developer’s behaviour seems to be purely to secure 
the investment. Other publisher participants in the research believe that by turning a blind 
eye to these activities, they provide the developer with a degree of security, thus 
contributing to their survival. Allan, a high-ranking publisher executive, justifies their 
leniency towards the developer in the following statement: 
 
We are a little bit more lenient on the profit or the shares. At the end of the day, 
they have to have some sense of stability, and I totally understand why they are like 
scratching away at the door, like a wolf trying to keep his family alive. It's their 
livelihoods. They have to have some sense of stability. There has to be some 
tolerance (Allan – publisher executive). 
 
Knowing they might be charged extra later on, the publisher prepares themselves by 
adding a twenty to thirty per cent contingency to their budget in order to help the developer 
and their collaboration work. Leo, another publisher executive, reveals: 
 
Publishers kind of accept the fact that they need to have a contingency built into a 
development budget. Because there's a studio of 120 people, and they need to have 
some contingency. I get it and we want the studio to stay open, so we can finish the 
game. I mean, if the studio goes bust, we spend $10 million and it just disappears 
(Leo – publisher executive).  
 
This developer thinks collusion and knowledge hiding are "the only way forward" for the 
traditional publisher-developer collaboration, while the publisher below also regards these 
methods as "the most common way" to finish the project. Timothy, a publisher senior 
executive, highlights: 
 
I think the developers have become more savvy these days. You need to make profit 
on your man-month rate, so it’s the most common way to cross the project. If I were 
a developer, I would build a profit into my man-month rate and I’ll be more 
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generous in sharing the back end, royalty and the profits. If I can build a fifty per 
cent profit into my man-month rate, well if the project’s twelve months, that means 
I can keep going for another twelve months after that project to make another 
project (Timothy – publisher senior executive). 
 
Laurence, a publisher executive, explains that the publisher-developer conflicts sometimes 
can't be resolved easily and they have to find ways to help the relationship work: 
 
When there is just a breakdown in the relationship that you can no longer correct, 
you just try to bandage things and get the product out to the market. It's like 
someone with a broken leg; you just splint it, wrap a bandage around it. Well, this 
is the best we can do, because at some points, you recognise the distrust is so bad 
that you won't be able to resolve it (Laurence – publisher executive).  
 
Adrian, a developer studio head, adds that they navigate round the problems, rather than 
address those issues: 
 
You have to navigate around problems because you know you can’t solve them. 
When you start to navigate around things, you know that you are not working in an 
ideal collaborative way, you're just trying to move stuff out of the way, so that you 
can get the game into the market. It's not the best style for anyone, but this is how it 
works in this industry” (Adrian – developer studio head). 
 
The data reveal that the publisher often colludes with the developer in hiding knowledge 
and deceiving. Although some publishers complain about these deceptive activities, they 
also think that making a profit on the production budget would help the developer to have 
some stability. For some publishers this is important for its own sake, while for others it 
secures the successful completion of the project, and ultimately contributes to their own 
bottom line. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the data on how the developer and the publisher manage their 
knowledge practices and cross-boundary work. The videogame development was found to 
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be an iterative, unpredictable and risky process that required complex and interdependent 
tasks. I also highlighted the tactics the developer and publisher resorted to in order to 
manage this complex and risky relationship. The analysis included two levels: the first 
level portrayed respondents' superficial and cliché responses to my questions, and the 
second level data represented more detailed and contradictory information that the 
participants revealed after I probed them.  
 
The participants initially emphasised that trust, communication and transparency were 
conducive to a successful collaboration with their partner. However, the data revealed that 
there were high levels of distrust between the parties. This was due to the complex, 
iterative and unpredictable nature of videogame development, the partners' inter-
dependencies, as well as their divergent interests. I discussed that both partners had fears 
that they might be exploited or abused by the other party. I outlined the sources of these 
fears. The high levels of dependencies and novelty, as well as their seemingly uneven 
access to power resources at different stages of their collaboration were found to be the 
sources of both partners’ fears and distrust. The second level data analysis revealed that 
both the publisher and developer used knowledge hiding to pursue their own interests. The 
data also showed that the developer sometimes acted deceptively in order to create stability 
for themselves. However, surprisingly the publisher wittingly colluded with the developer 
in their deceptive activities in order to secure their investment and also make the 
relationship work.  
 
On the surface, the relationship had high levels of distrust, but both parties combined and 
coordinated together in knowledge hiding and deception in order to maintain a functional 
relationship. Given the dependencies and the ambiguities of videogame development, the 
data revealed that the publisher and developer have learnt how to navigate round the 
problems, tension and the distrust between them. So rather than address their conflicts, 
they have worked out that through knowledge hiding, deception and collusion they can 
manage their complicated cross-boundary work.  
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Chapter Eight: Discussion  
 
This research aimed to examine knowledge processes across organisational boundaries in 
the videogame industry, where the companies had to face the challenges of innovation and 
deal with the conflicts resulting from their discrepancies and dependencies. In order to do 
this, I focused on the role of boundary objects, trust and power dynamics in knowledge 
processes. This was to understand how these factors influenced the processes of knowledge 
formation, sharing and integration, and as a result facilitated collaboration across 
boundaries. 
 
In this chapter I proceed to discuss and analyse the findings presented previously. This is 
organised into three consecutive sections each addressing one of my research questions. 
Section 8.1 discusses how boundary objects facilitate or obstruct knowledge processes and 
collaboration in the publisher-developer relationship, also describing how these objects 
evolve over the course of a project. Section 8.2 elaborates on the role of power relations in 
facilitating knowledge processes and collaboration. This is followed by section 8.3 that 
examines the role of trust and knowledge sharing in the publisher-developer work context. 
I finally conclude this chapter with a short summary that links all the findings and 
addresses the three research questions.  
 
8.1. The Shifting and Relational Role of Boundary Objects 
This research studied the role of boundary objects, aiming to understand how these objects 
facilitated collaboration across organisational boundaries in the context of videogame 
development. The study identified two types of boundary objects that had a critical role in 
managing knowledge and collaboration in the publisher-developer relationship: (1) static 
boundary objects and (2) dynamic boundary objects (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). The study 
shows that the effectiveness of these boundary objects did not remain the same during the 
course of the project, but changed and evolved as the development progressed. Although 
these boundary objects were found to have a shifting role – ranging from effective to 
obstructive – I argue that a combination of both static and dynamic boundary objects were 
conducive to effective cross-boundary work between organisations. In addition to 
highlighting their obstructive and dynamic roles, the analysis reveals the relational and 
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social dimensions of boundary objects. The study provides insights into these dimensions 
by discussing how boundary objects were embedded in social practices and power 
relations, and stressing the critical role of brokers in mobilising boundary objects and 
facilitating knowledge integration across organisational boundaries (for the role of brokers 
see section 5.3). In the following three sections, I elaborate on the two types of boundary 
objects – static and dynamic – and explain the three different dimensions I have identified 
for these objects: (1) obstructive; (2) dynamic and enabling; (3) relational and social.   
 
8.1.1. Evolving Role and Effectiveness of Static Boundary Objects 
Contrary to what the literature suggests in chapter two, this research finds static boundary 
objects useful in facilitating the complex and political collaboration between the publisher 
and the developer at the earlier stages of development. The literature argues that static 
boundary objects are difficult to adapt for specialised use in different boundaries, due to 
their rigidly structured nature (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Carlile, 2002; Cetina, 1997). As a 
result, the scholars suggest that static boundary objects might not facilitate knowledge 
integration and collaboration across boundaries (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Levina & Vaast, 
2006; Vaast & Levina, 2006). Instead, Carlile, (2002, 2004) discusses that these fixed 
boundary objects can be effective in managing collaboration across syntactic boundaries, 
when partners are aware of their differences and dependencies, and the relationship is not 
as complex. Conversely, I found that static boundary objects were useful at the initial 
stages of videogame development, despite the high levels of differences, dependencies and 
novelty in the publisher-developer relationship. This was because using these static 
boundary objects created a sense of stability, security and predictability, leading to low 
levels of trust and understanding between the partners. As a result, the publisher and 
developer could form a working relationship with each other, regardless of any 
discrepancies and divergent interests. 
 
At the beginning of a project static boundary objects were useful to both parties. In order to 
convince the publisher to invest in multi-million pound projects, the developer had to 
generate strong and clear design and planning documents and yield to contracts that 
included detailed game specifications and planning outlines. The publisher enforced the 
use of contracts, design documents and milestone schedules because these static and fixed 
boundary objects created a sense of stability and predictability for the project. In return for 
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their hefty investments, the publisher could use these static boundary objects to hold the 
developer accountable for the effective delivery of the game, and reduce their investment 
risks.  
 
Although static boundary objects were useful at the outset of projects, to establish the 
relationship, the study revealed that the effectiveness of these objects gradually diminished 
as a project progressed, and their role transitioned from being productive to becoming 
obstructive to working relationships. Whilst the literature suggests that boundary objects 
can sometimes trigger conflicts and clashes when they are not used in the appropriate 
context (Barrett & Oborn, 2010; Carlile, 2002, 2004), these existing studies fail to 
elaborate on how boundary objects can obstruct, nor do they provide an explanation for 
how boundary objects evolve during the course of a project (Nicolini, et al., 2012). 
 
The main reason I have defined some of these boundary objects, such as contracts and 
design documents, as being static is the publisher's and the developer's failure in reviewing 
and updating them during the course of a project. Given the iterative nature of videogame 
development, all design documents and the project plans should evolve as a project 
proceeds. But due to the financial and temporal pressures of production, the study shows 
that these documents were generally not often updated or upgraded by developers. This 
was also true of contracts, which are not inherently static, but in the context of games 
development and in the three networks under investigation in this study, were not usually 
revised or updated by the publisher. The contract, the game specifications and project plans 
agreed and approved by the two partners provided security and trust for the publisher. 
Reviewing and updating the contract sometimes did not align with the publisher's agenda 
or their shareholder's interests. For instance, the game concept and the vision should stay 
unchanged because the publisher's strategy was to deliver a game that accorded with their 
other products they were releasing at the same time, such as a movie. As a result, the 
publisher sometimes challenged the developer's diversion from the initial vision and 
specification of the game. That was the main reason that in most cases the publisher was 
persistent in following the original contract and refused to discuss any changes to the terms 
and conditions of this document. 
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The study shows that over time these static boundary objects disrupted the developer's 
creativity, creating tensions and dissension, thus leading to distrust between partners later 
in the project (see section 5.1). The developer found it difficult to conform to the pre-
determined designs and game specifications, as approved in their design documents and 
contract. They described the inflexibility of these drafts as a hurdle to their creativity, 
while the publisher on the other hand sometimes pressured the developer to commit to the 
agreed vision and design. While this rigidity would ensure some security for the publisher, 
reducing the risks for their investment, the developer viewed this as restricting their 
freedom and creativity. In order to try out new ideas in the game, the developer often 
required either reallocating or extending their resources. This meant revising the contract 
or the project plans, which would often not be welcomed by the publisher, thus leading to 
disagreements and high levels of distrust. These were the reasons why developers were 
typically unwilling to update these boundary objects, and which meant that the objects 
diverged from the work developers were actually doing, with these original documents 
thus potentially inhibiting their ability to adapt their projects and complete projects. 
 
8.1.2. The Evolving Role and Effectiveness of Dynamic Boundary Objects 
I explained in the previous section how static boundary objects transitioned through the 
course of the project from a productive force to an obstructive one in the publisher-
developer relationship. The study revealed that the partners replaced or complemented the 
static objects with dynamic boundary objects in order to address the inadequacies of static 
boundary objects (see section 5.2). This facilitated a more effective knowledge integration 
and collaboration between them. 
 
The literature underlines the open-ended and flexible nature of dynamic boundary objects, 
explaining that these objects can be adapted for use in specialised domains, while 
simultaneously being able to create a common boundary across different functions (Barrett 
& Oborn, 2010; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Knorr Cetina, 1999; McGivern & Dopson, 
2010; Nicolini et al., 2012; Scarbrough et al., 2015). Scholars have highlighted that 
dynamic boundary objects need to be subjected to continuous tailoring in order to be 
effective (Engestrom & Blackler, 2005; Star, 2010), but they have mainly focused on the 
relationship between different boundary objects rather than explaining and displaying the 
dynamic characteristics of these objects; there are relatively few empirical research studies 
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that describe how boundary objects might develop and evolve (Nicolini, et. al., 2012; 
Scarbrough et al., 2015). 
 
In this research, I address the limitations in the literature and highlight the dynamic 
characteristics of a number of boundary objects, explaining the relationship between these 
objects and how their effectiveness increases as projects progress. The game prototype, 
review meetings and iterative project planning methods were the three dynamic boundary 
objects that were identified as having a critical role in facilitating knowledge integration 
and collaboration between the publishers and developers.  
 
The flexible and open-ended nature of dynamic objects allowed them to be open to 
constant review and tailoring, which was compatible with the incremental and iterative 
nature of the videogame development process. In the three networks I studied, the 
development team started with a vision that was gradually reformed and developed. The 
participants reported that this creative process required flexibility and iterations, through 
which the ideas were continuously reviewed, modified and evolved. The study showed that 
static boundary objects – such as pre-defined design books and strict planning, determining 
the timelines and required resources – were not deemed to be appropriate for this process. 
Instead, a set of dynamic boundary objects, such as prototypes, iterative project planning 
and meetings were found to be useful for this creative process.  
 
The study reveals that the relations between dynamic boundary objects had a significant 
role in facilitating knowledge processes. This notion reinforces the relational dimension of 
boundary objects, and it is in line with the recent research emphasising the importance of 
the relations between different objects. This stream of research highlights that the relations, 
not the objects individually, can enable communication and collaboration (Leonardi et al., 
2012; Nicolini et al., 2012; Scarbrough et al., 2015). For example, iterative project 
planning methods facilitated dynamic planning practices, through mechanisms such as 
meetings and the game prototype that were both integral and indispensable parts of this 
method. Project review meetings provided an opportunity to review the project and 
develop a common understanding of current issues. The game prototype also created a 
point of reference and discussion in the meetings and interactions, through which the 
partners could have a better understanding of their dependencies and the development 
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requirements. The prototype complemented the diminishing role of design documents, so 
rather than invest time and resources in updating the design documents as projects evolved, 
the developer put more emphasis on creating a prototype that allowed the partners to have 
a clearer overall view of the game and its requirements. The prototype also helped the 
iterative planning for the game, by creating a less ambiguous panorama of development 
and resources required. At the same time, regular meetings also supported the use of 
prototypes, providing an opportunity for the partners to increase their understanding of the 
prototype.  
 
 
 
       Figure 3. The Evolving Effectiveness of Boundary Objects 
 
One of the most important findings of this research is the shifting role of the boundary 
objects and how both types of these objects – static and dynamic – were effective in 
facilitating the knowledge work at different stages of the project. The data demonstrated 
that static and dynamic objects were interrelated, complementing and mutually 
constitutive, therefore a combination of both contributed to effective knowledge work and 
creating a functional relationship between two organisations. Figure 3 displays how these 
boundary objects changed as the development process and the publisher-developer 
relationship progressed. This challenges Carlile’s idea (2002, 2004), that a single type of 
boundary object is most effective for managing collaboration across each type of 
boundary. While the type of boundary being spanned in videogame development can be 
conceptualised as pragmatic, an evolving combination of static and dynamics boundary 
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objects facilitates collaboration, with the effectiveness of each type of boundary objet 
being shaped by the stage of the collaboration being undertaken. 
 
8.1.3. The Brokers and the Social Dimension of Boundary Objects 
Applying a practice-based view, the study underlines the social and relational dimension of 
boundary objects by revealing the integral role of brokers/producers in managing and 
interpreting the use of these boundary objects in the publisher-developer collaboration (see 
section 5.3). The study reveals that brokers mobilised knowledge processes and created a 
working relationship between the publisher and developer by manipulating the dynamic 
and relational dimensions of boundary objects (Barnett, 2003; Kramer & Wells, 2005; 
Sverrisson, 2001; Swan et al., 2007). 
 
This study highlights that brokers acted as intermediaries between their two companies and 
had the responsibility of translating and interpreting for the two parties when/where 
possible. The analysis confirmed that utilising boundary objects, such as meetings, 
prototypes and flexible planning documents had a key role in enabling the brokers to 
facilitate knowledge integration and collaboration between the two companies. This 
finding reinforces the role of boundary objects as being embedded in social interactions 
and processes, constantly evolving and therefore enabling work across boundaries (Briers 
& Chua, 2001; Engestrom & Blackler, 2005; Huang & Huang, 2011; Koskinen & 
Makinen, 2009; Lee, 2007; Mork et al., 2012; Nicolini, 2011; Orlikowski, 2007; Osterlund 
& Carlile, 2003; Swan et al., 2007; Thompson, 2005). Informed by this view of boundary 
objects as social constructs, I suggest that brokers are required to reinforce the 
effectiveness of boundary objects. From the practical point of view of management, 
dynamic and social boundary objects are integral to the role brokers play in facilitating the 
work across boundaries. 
 
The study stresses the relational dimension of boundary objects, by showing how power 
dynamics – managed by brokers – mobilised boundary objects and facilitated the 
publisher-developer political relationship. While the role of brokers is described by 
scholars as creating mutual understanding, resolving discrepancies and ultimately 
mediating the knowledge flow between the partners (Allen, 1977; Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 
2004; Kramer & Wells, 2005; Levina and Vaast, 2005; Swan et al., 2007), I argue that 
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creating mutual understanding and resolving the differences and discrepancies were 
inadequate practices for facilitating the complicated and political collaboration of the 
publishers and developers. Brokers were aware of the differences and dependencies 
between the publisher and developer and they utilised this knowledge to be selective in 
their knowledge sharing practices. They would share knowledge when and where 
appropriate and also hid knowledge to protect and secure the stakeholders' interests (in 
section 8.3.1., I discuss in detail that the publisher and developer use knowledge hiding as 
a positive practice, to avoid escalating differences and disagreements, allowing their 
collaboration to continue). I would like to highlight that these power dynamics were 
activated and mobilised through the use of dynamic boundary objects. For instance, by 
using dynamic boundary objects, the publisher producer provided the developer with some 
levels of flexibility in their development process. This allowed the developer to be more 
creative and incur some changes to the designs or timelines if needed. The meetings also 
gave the partners the opportunity to engage in conversations with each other, weighing up 
the circumstances and sharing the levels of information that were necessary, without 
risking their interests. 
 
Boundary objects are viewed as being embedded in the "political interplay" of relations 
across boundaries (Kimble, et al., 2010, p.442). The literature also highlights the impact of 
power dynamics on knowledge integration and collaboration through shaping and forming 
boundary objects (Hawkins, et al., 2016; Huvila, 2011). Despite this emphasis on the 
relational and politicised dimensions of boundary objects, the literature does not explain 
how social interactions actually influence the boundary objects and their effectiveness 
(Lainer-Vos, 2013; Zeiss & Groenewegen, 2009). This thesis contributes to this discussion 
by explaining that the brokers were the key factors in manipulating the social and relational 
aspects of boundary objects, creating a functional relationship between the developer and 
publisher. The fluid and vague nature of dynamic boundary objects (Garud et al., 2008) 
accommodated the broker's selective knowledge sharing between the publisher and the 
developer and enabled the broker to secure the partners' interests and reduce the risks. This 
dynamic between the boundary objects and broker highlights the social and relational 
dimension of boundary objects, reinforcing that these objects are embedded in and 
influenced by social and power practices. I discuss the impact of power dynamics on 
boundary objects in the next section.  
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8.2. Power Dynamics and Knowledge Processes 
This research has found that knowledge processes in the publisher-developer collaboration 
were politicised. In contrast to the literature that emphasises the negative role of power 
relations, perceiving them as obstructing communication and knowledge integration, this 
study emphasises the productive force of power dynamics in mobilising knowledge 
integration. The analysis showed that power relations facilitated knowledge processes and 
created a functional relationship between two seemingly divergent and competing 
organisations.  
 
8.2.1. The Publisher-Developer's Political Relationship 
The research revealed that the publisher-developer relations were highly political, 
dominated by an "us and them" and "blame" culture. Through mechanisms of discursive 
positioning, both parties highlighted their differences and dependencies, insisting that they 
were two separate and incompatible entities. They emphasised that they were involved in 
an asymmetrical collaboration with irreconcilable differences and divergent interests. 
Many scholars have underlined that boundaries cannot be viewed as power-neutral 
(Carlile, 2002; Huvila, 2011; Kimble et al., 2010). While they interpret discursive 
positioning of partners as a method to constitute one's voice and identity (Butler, 1997), 
they add that this can signify the political dimension of a relationship (Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2002). 
 
This analysis revealed that the publisher-developer relationship was laden with conflicts. 
All participants insisted that their discrepancies led to a lack of understanding between the 
parties and this, as a result, hindered their communication and collaboration. They blamed 
the other party for the problems concerned with the project. While viewing the other party 
as being responsible for the disagreements and conflicts, the participants expressed high 
levels of negativity and criticism towards their partners. Thus developers criticised the 
publisher's lack of appreciation and understanding of the creative process, while the 
publisher accused the developer for their lack of knowledge of the financial demands of 
development. According to Butler (1997), the partners' tendency to challenge the 
legitimacy of the other and to demean the other partner by positioning them as less 
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knowledgeable or less credible is also an indication of a politicised relationship. 
 
8.2.2. Power Inequalities Vs. Power Dynamics  
The ubiquitous rhetoric within the industry highlighted the existence of power inequalities 
in the publisher-developer relationship, depicting the publisher as the dominant partner and 
the developer as being much less powerful (see section 6.3). Due to their financial 
investment in the project and their power to terminate the project, the publisher seemed to 
be the partner with more access to power resources. The developer was portrayed as the 
weaker party in the relationship because of their reliance on the publisher's funding to run 
the business, as well as their seeming lack of control over the publisher's decision-making. 
 
However, the findings of the research revealed that power wasn't a resource available to 
only the publisher (see section 6.4). Both partners faced challenges over managing/sharing 
knowledge and showed resistance to each other. This implied that the developer also had 
some leverage during the project, and rather than power inequalities, power dynamics 
dominated the relationship. I elaborate on this further in this section, using Figure 4 below: 
 
 
Figure 4. The Power Dynamics in the Publisher-Developer Relationship 
 
As shown in Figure 4, at the beginning of the project and due to the developer's financial 
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needs and instability, the publisher had more power in the relationship. In order to secure a 
project and funding for their company, the developer was likely to submit entirely to the 
publisher's demands and wishes. This meant that the developer agreed to the publisher's 
decisions in terms of the game specifications, the resources required for the project and the 
timelines. The developer would do this, regardless of their abilities and potentials, in order 
to secure a project and funding. 
 
However, as projects progressed and to the same proportion the publisher's investment 
increased, this power dynamic changed. The analysis revealed that at the later stages of 
production – despite their financial dependencies and instabilities – the developer had more 
leverage in the relationship. This was indicated by (1) the developer's attempts to challenge 
the contract and the publisher's decisions/requests for changes to the game specifications, 
and (2) the publisher's frustration due to their lack of control over the project at the later 
stages of their collaboration. The publisher's payments were completed gradually after the 
developer achieved each milestone. The research showed that when the publisher had 
already invested large sums in the project, the developer felt more in control over the 
relationship (see section 6.4). This was because the developer felt more secure and viewed 
the completion of the project as a priority for the publisher, perceiving them to be 
unwilling to cancel a project at a late stage when significant financial resources have been 
invested. It was at this stage that the developer felt more comfortable to announce the 
changes they had made to the project, or reveal the development problems and delays, thus 
asking the publisher to allocate more resources to the project.  
 
8.2.3. The Foucauldian Perspective on Power/Knowledge 
The Foucauldian perspective has informed this study with three implications, helping me 
develop my understanding of the knowledge processes in the publisher-developer 
relationship. First, this perspective supports the dynamic dimension of power relations. The 
research showed that the partners' positions in the power play did not remain static, but 
changed throughout the development process. In contrast to what the participants 
attempted to describe, their contradictory statements revealed that the publisher's dominant 
position was contested, and the developer also had access to power resources at later stages 
of development. Foucauldian perspective argues that power/knowledge claims are 
dynamic, embedded and constantly contested (Foucault, 1979; Heizmann, 2011; Roberts, 
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2006; Sewell, 2005). Informed by this perspective, the analysis highlighted that social 
relationships and interactions had a critical role in forming knowledge processes and power 
dynamics. Through knowledge processes, such as knowledge hiding processes and 
deceptive practices, the developer challenged and contested the publisher. This empowered 
the developer and gave them some leverage in the relationship. In doing this, the brokers 
and dynamic boundary objects, such as meetings, the iterative planning documents and the 
prototype, facilitated knowledge/power games, and allowed the parties to be able to hide 
some levels of knowledge and share knowledge when it was appropriate. This interplay of 
knowledge, power and resistance formed the dynamic between these two partners and 
facilitated their collaboration (Blackler, 1995; Fox, 2000; Hardy, 1996; Marshall & 
Rollinson, 2004; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). 
 
The second significant implication of a Foucauldian view on the power/knowledge 
dynamic for this research is that it supports the notion that the seemingly weaker party in 
the relationship can also have access to power and knowledge. In other words, 
power/knowledge claims are not regarded as a property only exclusive to the dominant 
(Gergen, 1992; Handy, 1985; Linstead et al., 2009), instead they are seen as dispersed, 
moving between parties. This research showed that power was not a privilege only in the 
publisher's possession, but the relationship consisted of “a network of relations, constantly 
in tension, in activity” (Foucault, 1979, p.26–27). In fact, despite the widespread depiction 
of developers as victims across the industry, it was the developer's wielding of power at 
different stages of the relationship that helped them manage the dynamic between the two.  
 
The third implication of the Foucauldian perspective for this research is the productive role 
of power/knowledge dynamics. The prevalent rhetoric within the industry attempts to 
depict the publisher-developer relationship as collaboration between two separate and 
irreconcilable entities. In contrast to these claims, this research found that the power 
dynamics were a positive and "productive force” that provided all parties with the 
opportunity to enter power relations (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005, p.920). Power dynamics 
ultimately enabled the seemingly unequal partners to create a functional relationship, 
which typically resulted in the development of a completed game. The power dynamics 
and social interactions mobilised knowledge processes. Using knowledge hiding and 
deceptive practices the publisher and developer navigated round the problems, reduced the 
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risks of the project and secured their interests. The brokers and a combination of static and 
dynamic boundary objects facilitated knowledge/power dynamics, thus enabling 
collaboration. 
 
8.3. A Distrustful Relationship 
One of the main and unexpected findings of this research is the high level of distrust in the 
publisher-developer collaboration, as shown in section 7.2. in chapter seven. Although the 
interviewees attempted to depict an idealistic picture where trust, communication and 
transparency led to knowledge sharing and collaboration, their contradictory statements 
revealed that the partners started their relationship with high levels of distrust, and 
maintained this distrustful relationship all throughout the project. I have not discussed the 
concept of distrust in my literature review chapter because this concept emerged as a key 
finding. I reviewed the literature to understand how knowledge processes could be 
facilitated across boundaries. Since scholars highlighted the development of trust as being 
an integral factor in mobilising knowledge processes and collaboration, I concentrated on 
the definition of trust and the trust-knowledge relationship in my literature review chapter. 
However, here in this section of my discussion chapter, I address and develop the concept 
of distrust, as a theme that has emerged from my data analysis. 
 
There is a burgeoning literature on distrust that defines this concept as a lack of trust or 
low trust (McKnight et al., 2004; Saunders, et al., 2014; Saunders & Thornhill, 2004). As 
Rousseau et al. (1998) explain, trust is a “willingness to render oneself vulnerable” to the 
actions of another party (p.395). On the other hand, distrust is viewed as “the expectation 
that others will not act in one’s best interests, even engaging in potentially injurious 
behaviour” (Lewicki et al., 1998, p.439) therefore distrust is viewed as instilling "fear" 
(McKnight et al., 2004, p.37). The data analysis showed that in the publisher-developer 
relationship there was a dominant "us and them" culture, where both partners blamed one 
another for the problems they faced in the project. Giving trust was a risk-laden act for 
these partners – they feared that revealing too much to the other party would jeopardise 
their business and ultimately lead to a substantial financial loss for the company. 
 
The analysis identified three key factors that led to high levels of distrust in the 
relationship, including: (1) the creative and unpredictable nature of the videogame 
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development process, (2) the dependencies of the partners, and (3) divergent interests. The 
creative and iterative development process made systematic planning and predicting for the 
project quite challenging. This was because the development process composed of multiple 
dependent tasks and needed continuous assessment, revision and updating. This resulted in 
high levels of uncertainty in the development process, making it was difficult to predict 
and reduce the risks of the project, especially at the earlier stages of production. The large 
financial investments required for videogame development also added to the uncertainties 
and risk of the production, especially for the publisher who was the sole investor in all 
three networks I studied. In addition to all of this, the divergent interests and the partners’ 
financial dependence complicated the relationship. The developer was highly reliant on the 
publisher’s investment to run their business, but the publisher was also found to be reliant 
on the developer’s performance for the return of their investment. Therefore trusting one 
another was viewed as putting both parties at risk. 
 
Despite the existence of high levels of distrust and negativity, the research recognised that 
there were practices and processes in place in the publisher-developer relationship whose 
purpose was to create stability and trust between the partners. Static and dynamic boundary 
objects were utilised with the aim being to develop structural and social trust, hence 
instigating collaboration. Structural and social trust were found to be mutually constitutive 
in the publisher-developer relationship. Firstly, forms and clearly defined structures, such 
as contracts, design documents and project planning documents (static boundary objects) 
were used at the earlier stages of the development in order to form the relationship and 
potentially develop trust between two seemingly divergent parties. This use of static 
boundary objects can be interpreted as developing structural trust, which is through using 
protective mechanisms, such as forms and standards to develop trust between people 
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dyer & Chu, 2003; McEvily, et al., 2003; Mouzas et al., 2007).  
 
Later in the project the publisher and developer attempted to facilitate knowledge 
integration and collaboration through social trust. The use of social interactions in this 
publisher-developer relationship can be defined as social trust, which is defined as utilising 
social interactions to foster people's confidence in each other’s goodwill and integrity 
(Adler, 2001; Argote et al., 2003; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Lee et al., 
2010; Madhok, 1995; McEvily et al., 2003; Mooradian et al., 2006; Narayandas & Rangan, 
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2004; Newell et al., 2007; Roberts, 2000; van Wijk et al., 2008; Zaheer et al., 1998). In the 
publisher-developer relationship, social interactions, meetings and the producers/brokers 
replaced static boundary objects at later stages of the project. These social practices were 
used to help knowledge integration and effective work across organisational boundaries.  
 
8.3.1. The Trust-Distrust Dynamic and Knowledge Processes 
While recognising the practices and processes that were used to develop structural and 
social trust in the relationship, I argue that these resulted in "an arduous relationship" 
(Szulanski, 1996), a state of essential distrust or illusions of trust and stability. In other 
words, the analysis showed that there was a trust-distrust dynamic in the publisher-
developer collaboration, where partners displayed high level distrust with sufficient trust to 
function as collaborators. In this thesis, I define trust and distrust as mutually constitutive 
in the political relationship between the publisher and developer, highlighting the existence 
of both concepts of trust and distrust at the same time. The relationship was distrustful 
because all throughout the project the partners feared that the other party would jeopardise 
their interests. But in order to enable work across their boundaries, they needed to instil 
some levels of trust between them. That was why they used skilful producers/brokers and a 
combination of static and dynamic boundary objects to facilitate their collaboration. 
Maintaining this, however, was found to be difficult and resulted in low levels of trust. 
 
Some scholars perceive trust and distrust as mutually exclusive concepts at either end of a 
continuum (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). In contrast, I argue that in the 
publisher-developer relationship, high levels of distrust cannot be avoided due to the 
creative and unpredictable nature of the videogame development process, the partners' 
dependencies, and their divergent interests. Similarly, Szulanski (1996) refers to the 
arduous relationship as a barrier for knowledge sharing and collaboration internally 
between the sender and the recipient. In this research, I found that the practices and 
processes were utilised with the hope to overcome this "arduous relationship" and create 
some stability and trust for the relationship to work (Szulanski, 1996). This is in line with a 
stream of research that recognises the existence of a dynamic between trust and distrust, 
supporting the co-existence of trust and distrust (Fox, 1974; Lewicki et al., 1998). These 
scholars state that the constructs of trust and distrust could occur simultaneously on a 
continuum, where a balance can be struck between them (Lewicki et al., 1998; McKnight 
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& Chervany, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Stratling et al., 2011). In support of Lewicki et 
al.'s (1998) discussions, this study also reveals that the publisher and developer created a 
balance or “equilibrium” between positions of trust and distrust in order to form a working 
relationship (p.444). Static and dynamic boundary objects, especially brokers/producers 
had a crucial role in mobilising this trust-distrust dynamic. 
 
In terms of the relationship between distrust and knowledge processes, there is a limited 
understanding of how knowledge is integrated when there are high levels of distrust in a 
highly risky and uncertain work setting. The literature gives a lot of attention to the 
relationship between trust and knowledge sharing (Abrams et al., 2003; Adler, 2001; 
Andrews & Delahaye, 2000; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Dyer & 
Chu, 2003; Holste & Fields, 2010; Jonsson & Kalling, 2007; Ko, 2010; Levin & Cross, 
2004; McEvily et al., 2003; Mooradian et al., 2006; Newell et al., 2007; Yusof & Ismail, 
2010). While trust is considered as supporting knowledge sharing practices (Bijlsma & 
Koopman, 2003), distrust is viewed as counterproductive and having a negative impact on 
social interactions and integration (Bies and Tripp, 1996; Holten et al., 2016). 
 
The analysis reveals that sharing knowledge had the potential to put the partners at risk and 
in a vulnerable position in the publisher-developer relationship, (Clegg, 1989; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1998; McEvily et al., 2003; Mooradian et al., 2006; Szulanski, 1996). For 
instance, the developer was found to be reluctant to share knowledge with the publisher 
producer when a project was behind schedule, or over budget. This was due to concerns 
about how the publisher producer would respond or whether the publisher would terminate 
the project because of these problems. That was why the partners were found to be 
reluctant to share knowledge incautiously, and instead were selective in their knowledge 
sharing practices. This meant that they shared knowledge when it was appropriate and 
when they perceived it as unthreatening to their project. In contrast to this finding, the 
literature recognises trust as a key factor in facilitating knowledge sharing, innovation and 
cross-boundary collaborations (Abrams et al., 2003; Levin & Cross, 2004; Nandhakumar, 
1999; Newell & Swan, 2000; Newell et al., 2007; Palmatier et al., 2007; Poppo et al., 
2008; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Yusof & Ismail, 2010). Scholars believe that 
development of trust mitigates the perceptions of risk, thus encouraging knowledge sharing 
(Das & Teng, 2001; Luhmann, 1988; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Quigley et al., 2007; 
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Rodriguez & Wilson, 2002). Conversely, I argue that the risk of the project was high, the 
trust was low (the level of distrust was high), but the partners still shared knowledge and 
completed their project. However these partners shared knowledge selectively and 
cautiously in order to secure their interests and maintain a working relationship. I elaborate 
on the knowledge processes and practices they used in the next section. 
 
8.3.2. Knowledge Hiding, Deception and Collusion 
While the literature stresses the complexity of collaboration and knowledge integration 
across boundaries (Tschang, 2007; Scarbrough et al., 2015; Scott 2003; Tschang & 
Szczypula, 2006; Zackariasson, et al., 2006), it proposes that management’s main focus 
should be on overcoming the differences and creating mutual understanding between 
individuals, teams or groups working together (Bechky, 2003b; Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; 
Carlile, 2004; Cook & Brown, 2000; Dougherty, 1992; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; 
Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Mork et al., 2012; Nonaka, 1994; Tsoukas, 2009). These 
scholars suggest that management should use extensive dialogue and negotiation to 
identify, elaborate, and then confront their differences and conflicts (see section 2.2.2). By 
doing this, they can create common understanding between different parties, so that 
knowledge integration and collaboration can be facilitated (Majchrzak, et al., 2012). 
 
Similarly, Carlile (2002, 2004) recommends creating mutual understanding and resolving 
the negative consequences to facilitate the collaboration between divergent partners. In his 
Integrated Framework, he suggests negotiation and knowledge transformation to achieve 
shared meaning and to deal with challenges in the relationship. However, at the same time, 
he emphasises that the level of differences, dependencies and novelty between individuals, 
teams and functions involved lead to different types of boundaries and challenges to 
collaboration. As a result of this, he proposes using distinct knowledge practices and 
strategies to facilitate collaboration and knowledge integration for different types of 
boundaries, depending on the level of complexity in the relationship. Carlile's argument 
highlights the importance of the context and the boundary, suggesting that the level of 
complexity, differences, dependencies and novelty specifies the strategies to manage 
knowledge and encourage collaboration.  
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In contrast to this literature, the analysis shows that addressing the differences, creating 
mutual understanding and using extensive dialogues were impractical and ineffective 
practices in the publisher-developer collaboration. While both publishers and developers 
maintained an arm's-length, low trust relationship, they ignored their problems and 
disagreements in order to be able to continue working together. This finding is in line with 
the small stream of research that showed how dialogic practices were ineffective in 
creating a collaborative work environment between distinct disciplines, especially when 
the relationship was temporary (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Dammann & Kieser, 2010; 
Dougherty, 1992; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Kellogg et al., 2006; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; 
Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Schmickl & Kieser, 2008; Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 
2005). Given the complex, ambiguous and high-risk nature of videogame development, as 
well as the discrepancies and dependencies between the publisher and developer, the 
partners refused to address their problems, tension and distrust, but navigated round these 
issues to create stability and secure their interests. This was because engaging in extensive 
dialogue seemed to expose differences and conflicts, thus potentially creating more 
challenges and disagreements between the parties involved (Dammann & Kieser, 2010; 
Dougherty, 1992; Edmondson & Nembhard, 2009; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Nembhard 
& Edmondson, 2006; Schmickl & Kieser, 2008; Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). 
 
Despite high levels of risk and distrust in the publisher-developer relationship, the partners 
created and maintained a functional cross-boundary working relationship. They facilitated 
knowledge integration and collaboration through practices such as knowledge hiding, 
deception and collusion (see sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 in chapter seven). Rather than 
discussing pertinent issues, both partners hid some levels of information at different stages 
of the project in order to prevent clashes, reduce the risks of the project, protect themselves 
and ultimately pursue their financial interests. For example, although the developer was 
aware of inadequate resources for the project, they typically hid this information and faked 
documents until the later stages of the production, because the publisher could potentially 
terminate the project if they had known the existing issues. Through withholding 
knowledge and not providing enough transparency, the developer gained control over the 
project and secured themselves financially until further stages of the project. The research 
also identified that the publisher colluded with the developer in knowledge hiding and 
deception, turning a blind eye to such practices in order to secure their hefty investments 
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and provide the developer with a degree of security, hence securing the completion of the 
project. 
 
Knowledge hiding and knowledge hoarding are the two constructs that have sometimes 
been used interchangeably in the literature in order to refer to the act of not sharing 
knowledge. Connelly et al. (2012), however, distinguish between these two terms, referring 
to knowledge hiding as "an intentional attempt by an individual to withhold or conceal 
knowledge that has been requested by another person" (Connelly et al., 2012, p.65). On the 
other hand, they refer to knowledge hoarding as the act of withholding knowledge that is 
not requested by any specific individual (Webster et al., 2008). The existing studies on 
knowledge hiding have found that employees withhold knowledge to increase their self-
interest (Haas & Park, 2010; Steinel et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2008), or to secure 
themselves from losing power and status (Hislop, 2013). But from the management’s point 
of view this is a negative, dishonest and unethical act that may lead to difficult 
relationships (Szulanski, 1996), or unproductive organisational outcomes (Holten et al., 
2016; Evans et al., 2015; Steinel et al., 2010). As a result of this perspective, organisations 
use methods and strategies to counter and discourage knowledge hiding and instead 
facilitate knowledge sharing between their employees. 
 
I define knowledge hiding as the strategic act of withholding knowledge or information 
that is encouraged by organisations to protect the interests of the company, reduce the risks 
and maintain a functional relationship when they are involved in risky and political cross-
boundary work. This is in contrast to the previous definitions that have solely focused on 
knowledge hiding as a negative and unproductive employee behaviour, counteracted by the 
management and organisational strategies. Although the existing literature has identified 
knowledge hiding as an area that needs further research (Connelly, et al., 2012; Schein, 
2004; Webster et al., 2008), relatively few studies have highlighted knowledge hiding as a 
productive practice (Evans et al., 2015; Haas & Park, 2010). Importantly, the context in 
which knowledge hiding is practised has received scanty research attention (Hansen et al., 
2005; Mors, 2010; Szulanski, 1996, 2000). 
 
As I discussed earlier in this section, the research findings revealed that Carlile's pragmatic 
boundary was not relevant in the context of publisher-developer collaboration. The 
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knowledge processes Carlile (2002, 2004) has suggested to address the challenges in this 
boundary were inadequate to manage the collaboration and knowledge integration. The 
politics of the publisher-developer relationship were more complicated and knowledge 
integration needed practices other than those of knowledge transfer, translation and 
transformation as proposed by Carlile (2002, 2004).  
 
Based on these findings, I add a complementary level to Carlile's Integrated Framework to 
explain work across organisational boundaries (see Figure 5). I propose a political view of 
knowledge and boundaries that revisits the challenges and integration of knowledge 
discussed in the literature. Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) define organisational boundaries 
as being political. Likewise, Edmondson and Nembhard (2009) confirm that conflicts and 
disagreements are the natural outcomes of boundary work across divergent groups, 
especially in novel settings. They argue that “the competing viewpoints that promote 
creative new ideas ... lead naturally to conflicts [and] erode team relationships” (p.124). 
The data analysis highlighted that the complexities, dependencies and unpredictability of 
videogame development created conflicts and disagreements in the publisher-developer 
relationship. Under these circumstances, the participants found communication and 
dialogue exposing their conflicts and putting both parties at risk (Dammann & Kieser, 
2010; Dougherty, 1992; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Schmickl & Kieser, 2008; Van der 
Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). This influenced the willingness of the partners to share and 
negotiate knowledge. The data analysis revealed that both parties were involved in a power 
game, through which their positions of power changed during the project. Informed by 
these findings, I suggest a political approach to managing boundaries and knowledge when 
extreme conditions of difference, dependency and novelty are all present. This approach is 
concerned with the role power and power games play in creating effective knowledge 
integration and collaboration across boundaries. 
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Figure 5. Revised Framework for Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries 
 
The political approach to knowledge management highlights that the cross-boundary 
challenge is not just that maintaining transparency and communication is difficult. This 
approach suggests that managing cross-boundary work requires significant political efforts 
and power games (Orlikowski, 2002). Therefore, rather than communication and 
knowledge sharing, partners choose to resort to opportunistic practices, such as knowledge 
hiding, deception and collusion when necessary. Through these practices these partners can 
secure their interests and reduce the risks of their collaboration. In addition to what Carlile 
(2002, 2004) explains in his framework, not only do the partners represent, learn, negotiate 
and alter knowledge, they also hide knowledge and create fake knowledge (when it is 
necessary) to manage their collaboration and knowledge integration. A Foucauldian 
perspective confirms this relationship between knowledge and power, highlighting that the 
nature of power/knowledge is contested and politicised (Foucault, 1979; Heizmann, 2011; 
Roberts, 2006; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). In line with this discussion, the data analysis 
revealed that knowledge practices in the political setting of the publisher-developer 
relationship were influenced and mobilised by power dynamics and power games (section 
8.3.3). 
 
This political framing of knowledge outlines that knowledge integration in a political 
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boundary is not simply a question of establishing mutual understanding and shared 
interests, as some studies suggest (Carlile, 2004; Inkpen & Tsand, 2005). I argue that the 
partners involved in a political boundary refuse to address their differences and conflicts. 
The data analysis showed that these partners navigate round the problems, or sometimes 
turn a blind eye in order to create a working relationship with their partner. Carlile (2002, 
2004) examines cross-boundary work in an intra-organisational context, where the level of 
differences, dependencies and novelty is expected to be much lower than an inter-
organisational context that might offer extreme challenges, divergent interests and high 
levels of dependencies. This might explain why knowledge transformation and negotiation 
as suggested by Carlile (2002, 2004) were found to be inadequate to facilitate the 
publisher-developer relationship. While Carlile's framework highlights the significance of 
context, it simultaneously proves to be insufficient to explain the conflicting and political 
work across organisational boundaries. Therefore, by adding a complementary level to 
Carlile’s Integrated framework, this study contributes to the literature, explaining how 
knowledge can be integrated across organisational boundaries where partners might 
experience extreme challenges and competing interests. I highlight that when the partners 
engage in a distrustful and political relationship, opportunistic practices such as knowledge 
hiding, deception and collusion facilitate selective knowledge sharing, thus enabling 
knowledge integration and collaboration. 
 
One of the most significant findings of this research is recognising the productive and 
positive dimension of knowledge hiding, deception and collusion in facilitating knowledge 
integration and collaboration. Through these opportunistic practices the partners could 
protect their interests in a highly political and distrustful collaboration, thus completing the 
project regardless of their conflicts and differences. Although the relationship had high 
levels of distrust, both parties combined and coordinated together in knowledge hiding and 
deception in order to maintain a functional relationship. This means that, due to the 
political nature of their relationship, the partners weighed up whether knowledge sharing 
would risk their interests and they cautiously used opportunistic practices in order to share 
and hide knowledge where and when it was appropriate in the project (Haas & Park, 2010).  
 
This discussion is in line with the studies that introduce knowledge hiding as bringing 
positive outcomes (Connelly et al., 2012; Evans et al., 2015; Saxe, 1991; Takala & 
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Urpilainen, 1999). In the context of the publisher-developer collaboration, while 
knowledge sharing and transparency could put the project and collaboration at risk, 
knowledge hiding, deception and collusion put both partners on a level playing field, 
empowered the partners and secured their partnership. Through these practices, the 
developer – who was seemingly the weaker partner, with minimum resources and less 
negotiation power – could protect themselves and secure the project. These practices 
helped them gain more control and increase their bargaining power in the relationship, thus 
assisting them in creating a working relationship (Evans et al., 2015). According to the 
publisher, this might not have benefited them temporarily, but might result in more 
stability for the development studios and the industry. The analysis revealed that 
knowledge hiding, deception and collusion were considered as common practices and 
labelled as "the only way forward" for the distrustful and political relationship between the 
publisher and developer – that is characterised by high levels of differences, dependencies 
and novelty in the industry.   
 
8.4. Conclusion 
I presented and discussed the findings of my study in this chapter, addressing the three 
research questions that were initially posed to understand how knowledge is integrated 
across organisational boundaries when there are high levels of differences, dependencies 
and novelty. I examined the role of boundary objects, power relations and trust in 
facilitating knowledge processes and collaboration in the publisher-developer relationship. 
The analysis highlighted the political and conflicting nature of the publisher-developer 
collaboration, adding that the creativity and unpredictability of the videogame 
development process, the dependencies of the partners, and their divergent interests 
resulted in a highly distrustful relationship, where partners felt at risk and fearful that the 
other party might jeopardise their interests. However the study revealed that despite the 
high levels of distrust, these two partners created a functional relationship and completed 
their projects. This was achieved through certain tactics and strategies: 
 
1. A combination of static and dynamic boundary objects, accompanied by a 
mediating role of brokers, mobilised knowledge and power dynamics. This 
finding highlighted the shifting role of boundary objects ranging from 
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obstructive to dynamic, and the relational and social dimension of boundary 
objects. 
2. Power relations were found to be dynamic and moving between partners, rather 
than being the possession of one party, hence their enabling and productive role 
in facilitating knowledge processes and collaboration. 
3. In this distrustful relationship, knowledge hiding, deception and collusion were 
found to empower the partners and secure their interests. This helped them to 
share knowledge selectively and cautiously when it did not put the project or 
their interests at risk. 
 
In the next chapter, I outline how these findings contribute to theory and practice. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter I start with a summary of the thesis, highlighting the steps I have taken 
to complete this research (section 9.1.). Next I explain the gaps I have addressed and 
present my thesis contributions (section 9.2.). Then, I reflect on the limitations of my 
research and provide some suggestions for future research (section 9.3.). I finalise this 
thesis with some concluding remarks.   
 
9.1. Thesis Summary  
I started the research by reviewing the existing literature, and identified three key factors 
that seemed to facilitate knowledge processes in cross-boundary work, including boundary 
objects, trust and power (chapter two). This review also revealed that there were areas in 
the extant research in which knowledge was limited. Therefore further study was required 
to explain how these factors influenced knowledge processes across organisational 
boundaries (see section 2.4. for more details). Once I identified the limitations of extant 
literature, I formed three research questions that each addressed one of these factors 
consecutively, including boundary objects, trust and power (as detailed in section 2.5.). 
These research questions became a basis for my three data analysis chapters, each of which 
interrogated one of the questions in light of the data. 
 
In chapter five, I addressed the first research question and explained how boundary objects 
facilitated/hindered knowledge processes in the publisher-developer collaboration (chapter 
5). First I identified the shifting role of boundary objects during the course of a project. I 
argued that while static boundary objects could be obstructive at later stages of the project, 
they were essential in forming relationships between two divergent organisations, because 
they created an illusion of stability, trust and security. Facing the inadequacies of static 
boundary objects, these companies used dynamic boundary objects to reconcile the 
challenges, complexities and ambiguities of the co-production and relationship. Therefore, 
a combination of both static and dynamic boundary objects was required to facilitate the 
complex collaboration of developers and publishers. The thesis also recognised the 
relational dimension of boundary objects by revealing the critical role of brokers in 
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manipulating and mobilising boundary objects in order to pursue the company goals and 
interests, while facilitating work across organisational boundaries (chapter 8, section 8.1). 
 
In chapter six, I addressed the second research question and provided an account of the 
interview data that elucidated power dynamics and their impact on knowledge integration 
in the publisher-developer collaboration. Rather than power inequalities, this thesis 
recognised power dynamics between the parties. Contrary to the dominant rhetoric in the 
industry, both companies had access to power resources at different stages of the 
collaboration. Informed by a Foucauldian/relational perspective, I argued that the nature of 
power/knowledge is contested and politicised. The parties used opportunistic practices, 
such as knowledge hiding, deception and collusion to contest knowledge and power. The 
thesis demonstrated that the seemingly weaker party had more power at later stages of 
development process. While confirming power games between the actors, the thesis 
stresses the productive and positive aspect of these power games and practices, showing 
that in a complex relationship where the parties have discrepancies and competition, these 
practices mobilise knowledge integration and collaboration (section 8.2.). 
 
Chapter seven used the interview data to address the third research question that examines 
the role of trust in the publisher-developer relationship. Despite the significant emphasis on 
the trust-knowledge relationship, the literature fails to explain how trust can be developed 
in highly risky and unpredictable relationships, where knowledge sharing can be viewed as 
a risk-taking act that might leave partners vulnerable to each other (Mooradian et al., 2006; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). In this thesis, I showed that there were high levels of distrust in the 
political collaboration between developers and publishers. However, I argued that despite 
the distrustful relationship, the parties managed to create a working relationship by 
resorting to opportunistic practices, such as knowledge hiding, deception and collusion. In 
this section, I added a complementary level to Carlile's Integrated Framework that I believe 
contributes to the theory. This complementary level explains knowledge processes in 
highly politicised and complex relationships, where there are high levels of differences, 
dependencies and novelty between the two parties (for more detailed discussions see 
section 8.3.2). 
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In chapter eight, I developed my discussions and further described that understanding the 
power dynamics in the publisher-developer relationship is the pre-requisite to explain how 
knowledge is managed across organisational boundaries during the course of a project. The 
research reveals that these two companies have epistemic and social differences, and this 
coupled with the challenges of innovation processes, such as complexity, inter-dependency 
and unpredictability make the work across these organisational boundaries highly complex, 
distrustful and political. While the research highlights the political/distrustful aspect of the 
relationship, it recognises the positive aspect of power dynamics in this relationship by 
applying a relational/Foucauldian perspective (Mintzberg, 1983; Swan & Scarbrough, 
2005). This perspective helps to explain the enabling role of power dynamics in shaping 
the relationship between two parties. Through these power dynamics, the partners manage 
to create a working relationship for the duration of the project.  
 
9.2. Thesis Contributions  
My thesis makes four contributions to the study of knowledge processes across 
organisational boundaries. Effectively managing work across diverse boundaries, such as 
organisational, functional, etc., matters because organisations with high levels of 
innovation and competition are dependent on the knowledge that diverse individuals, teams 
and groups bring to a collaboration. However, managing the collaboration between diverse 
domains and maintaining fluid knowledge processes across these is complex. While 
scholars working in the field advocate the use of different methods and strategies to 
facilitate the work across different boundaries, there were areas in the research that 
required further study and explanation. My thesis addresses these gaps in the knowledge 
and makes four main contributions to the theory as below. 
 
The first contribution is to the literature on boundary objects. The thesis identifies the 
shifting and relational role of these objects, and explains how boundary objects facilitated 
and hindered knowledge processes during the course of a project in the publisher-
developer cross-boundary work. Whilst the literature highlights the critical role of 
boundary objects in facilitating work across boundaries, and recognises the dynamic and 
multi-dimensional aspect of boundary objects, it also suggests that there is limited 
understanding of how these objects evolve during the course of a project (Nicolini, 2011; 
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Nicolini et al., 2012; Scarbrough et al., 2015; Star, 2010). The current studies also 
recommend that further research is required to address the impact of social processes and 
interactions on the effectiveness of boundary objects and knowledge processes (Lainer-
Vos, 2013; Zeiss & Groenewegen, 2009).  
 
This thesis addresses these limitations in the boundary object literature and makes a 
contribution by firstly identifying boundary objects as evolving during the course of a 
videogame development project. I argue that while static boundary objects can be 
obstructive at later stages of the project, at the outset they are essential in forming 
relationships between two divergent organisations, because they create a degree of 
stability, trust and security. Facing the inadequacies of static boundary objects and their 
obstructive impact on collaboration at the later stages of the project, these companies used 
dynamic boundary objects to reconcile the challenges, complexities and ambiguities of 
their creative co-production. Therefore, a combination of static and boundary objects was 
required to facilitate the complicated and political relationship between the publisher and 
developer. My second contribution to the study of boundary objects is recognising the 
politicised and relational dimension of boundary objects. I do this by revealing the vital 
role of brokers in manipulating and mobilising boundary objects in order to pursue the 
company goals and interests, while facilitating work across organisational boundaries. 
 
Thirdly, I make a contribution to the body of knowledge that links trust and knowledge 
integration, showing that companies still formed and shared knowledge, and worked 
together, despite high levels of distrust between them. This is in contrast to the existing 
literature that sees the development of trust as a key factor in facilitating knowledge and 
cross-boundary work (Adler, 2001; Argote et al., 2003; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Jonsson & 
Kalling, 2007; Narayandas & Rangan, 2004; Newell et al., 2007; van Wijk et al., 2008). 
Although the scholars stress that development of trust in highly risky and uncertain work 
environments can be difficult and complicated (Currall & Inkpen, 2006; Hislop, 2013; 
Janowics-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; Mooradian et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998) 
the literature fails to explain how knowledge can be integrated in these settings. Due to the 
complexities, dependencies and uncertainties of the publisher-developer relationship, trust 
and knowledge sharing were observed as risk-taking acts that could jeopardise both 
partners' businesses. However, the parties involved in the relationship resorted to 
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opportunistic practices in order to create illusions of trust and stability and thus to maintain 
a working relationship. The thesis showcases a trust-distrust dynamic, where on the 
contrary to what the literature offers, trust and distrust are not mutually exclusive. 
 
As a result of this finding, I add a complementary level to Carlile's Integrated Framework, 
explaining knowledge processes across organisational boundaries. My intention here is not 
to criticise Carlile's framework, but to show that where there are high levels of differences, 
dependencies and novelty, knowledge sharing, knowledge translation and transformation 
do not seem to be adequate practices to reconcile the complexities and challenges of the 
relationship. In these circumstances, actors resort to practices such as knowledge hiding, 
deception and collusion to facilitate knowledge integration and maintain a functional 
collaboration. Carlile (2002, 2004) highlights the importance of context in defining the 
strategies and methods to facilitate knowledge sharing, adding that depending on the level 
of novelty, differences and dependencies between the partners, knowledge processes 
require different mechanisms and methods to be managed. However, he elaborates the 
challenges and strategies for knowledge integration in an intra-organisational setting and 
the literature does not address inter-organisational settings, where the relationship is 
expected to be political and more complex. My thesis addresses this limitation, by adding a 
level to Carlile's framework and explaining how knowledge is managed in these extreme 
contexts. 
 
Finally, my thesis contributes to the theory that has called for empirical research to look at 
the role of power in knowledge processes, explaining how knowledge is integrated in 
political contexts (Karreman, 2010; Kimble et al., 2010; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Carlile, 2002, 
2004; Christensen et al., 2000; McGivern & Dopson, 2010; Oborn & Dawson, 2010). I 
draw upon a Foucauldian perspective on power and knowledge and argue that power is a 
productive force accessible to both partners in the relationship and the power games 
between these partners shaped knowledge processes. The contribution of this thesis is 
recognising power dynamics as a positive force that influenced boundary objects, trust and 
knowledge processes, thus brought positive outcomes and created a working relationship 
between the publishers and developers. 
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The contribution of this thesis to practice is the awareness it gives to managers about the 
sophisticated processes and practices in place to manage knowledge across publisher-
developer boundaries. The dynamic, social and shifting role of boundary objects brings to 
the attention the transient dimension of some objects, hence this cautions managers about 
the resources they allocate to develop and maintain some of these objects, and that they 
might not be effective during all stages of the project. The thesis also values the role of 
dynamic boundary objects and employing hybrid brokers (producers) who are skilled and 
experienced individuals aware of both parties interests and internal politics. Being ignorant 
in these areas might lead to great financial loss and failures in work across boundaries.   
 
9.3. Thesis Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
One of the limitations of the study can be connected to my methodological design. 
Although the research was informed by the existing literature, the aim of the research was 
exploratory and I adopted an inductive approach to the research, which resulted in 
generating theories and contributing to the existing literature on knowledge processes 
across organisational boundaries. The convenience sample and not having many female 
participants in this sample can be other issues critics might point to in my methodological 
design. As elaborated in section 4.3.1., I faced lots of difficulties in gaining access and the 
selection of my participants. I am aware of the limitations of my methodology and 
recognise that my findings cannot be generalised. I confirm that the thesis provides an 
initial map to guide future research efforts to explore knowledge processes in much more 
detail, using a larger sample. As a result, I suggest applying alternative methodological 
perspectives for further research. This will provide an opportunity to examine the findings 
and will result in additional insights. 
 
Developing an understanding of knowledge-power dynamic can be hard to achieve 
because the researcher needs to capture practices and interactions, and this can be one 
reason why the empirical research on power-knowledge relations is sparse in the extant 
literature. This thesis identifies the impact of power on knowledge processes and explains 
the dynamic between the two, through an in-depth analysis of participants' detailed 
accounts in three networks of publisher-developer collaborations. In order to increase the 
credibility of my discussions, I used cross-checking within and between these networks. I 
also validated my findings by asking some of the participants to read and comment on my 
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work. However, I suggest that further research might benefit from other methods, such as 
observation or participant observation in order to examine knowledge-power dynamics. As 
stated in chapter four, due to the sensitivity of the subject and the highly risky technology 
the companies were working with, gaining and maintaining access was a barrier to my 
research, and as a result, this limited my options in methods I could implement for my 
research. Perhaps, in future research, this problem can be overcome and therefore, the 
researcher can have a closer look at the power-knowledge dynamics by in-depth research 
methods, such as ethnography or non-participant observation. 
 
This thesis focused on inter-organisational politics and interactions to understand how 
knowledge is integrated across organisational boundaries and how boundary objects, trust 
and power dynamics contributed to knowledge integration within these settings. One 
limitation of my empirical research has been our little understanding of these cross-
disciplinary practices and interactions within the development studios. As noted in the 
study, development studios are made up of different teams and disciplines and this 
suggests a need for further research to bring into sharper focus the internal practices to 
examine (1) how boundary objects are utilised to facilitate knowledge sharing within the 
studios between different individuals/teams (2) how boundary objects evolve through the 
course of the project in this setting (3) how trust/distrust facilitate or hinder knowledge 
integration (4) how power dynamics impact knowledge integration in this process. 
 
The relational view of knowledge and power has important implications for further 
research in this area. This thesis highlighted the social and contested nature of knowledge 
and confirmed that cross-boundary work requires specific practices and processes to 
manage knowledge that varies from context to another context. This is underlined by 
Carlile (2002, 2004) and a recent work by Lainer-Vos (2013) on the role of boundary 
objects in facilitating collaborations. This thesis offers an account that is limited to only the 
traditional publisher-developer collaboration in the UK videogames industry intended to 
produce AAA games that require large investments from the publisher and hence the risky 
and sensitive state of the relationship. Based on these insights it would be useful to look at 
other inter-organisational joint ventures within the UK videogames industry that employ 
different business models, such as less risky publisher-developer collaborations, in which 
the publisher invests a small amount compared to AAA projects and the development 
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studio self-publishes the product. In this context, the relationship is expected to be less 
intense and risky, therefore it is expected that the partners might adhere to less 
opportunistic behaviour in their knowledge practices. 
 
Another area I see as being of particular interest for further and more detailed investigation 
is that of the collaboration between publishers and developers in other geographical 
settings, such as Japanese and German publishers or developers. Future work can bring 
into focus the role of culture in defining cross-boundary work and knowledge integration, 
as it was reinforced by recent work in the literature such as Liao et al. (2012) and Sanz-
Valle et al. (2011). Given some similarities that can be found between the UK based 
collaboration and the other geographical loci, it would be insightful to compare and 
contrast the findings of this research with a study of inter-organisational work where for 
instance a Japanese, Chinese or German company is involved. This could provide valuable 
insight for both theory and practice, investigating the impact of culture on shaping 
knowledge practices and processes. As explained earlier, this study has analysed three 
different cases of the publisher-developer relationship, where all three projects were 
completed successfully. I would also recommend that further study be carried out to 
examine the publisher-developer relationship when the projects fail, forming an interesting 
comparative study with this research.  
 
9.4. Concluding Remarks 
Videogame development is a complex, unpredictable and iterative process that involves a 
series of interdependent, emergent and underspecified tasks and goals. A dominant 
business model in the videogame industry is the publisher-developer relationship that is 
formed based on temporary projects, and videogames are co-produced by the collaboration 
of these two seemingly different and divergent companies. Despite its significance and 
contribution to the industry, this relationship, however, has proven to be challenging and 
conflicting, due to the discrepancies and competition between the two organisations. This 
problem instigated my research and I aimed to explain how two different organisations 
with divergent interests, facing the challenges of innovation, are able to process and 
integrate knowledge whilst collaborating. 
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I studied the collaboration between the publishers and developers in the videogames 
industry, in which they worked on temporary projects, needing large sums of investment, 
big teams and knowledge integration between the parties involved. The thesis showed that 
although the two companies had divergent or competing interests, both benefited from 
completing the project. Therefore, irrespective of their conflicts and challenges, they found 
ways to navigate round their problems. Rather than address their disagreements, they 
resorted to opportunistic practices to facilitate knowledge integration and collaboration. 
There were high levels of distrust between these companies, and they used knowledge 
hiding, deception and collusion to facilitate their collaboration and knowledge integration. 
They shared knowledge selectively and, when it was necessary, they created fake 
knowledge. However, the other party often turned a blind eye to these practices. The study 
revealed that the power games between the two parties were a positive force, mobilising 
and enabling knowledge processes. In other words, power games and opportunistic 
practices enabled the two competing parties to reduce the risks and secure the completion 
of their project. The thesis highlighted that the parties utilised a combination of static and 
dynamic boundary objects, as well as skilled brokers to facilitate their practices and 
processes, and ultimately form and maintain a functional relationship.  
 
The dominant rhetoric within the industry emphasises the power inequalities between the 
publisher and developer, portraying one as an exploiter and the other as a victim. However, 
this research highlights that rather than power inequalities, the relationship is formed and 
mobilised by power dynamics. Thus, rather than eradicate the publisher-developer 
relationship, the thesis suggests that policymakers or the senior management could find 
ways to empower and solidify the relationship within the videogames industry.    
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Appendix A. Industry Proposal 
 
 
Title of the Research:  
Playing the Game: The Study of Knowledge Processes Across 
Organisational Boundaries in the Videogames Industry 
 
Researcher: 
Sara Turner, PhD Student, 
School of Business and Economics 
Loughborough University 
Email: S.Turner@lboro.ac.uk 
Tel: 07850472813 
 
Supervisors:  
Prof. Donald Hislop, D.Hislop@lboro.ac.uk 
Prof. Laurie Cohen, L.Cohen@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Aims and Objectives:  
This study attempts to analyse how knowledge is shared, created and transformed in the 
collaborations between inter- and intra-organisational disciplines and teams in the context 
of a videogame development studio. Since knowledge creation and innovation form the 
basis of collaboration of the industry, understanding knowledge processes in this context 
will shed some light on what impedes and facilitates these collaborations.  As a result, this 
study will address the following questions in the context of the development studio’s 
multidisciplinary collaboration: 
• What are the obstacles to knowledge creation/sharing within a development 
studio? 
• What are the obstacles to knowledge creation/sharing in the developer- publisher 
collaboration? 
• How knowledge is transferred/shared/transformed between disciplines within a 
development studio? 
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• How knowledge is transferred/shared/transformed in the developer-publisher 
collaborations? 
 
Methods:  
This study aims to conduct interviews with the studio directors and senior managers in 
both developers and publishers. This will form an understanding of the dynamic between 
different individuals/teams within development studios, as well as the interactions between 
the publishers and the developers. Each interview will take an hour and it will be either 
recorded or noted, upon the participant’s approval. 
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity:  
The research will be carried out within the ethical framework set out by Loughborough 
University, as well as under the relevant non-disclosure agreement deemed necessary by 
the company/person involved. Confidentiality and anonymity will be taken seriously 
within this research; the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the University’s 
Data Protection Policy will be complied with. The notes/recordings collected from the 
meetings will be encoded or anonymised and they will be kept in a safe and secure place. 
The participants will be assigned pseudonyms or codes and the data will be stored by these 
names or codes in a safe and protected file. The data will all be destroyed after the project 
is finished.  
 
Conclusion: 
This study will have both academic and practical contributions. It will extend the current 
academic literature and develop a conceptual framework, which explains knowledge 
management processes in the type of cross-community collaboration involved in game 
production.   
 
In terms of practical contributions, the study will also provide the senior managers 
involved in these collaborations with: 
 
• Feedback of the most important factors facilitating and inhibiting effective 
collaborations. 
 
This feedback could contribute towards more effective end of project post-mortems, for 
both internal and joint reviews.  
 
 
281 
Appendix B. Interview Questions 
 
Would you please talk about your experience in the videogame industry? 
 
Which label/game did you enjoy making the most or were most proud of? Why 
(organisational/team and creative perspective)? 
 
Being creative is an intrinsic part of game development – how is the creativity of 
developers facilitated and managed? 
• Can you bring some illustrative examples? 
• What challenges exist while trying to manage the creative process? 
 
How are projects managed? (RQ1) 
• What type of software/tools/processes do you use to manage projects? 
• What are the biggest challenges involved in keeping projects to timescale and 
budget? 
• What processes are put in place to manage the publisher relationship? 
 
How do the publishers and developers interact during the concept/production/finaling 
stages of game development (RQ1) 
• Do publishers and developers experience any conflict in the production 
process? 
• How are such conflicts managed and resolved? 
• What causes the dynamic between the pub./dev. to shift? 
• What events trigger this? 
• Failed milestones? 
• Major changes demanded by pub./dev.? 
• Lack of perceived progress / improvement in quality? 
• Subjective judgements on project status? 
• Pressure from other areas of the publisher business? 
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Who is in charge of finalising decisions in the above-mentioned stages of the product 
development? (RQ 2 & 3) 
• What’s the role/contribution of the publisher in the above processes? 
 
How are decisions made in regards to each of the following? Who’s the most influential/ 
least influential in the process? (RQ 2 &3) 
• Underlying tech 
• General engine features 
• Platform-specific features 
• In-game budgets 
• Middleware to use 
• Networking tech 
• Experimental R&D 
• Team structure 
• Hierarchy 
• Creative vision 
• Creative direction 
• Gameplay direction 
• Gameplay innovation 
• Project management 
• Hiring plans 
• Outsourcing requirements 
• Development process 
• Review processes 
• Sign-off authorities 
• Workgroups (scrums) 
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Appendix C. The Coding List 
 
 
The Nature of Publisher-Developer Relationship 
 
 
• Subjective 
• Product Driven 
• Iterative vs. Horizontal 
• Collaborative 
• Adversarial and Complex (Emergent code) 
 
 
How They Manage Their Relationship 
 
 
Boundary Objects (RQ1) 
 
o Static 
§ Contracts 
§ Game Design Documents 
§ Project Plan 
 
o Dynamic 
§ Producer 
§ Milestone 
§ Meetings 
 
o A Combination of Objects (Emergent code) 
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Challenges and Power Inequalities (RQ2) 
 
o Differences 
§ Perception / Lack of Understanding 
§ Objectives 
§ Skill sets 
 
o Developer Dependencies 
o Publisher Dependencies (Emergent code) 
o Decision Making (DM) 
o Communication  
o Power Games (Emergent code) 
o Power Dynamics (Emergent code) 
 
 
Trust & Distrust (RQ3) (Emergent codes) 
 
o Credibility 
o Bias 
o Transparency 
§ Man-Months 
§ Money 
§ Time 
§ Deception 
§ Knowledge Hiding 
 
 
o Knowledge Hiding (Emergent code) 
o Deception (Emergent code) 
o Reaction To Knowledge Hiding & Deception (Emergent code) 
§ Tolerance (Finding ways round it) 
§ Control 
 
